Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of ε -contaminated beliefs

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 207-234

  Lo, Kin Chung ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agreement; C72; D81; Stochastic independence; Strategic games; Contamination

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010864851     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00014-1     Document Type: Article

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