Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 36-64

  Aiyagari, S Rao ^a   Williamson, Stephen D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010854029     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0034     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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