Kennedy's Algerian dilemma: Containment, alliance politics and the 'rebel dialogue'

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 61-82

  Lefebvre, Jeffrey A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0010835569     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263209908701267     Document Type: Article

References (163)

1. See US Senate, Congressional Record, Part 8, Vol.103, 2 July 1957, 'Imperialism - The Enemy of Freedom', 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1957), 10780-10793.
2. Russell Baker, 'Kennedy Urges US Back Independence for Algeria', New York Times, 3 July 1957.
3. See US Senate, 'Imperialism - The Enemy of Freedom'.
4. See 'Eisenhower Wary on Algeria Policy', New York Times, 4 July 1957; Dana Adams Schmidt, 'Algerian Scores US Role', New York Times, 15 July 1957; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Africa, 26 Nov. 1963, pp.I1-I2. Following Kennedy's assassination, Algerian President Ben Bella led a ceremony at Delgarde Square (later renamed for Kennedy) and decreed a seven-day period of mourning. Algiers radio commented: President Kennedy was one of the men who showed reasonable understanding of the struggle of the colonized people. Algeria has not forgotten his attitude toward the struggle of our people when Kennedy was a member of the Senate. For this reason, the name of the departed President will remain to our people linked with the honorable stand which he adopted during the darkest period which we witnessed.
5. See 'Eisenhower Wary on Algeria Policy', New York Times, 4 July 1957; Dana Adams Schmidt, 'Algerian Scores US Role', New York Times, 15 July 1957; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Africa, 26 Nov. 1963, pp.I1-I2. Following Kennedy's assassination, Algerian President Ben Bella led a ceremony at Delgarde Square (later renamed for Kennedy) and decreed a seven-day period of mourning. Algiers radio commented: President Kennedy was one of the men who showed reasonable understanding of the struggle of the colonized people. Algeria has not forgotten his attitude toward the struggle of our people when Kennedy was a member of the Senate. For this reason, the name of the departed President will remain to our people linked with the honorable stand which he adopted during the darkest period which we witnessed.
6. See 'Eisenhower Wary on Algeria Policy', New York Times, 4 July 1957; Dana Adams Schmidt, 'Algerian Scores US Role', New York Times, 15 July 1957; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Africa, 26 Nov. 1963, pp.I1-I2. Following Kennedy's assassination, Algerian President Ben Bella led a ceremony at Delgarde Square (later renamed for Kennedy) and decreed a seven-day period of mourning. Algiers radio commented: President Kennedy was one of the men who showed reasonable understanding of the struggle of the colonized people. Algeria has not forgotten his attitude toward the struggle of our people when Kennedy was a member of the Senate. For this reason, the name of the departed President will remain to our people linked with the honorable stand which he adopted during the darkest period which we witnessed.
7. See Robert Doty, 'Paris Is Bitter', New York Times, 4 July 1957; and Homer Bigart. 'Lacoste Rejects Algeria Criticism', New York Times, 8 July 1957. Robert Lacoste, the French Governor-General of Algeria, dismissed JFK as 'a young, ambitious Senator' speaking for 'the old maids of the United States' who ought to solve America's own 'Negro problems' before lecturing France on how to get along with the Muslims.
8. See Robert Doty, 'Paris Is Bitter', New York Times, 4 July 1957; and Homer Bigart. 'Lacoste Rejects Algeria Criticism', New York Times, 8 July 1957. Robert Lacoste, the French Governor-General of Algeria, dismissed JFK as 'a young, ambitious Senator' speaking for 'the old maids of the United States' who ought to solve America's own 'Negro problems' before lecturing France on how to get along with the Muslims.
9. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Vol. XVIII, Memorandum of a conversation at the Department of State, 1 July 1957, 'Subject: Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy on Algeria, on Tuesday, 2 July 1957', pp.270-1.
10. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, The Near and Middle East and Africa, 'The Wisdom of United States Noninvolvement in the Algerian Question', Reply made by the Secretary of State to a question asked at a news conference', 2 July 1957, pp.1071-2.
11. See Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp.121-7; Walter Isaacs and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.590; and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp.638-9 and 648-50. While privately critical of French policy in North Africa, Acheson was primarily concerned with strengthening NATO. Stevenson thought the speech 'was terrible' and declared 'Algeria is a French problem'. See John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), p.415.
12. See Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp.121-7; Walter Isaacs and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.590; and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp.638-9 and 648-50. While privately critical of French policy in North Africa, Acheson was primarily concerned with strengthening NATO. Stevenson thought the speech 'was terrible' and declared 'Algeria is a French problem'. See John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), p.415.
13. See Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp.121-7; Walter Isaacs and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.590; and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp.638-9 and 648-50. While privately critical of French policy in North Africa, Acheson was primarily concerned with strengthening NATO. Stevenson thought the speech 'was terrible' and declared 'Algeria is a French problem'. See John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), p.415.
14. See Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp.121-7; Walter Isaacs and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.590; and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp.638-9 and 648-50. While privately critical of French policy in North Africa, Acheson was primarily concerned with strengthening NATO. Stevenson thought the speech 'was terrible' and declared 'Algeria is a French problem'. See John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), p.415.
15. US Senate, Congressional Record, Part 8. Vol.103, 8 July 1957, 'Algeria', pp.10966-7.
16. See Tony Smith, The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp.74-124 and 154-77. In August 1957, less than 13% of the French public favoured complete independence for Algeria. As the war dragged on, however, a gap grew between the French military and government, who favoured prosecuting the war, and French public opinion. By February 1959, about 64% of the French public believed Algeria would eventually become independent. See Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP), Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, Storrs.
17. See Tony Smith, The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp.74-124 and 154-77. In August 1957, less than 13% of the French public favoured complete independence for Algeria. As the war dragged on, however, a gap grew between the French military and government, who favoured prosecuting the war, and French public opinion. By February 1959, about 64% of the French public believed Algeria would eventually become independent. See Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP), Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, Storrs.
18. Because of its French status Algeria was located in the European Bureau. It was relocated to AF after independence, and moved to NEA along with Tunisia, Morocco and Libya in 1974.
19. For documents concerning French requests for US arms see US Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, pp.238-9 and 276-9; and US Department of State, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XIII, pp.631-5.
20. For documents concerning French requests for US arms see US Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, pp.238-9 and 276-9; and US Department of State, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XIII, pp.631-5.
21. For documents concerning the US policy debate over the Algerian question at the UN see FRUS, 1958-1960, pp.627-719.
22. Ibid., p.643. Acting on the advice of the State Department, President Eisenhower refused to acknowledge a letter sent to him by the president of the PGAR.
23. Ibid., p.651.
24. Eisenhower and Dulles felt that an orderly decolonization process would require 25-50 years. See Egya N. Sangmuah, 'Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa: 1956-1960', Middle East Journal Vol.44, No.1 (Winter 1990), pp.76-91.
25. At his meeting with Ambassador Alphand before JFK's Algeria speech, Dulles 'confessed he would be at a loss to explain convincingly French policy in Algeria, if he had to do so before the United Nations at this time or later this fall, should there have been no progress by then'. See FRUS, 1955-1957, pp.270-271.
26. US Senate, 'Imperialism - The Enemy of Freedom', p.10791.
27. See Sangmuah, 'Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960', pp.76-91; and Irwin M. Wall, 'The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic', Diplomatic History, Vol.18, No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.489-511.
28. See Sangmuah, 'Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960', pp.76-91; and Irwin M. Wall, 'The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic', Diplomatic History, Vol.18, No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.489-511.
29. See 'Behind the Lines in Algeria - Quiet, Then Sudden Death', US News & World Report, 18 April 1958, pp.58-63; William Blau, The Men Against France', Newsweek, 19 May 1958, p.50; and Joseph Kraft, 'Big Three of Algeria's Rebels', New York Times Magazine, 23 Nov. 1958, p.12+.
30. See 'Behind the Lines in Algeria - Quiet, Then Sudden Death', US News & World Report, 18 April 1958, pp.58-63; William Blau, The Men Against France', Newsweek, 19 May 1958, p.50; and Joseph Kraft, 'Big Three of Algeria's Rebels', New York Times Magazine, 23 Nov. 1958, p.12+.
31. See 'Behind the Lines in Algeria - Quiet, Then Sudden Death', US News & World Report, 18 April 1958, pp.58-63; William Blau, The Men Against France', Newsweek, 19 May 1958, p.50; and Joseph Kraft, 'Big Three of Algeria's Rebels', New York Times Magazine, 23 Nov. 1958, p.12+.
32. Meetings with FLN representatives at the State Department were only permitted at the working level. FRUS, 1955-1957, pp.256-8; and FRUS. 1958-1960, pp.642-3.
33. Meetings with FLN representatives at the State Department were only permitted at the working level. FRUS, 1955-1957, pp.256-8; and FRUS. 1958-1960, pp.642-3.
34. FRUS, 1958-1960, pp.642-3.
35. Ibid. Washington agreed to keep Paris informed of all official discussions with the FLN.
36. See John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp.20, 352-3; and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1979), pp.59, 337.
37. See John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp.20, 352-3; and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1979), pp.59, 337.
38. See Wall, 'The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic', pp.489-511.
39. US officials feared that, if Western influence was driven out of the area, the vacuum would be filled by Nasser and pro-Soviet influence. See FRUS, 1958-1960, pp.640-1.
40. See Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp.247-9.
41. See Mongli Slim, Oral History Interview, no date, by Lorna Hahn, John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL), pp.1-7.
42. See 'Kennedy Praised on Algeria Stand', New York Times, 7 Dec. 1960; and 'Kennedy Is Urged to Act', New York Times, 10 Dec. 1960.
43. See 'Kennedy Praised on Algeria Stand', New York Times, 7 Dec. 1960; and 'Kennedy Is Urged to Act', New York Times, 10 Dec. 1960.
44. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), pp.552-3; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p.65; Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Oral History Interview, 1 April 1964, by David Schoenbrun, JFKL, pp.1-3; and Mongli Slim, Oral History, pp.2-5.
45. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), pp.552-3; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p.65; Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Oral History Interview, 1 April 1964, by David Schoenbrun, JFKL, pp.1-3; and Mongli Slim, Oral History, pp.2-5.
46. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), pp.552-3; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p.65; Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Oral History Interview, 1 April 1964, by David Schoenbrun, JFKL, pp.1-3; and Mongli Slim, Oral History, pp.2-5.
47. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), pp.552-3; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p.65; Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Oral History Interview, 1 April 1964, by David Schoenbrun, JFKL, pp.1-3; and Mongli Slim, Oral History, pp.2-5.
48. Victor Lasky, JFK: The Man and the Myth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp.285.
49. Kennedy expressed concern to his aides about being tagged with this label. See Frank Costigliola, France and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), p.116.
50. '16 Democrats Bid US Act to Halt Algeria Conflict', New York Times, 9 Aug. 1959. Kennedy's influence was seen at work behind the scenes, although JFK did not comment publicly.
51. JFK had defended US arms transfers to France on the grounds of 'common defense in accordance with NATO' to Ambassador Slim following the French attack on the Tunisian town of Sakiet on 8 February 1958. Mongli Slim, Oral History, pp.5-6. Kennedy did, however, release a statement on 11 February calling upon the 'U.N. and NATO to assert jurisdiction over this threat to world peace'. See Statement of Senator John F. Kennedy on the Tunisian incident of 8 Feb. 1958. Senate Files, Holborn Files, Subject: Miscellaneous, North Africa, 1957-1959, PPP, Box 564, JFKL.
52. Lasky, JFK: The Man and the Myth, p.286.
53. See Today's thoughts on Algeria - 9/17/59, Senate Files, Holborn Research Materials. 1958-1960, Foreign Relations: Algeria, PPP, Box 570.
54. While avoiding the topic of Algeria, during the 1960 campaign JFK made 479 references to Africa. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.554.
55. Harriman's statement is quoted in W. Grangler Blair, 'Paris Is Hopeful of Mali Accord', New York Times, 25 Aug. 1960.
56. For excerpts of the Tunisia letter see 'Kennedy Explains Views on Algeria', New York Times, 17 Oct. 1960.
57. Mongli Slim, Oral History, p.12.
58. For an explanation of the Eisenhower administration's 'order and stability' policy toward decolonization in Africa see US Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 27 Oct. 1958, Address by Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Western Regional Assembly, University of California at Los Angeles, at Lake Arrowhead, CA, 9 Oct. 1958. pp.641-8.
59. See James Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p.221; and Robert Komer, Oral History Interview, 'JFK and the Third World', 18 June 1964, by Elizabeth Farmer, JFKL, pp.1-8.
60. See James Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p.221; and Robert Komer, Oral History Interview, 'JFK and the Third World', 18 June 1964, by Elizabeth Farmer, JFKL, pp.1-8.
61. One of the respected 'old hands' at the State Department remarked that the trouble with Bowles and Williams was that 'when they saw a band of black baboons beating tom-toms they saw George Washington'. When informed that Bowles' days as undersecretary of state were numbered, an 'old hand' raised a glass and toasted: 'one down and a Williams to go'. See Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1980), pp.371-2.
62. See Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p.313; Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Times (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), pp.484-485; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.216-18; and Letter to Adlai Stevenson from Chester Bowles, 23 July 1961, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 542, Yale University. The strong anti-colonial bias of AF reflected the views of the members of the Africa bloc who were its clients. See George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp.185, 230-1.
63. See Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p.313; Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Times (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), pp.484-485; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.216-18; and Letter to Adlai Stevenson from Chester Bowles, 23 July 1961, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 542, Yale University. The strong anti-colonial bias of AF reflected the views of the members of the Africa bloc who were its clients. See George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp.185, 230-1.
64. See Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p.313; Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Times (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), pp.484-485; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.216-18; and Letter to Adlai Stevenson from Chester Bowles, 23 July 1961, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 542, Yale University. The strong anti-colonial bias of AF reflected the views of the members of the Africa bloc who were its clients. See George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp.185, 230-1.
65. See Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p.313; Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Times (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), pp.484-485; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.216-18; and Letter to Adlai Stevenson from Chester Bowles, 23 July 1961, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 542, Yale University. The strong anti-colonial bias of AF reflected the views of the members of the Africa bloc who were its clients. See George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp.185, 230-1.
66. See Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p.313; Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Times (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), pp.484-485; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.216-18; and Letter to Adlai Stevenson from Chester Bowles, 23 July 1961, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 542, Yale University. The strong anti-colonial bias of AF reflected the views of the members of the Africa bloc who were its clients. See George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp.185, 230-1.
67. McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Times, pp.484-5.
68. Stevenson felt that he and Bowles were slightly old-fashioned New Dealers which irritated the members of the New Frontier. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.649. Kennedy viewed himself as a 'realist' or 'an Idealist without illusions'. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, p.13.
69. Stevenson felt that he and Bowles were slightly old-fashioned New Dealers which irritated the members of the New Frontier. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.649. Kennedy viewed himself as a 'realist' or 'an Idealist without illusions'. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, p.13.
70. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.649; Edwin Guthman (ed.), Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp.11, 38-39 and 264-6; and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.555.
71. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.649; Edwin Guthman (ed.), Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp.11, 38-39 and 264-6; and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.555.
72. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.649; Edwin Guthman (ed.), Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp.11, 38-39 and 264-6; and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.555.
73. Bowles, Promises to Keep, p.449. On the other hand, Kennedy was reminded that his views and those of Bowles on foreign policy issues, especially concerning the developing world were much closer than with the Achesonians - many of the same people who had attacked him on Algeria in 1957. See Memo for the President from Harris Wofford, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 298, Folder 509, Yale University.
74. Bowles, Promises to Keep, p.449. On the other hand, Kennedy was reminded that his views and those of Bowles on foreign policy issues, especially concerning the developing world were much closer than with the Achesonians - many of the same people who had attacked him on Algeria in 1957. See Memo for the President from Harris Wofford, Chester Bowles Papers, Box 298, Folder 509, Yale University.
75. In Angola, because of the Azores base Portugal had the backing of the Pentagon, EUR, and Acheson when violence erupted there in February 1961. See McKeever, Adlai Stevenson, pp.484-5; and Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.697.
76. In Angola, because of the Azores base Portugal had the backing of the Pentagon, EUR, and Acheson when violence erupted there in February 1961. See McKeever, Adlai Stevenson, pp.484-5; and Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.697.
77. Some participants saw it as a struggle which pitted Europeanists against anti-colonialists and those who took a military view of foreign policy versus those who focused upon its political ramifications. However, the Europeanists were not uniformly against Africa. George Ball, for one, was sensitive to Third World concerns regarding Western colonialism. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.703; and G. Mennen Williams, Oral History Interview, 27 Jan. 1970, by William Moss, JFKL, pp.55-8. State's policy of staying out of former colonial areas of Africa was influenced by the European desk. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), pp.273-81; and Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, p.367.
78. Some participants saw it as a struggle which pitted Europeanists against anti-colonialists and those who took a military view of foreign policy versus those who focused upon its political ramifications. However, the Europeanists were not uniformly against Africa. George Ball, for one, was sensitive to Third World concerns regarding Western colonialism. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.703; and G. Mennen Williams, Oral History Interview, 27 Jan. 1970, by William Moss, JFKL, pp.55-8. State's policy of staying out of former colonial areas of Africa was influenced by the European desk. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), pp.273-81; and Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, p.367.
79. Some participants saw it as a struggle which pitted Europeanists against anti-colonialists and those who took a military view of foreign policy versus those who focused upon its political ramifications. However, the Europeanists were not uniformly against Africa. George Ball, for one, was sensitive to Third World concerns regarding Western colonialism. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.703; and G. Mennen Williams, Oral History Interview, 27 Jan. 1970, by William Moss, JFKL, pp.55-8. State's policy of staying out of former colonial areas of Africa was influenced by the European desk. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), pp.273-81; and Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, p.367.
80. Some participants saw it as a struggle which pitted Europeanists against anti-colonialists and those who took a military view of foreign policy versus those who focused upon its political ramifications. However, the Europeanists were not uniformly against Africa. George Ball, for one, was sensitive to Third World concerns regarding Western colonialism. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.703; and G. Mennen Williams, Oral History Interview, 27 Jan. 1970, by William Moss, JFKL, pp.55-8. State's policy of staying out of former colonial areas of Africa was influenced by the European desk. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), pp.273-81; and Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, p.367.
81. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.561; Isaacs and Thomas, The Wise Men, pp.589-93. Of course, Dean Acheson's recommendation may have been a double-edged sword since JFK did not particularly like Acheson. While Kennedy respected Acheson, JFK found him 'irritating' and on 'many occasions his advice was worthless'. Kennedy also found Rusk frustrating to work with. Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, pp.7-10 and 19.
82. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, p.561; Isaacs and Thomas, The Wise Men, pp.589-93. Of course, Dean Acheson's recommendation may have been a double-edged sword since JFK did not particularly like Acheson. While Kennedy respected Acheson, JFK found him 'irritating' and on 'many occasions his advice was worthless'. Kennedy also found Rusk frustrating to work with. Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, pp.7-10 and 19.
83. Isaacs and Thomas, The Wise Men, pp.589-93. Of course, Dean Acheson's recommendation may have been a double-edged sword since JFK did not particularly like Acheson. While Kennedy respected Acheson, JFK found him 'irritating' and on 'many occasions his advice was worthless'. Kennedy also found Rusk frustrating to work with. Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, pp.7-10 and 19.
84. Rusk, like many of the Europeanists, was opposed to colonialism. But the fear of chaos erupting in these areas if independence was granted too quickly coupled with more vital US military, political and economic interests in Europe predisposed them to favour European allies. Rusk and the Europeanists essentially wanted the Europeans to do more (in terms of providing aid), not less in Africa. Rusk, As I Saw It, pp.260-3 and 273-81.
85. Ibid., pp.260-1 and 274. As secretary of state, Rusk never visited Africa.
86. Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, p.85.
87. Kennedy, in essence, wanted an 'under' secretary of state. See Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), pp.60-1.
88. See John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York: Viking Press, 1970), pp.3-5; Michael M. Harrison, 'French Anti-Americanism under the Fourth Republic and the Gaullist Solution', in D. Lacorne, J. Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp.169-78; and Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, De Gaulle and French Foreign Policy, NSF:CO: France-General: CIA Briefing Packet, 18 May 1961, NSF, Box 70, JFKL.
89. See John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York: Viking Press, 1970), pp.3-5; Michael M. Harrison, 'French Anti-Americanism under the Fourth Republic and the Gaullist Solution', in D. Lacorne, J. Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp.169-78; and Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, De Gaulle and French Foreign Policy, NSF:CO: France-General: CIA Briefing Packet, 18 May 1961, NSF, Box 70, JFKL.
90. Costigliola, France and the United States, pp.121-30.
91. Ibid., p.130. US officials feared that an independent French nuclear force would complicate decision-making in a nuclear crisis and might provoke West Germany to go nuclear.
92. For an account of de Gaulle's handling of the coup see Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, pp.279-86.
93. See Office of the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the President, Subject: The Situation in France and Algeria, 24 April 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 4/24/61-4/30/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL; and Outgoing Telegram to Paris. No.4506, 24 April 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 4/24/61-4/30/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
94. Outgoing Telegram to Paris. No.4506, 24 April 1961,
95. Ibid. In retrospect, US aid was unnecessary as CIA operatives on the ground did not give the coup much chance for success. See Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.4793, 3 May 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 5/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL. JFK's message to de Gaulle read: 'In this grave hour for France, I want you to know of my continuing friendship and support as well as that of the American people...' See NSF:CO: France, Subjects: De Gaulle Correspondence, 2/26/61-5/1/61, NSF, Box 73, JFKL.
96. Office of the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the President, Subject: The Situation in France and Algeria, 24 April 1961.
97. See Costigiola, France and the United States, pp.131-2; and Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p.337. For a record of US concerns and protests over these allegations see Outgoing Telegram to Paris, No.4658, 2 May 1961; Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.4793, 3 May 1961; and Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.4829, 5 May 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 5/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL. Also see Outgoing Telegram to Paris, No.4379, 13 February 1962, NSF:CO: France-General, 12/10/61-2/16/62, NSF, Box 71, JFKL.
98. See Costigiola, France and the United States, pp.131-2; and Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p.337. For a record of US concerns and protests over these allegations see Outgoing Telegram to Paris, No.4658, 2 May 1961; Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.4793, 3 May 1961; and Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.4829, 5 May 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 5/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL. Also see Outgoing Telegram to Paris, No.4379, 13 February 1962, NSF:CO: France-General, 12/10/61-2/16/62, NSF, Box 71, JFKL.
99. Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.123-4.
100. Ibid.
101. Thomas Brady, Tunisians Wary of Border Raids', New York Times, 24 April 1961. For a record of US policy during this crisis see NSF:CO: Tunisia, Bizerte Crisis, 6/28/61-7/22/61, NSF, Box 166, JFKL.
102. See UN General Assembly Official Reports, 3rd Special Session, Plenary Meetings and Annexes, 21-25 August 1961. Stevenson feared that the US vote would 'cost us dearly' in Africa and Asia and felt the expense of de Gaulle's friendship was now getting 'intolerable'. De Gaulle told Stevenson: 'We supported you in Cuba. Our situation in Bizerte is like yours in Cuba. We are not in Bizerte for our pleasure. You were not in Cuba for your pleasure'. See Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World, pp.650-9.
103. Incoming Telegram from Paris, No. 1015, 24 Aug. 1961, NSF:CO: France-General, 8/21/61-8/31/61, NSF, Box 70, JFKL.
104. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.561.
105. Mongli Slim, Oral History, pp.17-18.
106. Rusk, As I Saw It, pp.268-70.
107. Dean Rusk, Oral History Interview, 13 March 1970, by Dennis O'Brien, JFKL, pp.178-9.
108. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp.560-4.
109. Quoted in UN General Assembly Official Reports, 3rd Special Session, 21-25 August 1961, p.102.
110. Mongli Slim, Oral History, p.13.
111. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 'The Status of Algerians Imprisoned in France', Resolution 1650 (XVI), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 15 Nov. 1961, pp.724-5.
112. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 'The United States Position on the Question of Algeria', Statement made by the US Representative (Yost) in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, 19 Dec. 1961, pp.725-6; and, 'The Question of Algeria', Resolution 1724 (XVI), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 20 Dec. 1961, pp.726-7.
113. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 'The United States Position on the Question of Algeria', Statement made by the US Representative (Yost) in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, 19 Dec. 1961, pp.725-6; and, 'The Question of Algeria', Resolution 1724 (XVI), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 20 Dec. 1961, pp.726-7.
114. G. Mennen Williams, Oral History, pp.55-8.
115. In June 1960 the US embassy in Tunis suggested raising the level of US contacts with the FLN following the opening of the Melun talks (25-29 June) between France and the FLN. Then in December 1960 the Africa Bureau suggested that this issue be revisited. See FRUS, 1958-1960, pp.691-2 and 718-19.
116. Ibid, pp.718-19.
117. Ibid, pp.691-2.
118. Ibid.
119. Incoming Telegram from Tunis, No.881, 27 Jan. 1961. NSF:CO: Algeria. 1/20/61-4/23/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
120. Incoming Telegram Paris, No.3061, 2 Feb. 1961.
121. Outgoing Telegram to Paris, Rabat, Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli, 1 Feb. 1961.
122. Ibid. See Outgoing Telegram to Paris, No.3201, 4 Feb. 1961.
123. Thomas Brady, 'Key Man in Algeria's Future', New York Times, 12 March 1961; and 'The FLN: From Rebellion to Independence', Newsweek, 8 May 1961, pp.47-8.
124. Thomas Brady, 'Key Man in Algeria's Future', New York Times, 12 March 1961; and 'The FLN: From Rebellion to Independence', Newsweek, 8 May 1961, pp.47-8.
125. US Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 10 March 1961, Subject: Algeria, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
126. Because of French oil interests and nuclear testing sites in the Sahara, Paris wished to treat the Sahara as a separate department from the rest of Algeria, which the FLN rejected.
127. See Norman Lewis, 'Men Who Cry: "Algérie Algérienne!'", New York Times Magazine, 4 Feb. 1962, pp.12, 54-5.
128. Lewis, 'Men Who Cry: "Algérie Algérienne!'"; 'Algeria: Back to Chaos?' Newsweek, 16 July 1962, pp.33-4; and 'Algeria: Birth of a Nation - Death of a Myth', Newsweek, 13 Aug. 1962, pp.35-8.
129. Lewis, 'Men Who Cry: "Algérie Algérienne!'"; 'Algeria: Back to Chaos?' Newsweek, 16 July 1962, pp.33-4; and 'Algeria: Birth of a Nation - Death of a Myth', Newsweek, 13 Aug. 1962, pp.35-8.
130. Letter from Ambassador Walmsly to McGeorge Bundy, 11 Sept. 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 6/61-9/91, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
131. G. Mennen Williams, Oral History, p.58.
132. Memorandum for the President, Report on Assistant Secretary Williams Third Trip to Africa (29 Sept.-26 Oct. 1961), 28 Nov. 1961, NSF:CO: Africa, 11/61, NSF, Box 2, JFKL.
133. Ibid.
134. G. Mennen Williams, Oral History, pp.57-8.
135. Ibid., p.58.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid., p.63. Williams felt that Bobby Kennedy had a significant interest and impact on US Africa policy. The Attorney General recalled thai Williams 'did a damn good job' and 'made a helluva effort' coming up with a lot of good ideas. Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, p.28.
139. Ibid., p.63. Williams felt that Bobby Kennedy had a significant interest and impact on US Africa policy. The Attorney General recalled thai Williams 'did a damn good job' and 'made a helluva effort' coming up with a lot of good ideas. Guttman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, p.28.
140. Memorandum for the President, Report on Assistant Secretary Williams Third Trip to Africa (29 Sept.-26 Oct. 1961).
141. US Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 27 Nov. 1961, 'The Three "A's" of Africa: Algeria, Angola, and Apartheid', Address by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, made before the Overseas Press Club, New York City, 31 Oct. 1961, pp.885-8.
142. Outgoing Telegram to Paris, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, USUN, 26 Oct. 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 10/61-11/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
143. Incoming Telegram from Tunis, No.641, 5 Nov. 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 6/61-9/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
144. The CIA sometimes acts as the 'other voice' of US foreign policy. Ranelagh, The Agency, p.20.
145. Jeffrey-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, pp.124-5.
146. See Ibid.; Ranelagh, The Agency, p.20; and Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p.337.
147. See Ibid.; Ranelagh, The Agency, p.20; and Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p.337.
148. See Ibid.; Ranelagh, The Agency, p.20; and Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p.337.
149. This was the sort of thing that angered de Gaulle, Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p.337.
150. Ibid., p.59.
151. Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.3205, 23 Dec. 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 12/61-1/62, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
152. Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.3250, Dec. 28, 1961.
153. Ibid.
154. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 Jan. 1961, Subject: Call by Ambassador Alphand - 3 Jan. 1961, NSF:CO: France - General, 1/1/62-1/31/62, NSF, Box 71, JFKL.
155. White House, McGeorge Bundy from W. W. Rostow, Subject: Tuesday Planning Group Meeting - 6 Feb. 1962, NSF:CO: Algeria, 2/1/62-2/14/62. NSF, Box 4, JFKL. The group reviewed future options and a discussion paper on Algeria.
156. At the end of 1961 the State Department began to press Paris to hold talks on the future of Algeria. The US embassy in Paris warned against such an attempt. US officials grew increasingly frustrated by France's refusal to discuss future US-Algerian relations or how to coordinate western aid to Algeria after independence. See Outgoing Telegram to Paris, No.2918, 20 Nov. 1961; and Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.2836, 30 Nov. 1961, NSF:CO: Algeria, 10/61-11/61, NSF, Box 4, JFKL. Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.3503, 19 Jan. 1962, NSF:CO: Algeria, 12/61-1/62, NSF, Box 4, JFKL. Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.3957, 20 Feb. 1962; Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.3947, 21 Feb. 1962; and Incoming Telegram from Algiers, No.407, 23 Feb. 1962, NSF:CO: Algeria, 2/15/62-2/28/62, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
157. See NSC, Memorandum for Mr. Bundy from David Klein, Subject: The French on Algeria's Foreign Relations, 20 March 1962, Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, Vol.17 (1991), p.1515.
158. See Incoming Telegram from Algiers, No.338, 16 Feb. 1962; Incoming Telegram from Paris, No.3912, 17 Feb. 1962; and Department of State, Memo for McGeorge Bundy -White House, Subject: Standby Oral Messages From President to Ben Khedda and de Gaulle, 23 Feb. 1962, NSF:CO: Algeria, 2/15/62-2/28/62, NSF, Box 4, JFKL. Also see NSF:CO: Algeria, 3/1/62-3/9/62, NSF, Box 4, JFKL.
159. Kennedy stated that a government still had not been established and, therefore, 'France still bears responsibility ... I think we should wait until the proper moment.' American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, Africa, 'United States Reaction to Soviet Recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria', Reply made by the President (Kennedy) to a question asked at a news conference, 21 March 1962, p.809.
160. To avoid being drawn into an intra-FLN dispute between Ben Khedda and Ben Bella, Kennedy refrained from establishing formal diplomatic ties with Algiers until 27 September 1962 at which time William Porter was sent to Algiers to serve as US ambassador. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, Africa, 'Developments Holding Up United States Recognition of A Government of Algeria', Replies made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to questions asked at a news conference, 12 July 1962, pp.813-14; and ' United States Recognition of the "Newly Established Government of the Republic of Algeria",' Statement issued by the Department of State, 29 September 1962, p.814.
161. To avoid being drawn into an intra-FLN dispute between Ben Khedda and Ben Bella, Kennedy refrained from establishing formal diplomatic ties with Algiers until 27 September 1962 at which time William Porter was sent to Algiers to serve as US ambassador. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, Africa, 'Developments Holding Up United States Recognition of A Government of Algeria', Replies made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to questions asked at a news conference, 12 July 1962, pp.813-14; and ' United States Recognition of the "Newly Established Government of the Republic of Algeria",' Statement issued by the Department of State, 29 September 1962, p.814.
162. See American Foreign Policy: Current Document, 1962, Africa, 'United States Recognition of "National Independence For the Algerian People'", Statement by the President (Kennedy) issued 3 July 1962, p.812.
163. See Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pp.60-1.