Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy

Journal of the History of Ideas

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 199-219

  Maia Neto, José R ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0010858569     PISSN: 00225037     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3653866     Document Type: Article

References (97)

1. Charles B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1496-1533) and His Critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967) and Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972). Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego, 1980); and The Third Force in 17th Century Philosophy (Leiden, 1992).
2. Charles B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1496-1533) and His Critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967) and Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972). Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego, 1980); and The Third Force in 17th Century Philosophy (Leiden, 1992).
3. Charles B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1496-1533) and His Critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967) and Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972). Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego, 1980); and The Third Force in 17th Century Philosophy (Leiden, 1992).
4. Charles B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1496-1533) and His Critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967) and Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972). Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego, 1980); and The Third Force in 17th Century Philosophy (Leiden, 1992).
5. Charles B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1496-1533) and His Critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967) and Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972). Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego, 1980); and The Third Force in 17th Century Philosophy (Leiden, 1992).
6. Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus (The Hague, 1972), 33-77. A skeptic of the Renaissance who did base his skepticism on Sextus's before the publication of Sextus's works is Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola. See Schmitt (cited above) and Richard H. Popkin, "Prophecy and Scepticism in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 4 (1996), 1-20.
7. Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus (The Hague, 1972), 33-77. A skeptic of the Renaissance who did base his skepticism on Sextus's before the publication of Sextus's works is Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola. See Schmitt (cited above) and Richard H. Popkin, "Prophecy and Scepticism in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 4 (1996), 1-20.
8. L. C. F. Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, tr. Mary Francis McDonald (Washington, D.C., 1964), and Augustine, Against the Academics, tr. Sister Mary Patricia Garvey (Milwaukee, 1957).
9. L. C. F. Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, tr. Mary Francis McDonald (Washington, D.C., 1964), and Augustine, Against the Academics, tr. Sister Mary Patricia Garvey (Milwaukee, 1957).
10. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (hereafter PH), tr. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), I.220-35.
11. Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus (The Hague, 1972), 73-74 e 164.
12. Ibid., 164.
13. Cf. Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 42.
14. "Cela, d'éstablir la mésure de nostre puissance, de connoistre et juger la difficulté des choses, c'est une grande et extrème science, de laquelle ils [the Pyrrhonians] doubtent que l'homme soit capable." Michel de Montaigne, Essais (3 vols.; Paris, 1979), II, 12, 168 (hereafter cited parenthetically by volume, chapter, and page numbers).
15. "Cette assiette de leur jugement, droicte et inflexible ... [that] les achemine à leur Ataraxia" (II, 12, 169). Sextus says that the end of Pyrrhonism is ataraxia (mental tranquility) (PH I.25-30). We do not find this end associated with the Academic skeptics in Cicero's Academica.
16. M. T. Cicero, De Natura Deorum and Academica, tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 475. Ac. for short.
17. "[H]oc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas" (Ac. II.8). Gassendi proposes intellectual integrity against submission to Aristotle's authority, citing this same passage from Cicero in his most skeptical book, the Dissertations en forme de paradoxes contre les Aristoteliciens, tr. Bernard Rochot (Paris, 1959), 59-60.
18. Ac. I.45, II.7, II.68, II.87. Sextus's charges are numerous, for example, PH III.280 and Adversus Mathematicos (M for short), tr. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), VIII.475.
19. "Vaut-il pas mieux demeure en suspens que de s'infrasquer en tant d'erreurs que l'humaine fantasie a procuictes?" (II, 12, 170).
20. I examine this development in José R. Maia Neto, The Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Scepticism and Faith in Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov (Dordrecht, 1995), 1-36.
21. "Car il se peut dire avec toute apparence de raison ... comme parle nostre Sextus, qu'il n'y a point plus d'inconveniens à surmonter ... dans l'Epoche Sceptique, qu'il y en a dans les nombres Pythagoriques, dans les idées Academiques, dans l'Autarquie Peripatetique, etc. ... pour ne rien dire des fondemens de tant de Systemes nouveaux, que nous voyons aujoud'huy si opiniastrement soustenus." F. de La Mothe Le Vayer, "De l'ignorance louable," Dialogues faits à l'imitation des anciens (Paris, 1988), 217.
22. Charron asserts universal equipollence in the following passage: "toutes choses ont deux anses et deux visages, il y a raison par tout, et n'y en a aucune qui n'aye sa contraire." Pierre Charron, De La Sagesse (Paris, 1986), bk. II, chap. 2, 400.
23. "[Le Sage] ne se lie ou oblige à aucune chose, mais se tient libre, universal et ouvert à tout.... C'est la modestie Academique tant requise au Sage par laquelle il est toujours prest et capable de verité et raison quand elle se presente. Cette modestie et retenuë surseance vient du precedent, qui est juger de tous: car examinant universellement toutes choses sans passion, lon trouvera par tout de l'apparence qui arreste et empasche de precipiter son jugement, et donne crainte de s'eschauder." Pierre Charron, "Petit Traicté de Sagesse," De La Sagesse, 838-39.
24. Schoock is best known as the Dutch critic of Descartes associated with Voetius. See René Descartes and Martin Schoock, La Querelle d'Utrecht ed. and tr. Theo Verbeek (Paris, 1988).
25. On Huet's criticism of Descartes, see Germain Malbreil, "Descartes censuré par Huet," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, 18 (1991), 311-28 . For Huet's criticism of Malebranche, see R. H. Popkin, "Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet's Remarks on Malebranche," S. Brown (ed.), Nicholas Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors (Assen, 1991), 10-21.
26. On Huet's criticism of Descartes, see Germain Malbreil, "Descartes censuré par Huet," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, 18 (1991), 311-28 . For Huet's criticism of Malebranche, see R. H. Popkin, "Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet's Remarks on Malebranche," S. Brown (ed.), Nicholas Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors (Assen, 1991), 10-21.
27. The relevance of Foucher's Academic skepticism to the criticism of Descartes and to the development of modern philosophy was first shown by Richard A. Watson, The Downfall of Cartesianism 1673-1712: A Study of Epistemological Issues in Late 17th Century Cartesianism (The Hague, 1966).
28. Rapin's skepticism against Descartes is analyzed by Richard H. Popkin, "The Traditionalism, Modernism and Scepticism of René Rapin," Studi e Recherche di Storia della Filosofia, 63 (1964), 1-16.
29. "We do not deny that some truth exists but deny that it can be perceived" (Ac. II.73).
30. "Qui surpasse de si loin leur capacité." Pierre-Daniel Huet, Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain (Amsterdam, 1723), 173.
31. René Rapin, Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, et sur l'usage qu'on en doit faire pour la religion (Paris, 1676), 83-85.
32. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (2 vols., Cambridge, 1987), I, 459.
33. Some Augustinians such as Biaise Pascal and Pierre Poiret who have a strong position on human corruption attack Cartesian certainty because they find it incompatible not with human nature but with human fallen condition. See José R. Maia Neto and Richard H. Popkin, "Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet's Remarks on Pascal," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 147-60, and Maia Neto, The Christianization of Pyrrhonism (Dordrecht, 1995), 37-64.
34. Some Augustinians such as Biaise Pascal and Pierre Poiret who have a strong position on human corruption attack Cartesian certainty because they find it incompatible not with human nature but with human fallen condition. See José R. Maia Neto and Richard H. Popkin, "Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet's Remarks on Pascal," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 147-60, and Maia Neto, The Christianization of Pyrrhonism (Dordrecht, 1995), 37-64.
35. Rapin, Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 163-65; Martinus Schoock, De Scepticismo (Groning, 1652), 169-73; and Simon Foucher, Nouvelle Dissertation sur la Recherche de la Verité (Paris, 1679), 55. The view that certain knowledge is possible only to God has ancient sources, cf. Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX.72): "Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation." D. Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), IX.72.
36. Rapin, Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 163-65; Martinus Schoock, De Scepticismo (Groning, 1652), 169-73; and Simon Foucher, Nouvelle Dissertation sur la Recherche de la Verité (Paris, 1679), 55. The view that certain knowledge is possible only to God has ancient sources, cf. Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX.72): "Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation." D. Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), IX.72.
37. Rapin, Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 163-65; Martinus Schoock, De Scepticismo (Groning, 1652), 169-73; and Simon Foucher, Nouvelle Dissertation sur la Recherche de la Verité (Paris, 1679), 55. The view that certain knowledge is possible only to God has ancient sources, cf. Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX.72): "Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation." D. Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), IX.72.
38. Rapin, Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 163-65; Martinus Schoock, De Scepticismo (Groning, 1652), 169-73; and Simon Foucher, Nouvelle Dissertation sur la Recherche de la Verité (Paris, 1679), 55. The view that certain knowledge is possible only to God has ancient sources, cf. Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX.72): "Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation." D. Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), IX.72.
39. Rapin, Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 212.
40. Defending the supremacy of the commitment to intellectual integrity, Cicero asks: "Then it is we that are shameless, who do not wish to make a slip, or they presumptuous, who have persuaded themselves that they alone know everything?" (Ac. II.115). The claim that dogmatists lack modesty appears in other passages of the Academica, for example, in II.125-27. It is raised against Descartes by Foucher in almost all of his books, for example, in his Novelle dissertation sur la recherche de la verité (Paris, 1679), 18; by Rapin in his Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 212; and by Huet in the Traité de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain (Paris, 1723), 171-73 and in the Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae (Paris, 1689), 209 and 216.
41. Defending the supremacy of the commitment to intellectual integrity, Cicero asks: "Then it is we that are shameless, who do not wish to make a slip, or they presumptuous, who have persuaded themselves that they alone know everything?" (Ac. II.115). The claim that dogmatists lack modesty appears in other passages of the Academica, for example, in II.125-27. It is raised against Descartes by Foucher in almost all of his books, for example, in his Novelle dissertation sur la recherche de la verité (Paris, 1679), 18; by Rapin in his Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 212; and by Huet in the Traité de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain (Paris, 1723), 171-73 and in the Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae (Paris, 1689), 209 and 216.
42. Defending the supremacy of the commitment to intellectual integrity, Cicero asks: "Then it is we that are shameless, who do not wish to make a slip, or they presumptuous, who have persuaded themselves that they alone know everything?" (Ac. II.115). The claim that dogmatists lack modesty appears in other passages of the Academica, for example, in II.125-27. It is raised against Descartes by Foucher in almost all of his books, for example, in his Novelle dissertation sur la recherche de la verité (Paris, 1679), 18; by Rapin in his Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 212; and by Huet in the Traité de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain (Paris, 1723), 171-73 and in the Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae (Paris, 1689), 209 and 216.
43. Defending the supremacy of the commitment to intellectual integrity, Cicero asks: "Then it is we that are shameless, who do not wish to make a slip, or they presumptuous, who have persuaded themselves that they alone know everything?" (Ac. II.115). The claim that dogmatists lack modesty appears in other passages of the Academica, for example, in II.125-27. It is raised against Descartes by Foucher in almost all of his books, for example, in his Novelle dissertation sur la recherche de la verité (Paris, 1679), 18; by Rapin in his Reflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, 212; and by Huet in the Traité de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain (Paris, 1723), 171-73 and in the Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae (Paris, 1689), 209 and 216.
44. Simon Foucher, Critique of the Search for the Truth, tr. Richard A. Watson (Carbondale Ill., 1995), 17.
45. Cicero also denouces the sectarian spirit of the dogmatists (Ac. II.137). Sectarianism is one of the things censured by Huet in his Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae (Paris, 1689), 209.
46. "Qu'il sçache une fois pour toutes, que si j'ai consenti que ce livre [De la Recherche de la Verité] parût, c'est principalement parce qu'il contient les choses qu'il y condamne comme des enthousiasmes." Nicholas Malebranche, De la Recherche de la Vérité, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis (3 vols., Paris, 1974), II, 494.
47. See Thomas Lennon, The Battle of the Gods and Giants: The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715 (Princeton, 1993), 169-90.
48. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (La Salle, Ill., 1949), 129-31.
49. René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings, tr. J. G. Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (2 vols.,Cambridge, 1985), I, 120.
50. "Il semble que Mr. Descartes ait voulu proposer cette loy, en disant qu'il faut diviser le choses en plusieurs parcelles: a fin de les connoître les unes après les autres & de sçavoir que nous connoissions celles-cy par example, & qu'il nous reste à connoître celles-là" (Apologie, 83).
51. Simon Foucher, Critique of the Search for the Truth, 49.
52. "J'ai renvoyé à quelques Livres de S. Augustin & aux meditations de Monsieur Descartes, pour prouver une chose que est cependant assez receue, & qu'il veut faire croie que j'ai grand tort de supposer ... il devoit se souvernir que tout ce que je demande en rigueur, est que l'on entre seulement en quelque défiance de ses sens, comme j'en ai averti dans le dernier Chapitre des erreurs des sens." Nicholas Malebranche, De la Recherche de la Verité, II, 498.
53. "quelle que soit celle [method] qu'il fait estat d'apporter à la fin de sa Recherche; comme on ne la possed pas encore, on doit prendre tout ce qui la precede pour autant de decisions precipitées qui nous engagent en de nouveaux préjugez dans le lieu mesme où il fait estat de nous délivrer de principales erreurs où nous tombons naturellement." Simon Foucher, Réponse à la critique de la recherche de la verité (Paris, 1676), 9-10.
54. Two kinds of Augustinians are here concerned. Those pessimistic (e.g., some Jansenists) who believe that in the state of corruption even intelligible knowledge is jeopardized and those optimistic (e.g., Malebranche) who believe that the fall compromised only sensory-based information.
55. Gassendi says, probably based on the passage from Diogenes Laertius IX.72 cited above, that "[q]u'on parcoure seulement le Dialogue du Timée, ou sur l'Univers, et l'on verra avec quelle modestie ce divin Philosophe a raisonné sur la nature. J'ajoute que l'on a parfaitement raison de considérer Platon comme le Père de toute l'Académie." Pierre Gassendi, Dissertations en forme de paradoxes contre les Aristoteliciens, tr. Bernard Rochot (Paris, 1959), 492.
56. "Ainsi c'est unmal d'assurer que les richesses temporelles sont des biens, ou que la glorie, les honneurs, les applaudissemens du mond sont des biens. C'est encore un mal d'assurer que le mépris des hommes, la pauvreté & les autre évenemens particuliers de la fortune soient des maux, au lieu que si l'on doute de toutes ces chose, & si on les regarde avec indiffence, autant de fois qu'on le fait, autant de fois on s'acquiert de veritables biens, que consistent en de bonnes dispositions d'esprit." Foucher, Histoire, 33.
57. "C'est n'estoit que par provision qu'ils conduisoient dans le doute & c'estoit seulement pour estre mieux disposé à recevoir la connoissance de la verité." Foucher, Apologie, 153-54.
58. This distinction is partially strategic. In order to make Academic skepticism acceptable, he has to dissociate it from Pyrrhonism, which by this time was seen as an enemy of religion. That the distinction is rhetorical is clear from Foucher's acknowledgment that the difference between Pyrrhonians and Academics is not so strong, for Sextus accepts appearances (Histoire, 177).
59. "Ces principales veritez sont les Premiers que l'on conaît: C'est ce que plusieurs Academiciens ont entrepris de faire voir entre autres.... S. Augustin: de sorte qu'on en sçait assez pour bien vivre; mais non pas assez pour sçavoir sans le Criterium que l'on cherche." Foucher, Apologie, 19.
60. "Quoy qu'il ne les applicasse peut-estre point aux veritez des choses qui sont hors de l'esprit, ne supposent pas que tout ce que nous concevons clairement soit hors de nostre esprit tel que nous le concevons. Il recevoit la foy pour ce qui regarde la conduite de la vie." Foucher, Apologie, 66.
61. "Avouër que l'on ne sçait pas ce qu'on ignore." Foucher, Apologie, 6.
62. "Va plus loin que les Academiciens, mais c'est pour se precipiter en des préjugez." Simon Foucher, Apologie, 113-14.
63. Descartes, The Philosophical Writings, I, 120.
64. "[Descartes] aurait dû considerer avec les Academiciens que le raisonnement qui oblige de rejetter le préjugé des autres apparences sensibles, nous oblige aussi d'en faire le même jugment, à l'égard de tout ce qui nos paroist par les sens. Et cela posé, il faudra ramener M. Descartes à l'Academie, & non pas quitter les Academiciens pour se joindre à M. Descartes." Foucher, Histoire, 113.
65. Richard A. Watson, "Introduction" to Foucher's Critique de la Recherche de la Verité (New York, 1969), xxix-xxx. See also Richard A. Watson, "Foucher's Mistake and Malebranche's Break: Ideas, Intelligible Extension, and the End of Ontology," Stuart Brown (ed.), Nicholas Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors (Assen, 1991), 22-34; Richard H. Popkin, "L'Abbé Foucher et le problème des qualités premières," Bulletin de la Société d'Etude du XVIIe Siècle, 33 (1957), 633-47.
66. Richard A. Watson, "Introduction" to Foucher's Critique de la Recherche de la Verité (New York, 1969), xxix-xxx. See also Richard A. Watson, "Foucher's Mistake and Malebranche's Break: Ideas, Intelligible Extension, and the End of Ontology," Stuart Brown (ed.), Nicholas Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors (Assen, 1991), 22-34; Richard H. Popkin, "L'Abbé Foucher et le problème des qualités premières," Bulletin de la Société d'Etude du XVIIe Siècle, 33 (1957), 633-47.
67. Richard A. Watson, "Introduction" to Foucher's Critique de la Recherche de la Verité (New York, 1969), xxix-xxx. See also Richard A. Watson, "Foucher's Mistake and Malebranche's Break: Ideas, Intelligible Extension, and the End of Ontology," Stuart Brown (ed.), Nicholas Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors (Assen, 1991), 22-34; Richard H. Popkin, "L'Abbé Foucher et le problème des qualités premières," Bulletin de la Société d'Etude du XVIIe Siècle, 33 (1957), 633-47.
68. Richard A. Watson, The Downfall of Cartesianism (1673-1712) (The Hague, 1966), 29-63.
69. I am preparing a paper on Bayle's skepticism in which I develop these two features and add other evidences that Bayle's skepticism is more Academic than Pyrrhonian.
70. Bayle makes this point in the Dictionary, in remark G of "Zeno of Elea" and in remark B of "Pyrrho," where he acknowledges Foucher as his source. Pierre Bayle, The Dictionary of Mr. Peter Bayle (5 vols., New York, 1984), V, 612a and IV, 654a.
71. The Academic method is characterized in remark G of "Chrysippus" and the statement about Bayle's historical method is made in the "Dissertation concerning the project of the Dictionary." These passages are, respectively, in Pierre Bayle, op. cit., II, 487-88 and V, 790.
72. Cited by J.-P. Jossua, "Doute sceptique et doute méthodique chez Pierre Bayle," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 61 (1977), 241 , from Pierre Bayle, Oeuvres diverses (La Haye, 1737), II, 675-76.
73. Cited by J.-P. Jossua, "Doute sceptique et doute méthodique chez Pierre Bayle," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 61 (1977), 241 , from Pierre Bayle, Oeuvres diverses (La Haye, 1737), II, 675-76.
74. Elizabeth Labrousse, Pierre Bayle, t. II: Hétérodoxie et Rigorisme (The Hague, 1964), 57.
75. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
76. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
77. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
78. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
79. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
80. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
81. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
82. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
83. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
84. See Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1950-51), 387-407, repr. in Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Francisco, 1979), 103-32. The following are scholars who have contributed to the placement of Hume in the skeptical tradition. Besides Olshewsky and Wright - whose works are discussed below - Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh, 1982); Ezequiel de Olaso, "Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume," Manuscrito, 1 (1978), 45-63; David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, 1982); Plínio J. Smith, "O Ceticismo Naturalista de David Hume," Manuscrito, 13 (1990), 69-86; José R. Maia Neto, "Pascal and Hume: Pyrrhonism versus Nature," Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 41-49; Barry Stroud, "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection," Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 271-91 ; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause," JHI, 52 (1991), 645-63. See also Popkin, "Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," JHI, 54 (1993), 137-41.
85. Thomas M. Olshewsky, "The Classical Roots of Hume's Skepticism," JHI 52 (1991) 273.
86. Ibid., 283, emphasis added.
87. Ibid., 282.
88. "Ne point agiter les questions que l'on voit bien ne pouvoir decider." Simon Foucher, Apologie, 5.
89. Olshewsky, op. cit., 283-84, emphasis added.
90. See also Myles Burnyeat, "The Sceptic in his Place and Time," Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History (Cambridge, 1984), 255-78.
91. John P. Wright, "Hume's Academic Scepticism: a Reappraisal of His Philosophy of Human Understanding," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1986), 435. See also Wright's book The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (Manchester, 1983).
92. John P. Wright, "Hume's Academic Scepticism: a Reappraisal of His Philosophy of Human Understanding," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1986), 435. See also Wright's book The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (Manchester, 1983).
93. Hume, op. cit., 171.
94. Hume, op. cit., 172.
95. Hume, op. cit., 166-67.
96. Cf. Richard H. Popkin, "So, Hume did read Berkeley," Journal of Philosophy, 61(1954), 773-79, repr. in Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, 289-96.
97. Cf. Richard H. Popkin, "So, Hume did read Berkeley," Journal of Philosophy, 61(1954), 773-79, repr. in Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, 289-96.