Intervention in unnatural humanitarian emergencies: Lessons of the first phase

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-22

  Farer, Tom J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0010824916     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1996.0005     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. See Charles Forrest, The Coward's Way Out, WASH. POST, 12 Dec. 1994, at 23; David Rieff, The Peacekeepers Who Couldn't: The Real Reasons for the U.N.'s Retreat In Bosnia, WASH. POST, 11 Dec. 1994, at C1-2.
2. See Charles Forrest, The Coward's Way Out, WASH. POST, 12 Dec. 1994, at 23; David Rieff, The Peacekeepers Who Couldn't: The Real Reasons for the U.N.'s Retreat In Bosnia, WASH. POST, 11 Dec. 1994, at C1-2.
3. For example, when the Kremlin became disenchanted with the UN operation in the Congo in 1960, Premier Nikita Khrushchev demanded the resignation of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and called for the replacement of the office of the Secretary-General by a "troika of pro-Western, neutralist, and pro-Soviet bloc officials." Additionally, the USSR refused to pay its assessment for the Congo operation. THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING 323 (William J. Durch ed., 1993).
4. See Somalia Faces the Future: Human Rights in a Fragmented Society, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AFRICA 5-6 (April 1995). Cf. Tadeusz Mazowiecki (former Special Rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights regarding the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia): Question (from an interviewer): "What was your relationship with various OUN [i.e. United Nations] agencies?" Answer: "Varied. . . . The violation of human rights was, indeed, within the field of interest of UN civilian services, but as a secondary, not a primary duty. They were not obliged to forward us the documentation concerning the violation of those rights. Sometimes, even information on very serious crimes was not forwarded." THE WEEKLY PRESS, produced by the Media Analysis Unit, Analysis and Assessment Unit, UNPROFOR HQ, Zagreb, in 15 Sept. summary of Croatian press, at 7.
5. See Somalia Faces the Future: Human Rights in a Fragmented Society, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AFRICA 5-6 (April 1995). Cf. Tadeusz Mazowiecki (former Special Rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights regarding the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia): Question (from an interviewer): "What was your relationship with various OUN [i.e. United Nations] agencies?" Answer: "Varied. . . . The violation of human rights was, indeed, within the field of interest of UN civilian services, but as a secondary, not a primary duty. They were not obliged to forward us the documentation concerning the violation of those rights. Sometimes, even information on very serious crimes was not forwarded." THE WEEKLY PRESS, produced by the Media Analysis Unit, Analysis and Assessment Unit, UNPROFOR HQ, Zagreb, in 15 Sept. summary of Croatian press, at 7.
6. See generally IAN JOHNSTONE, RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION: UN STRATEGIES IN EL SALVADOR (1995); Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, HEMISPHERE INITIATIVES (June 1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AMERICAS, EL SALVADOR-DARKENING HORIZONS: HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE EVE OF MARCH 1994 ELECTIONS (1994); Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE (1995).
7. See generally IAN JOHNSTONE, RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION: UN STRATEGIES IN EL SALVADOR (1995); Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, HEMISPHERE INITIATIVES (June 1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AMERICAS, EL SALVADOR-DARKENING HORIZONS: HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE EVE OF MARCH 1994 ELECTIONS (1994); Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE (1995).
8. See generally IAN JOHNSTONE, RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION: UN STRATEGIES IN EL SALVADOR (1995); Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, HEMISPHERE INITIATIVES (June 1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AMERICAS, EL SALVADOR-DARKENING HORIZONS: HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE EVE OF MARCH 1994 ELECTIONS (1994); Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE (1995).
9. See generally IAN JOHNSTONE, RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION: UN STRATEGIES IN EL SALVADOR (1995); Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, HEMISPHERE INITIATIVES (June 1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AMERICAS, EL SALVADOR-DARKENING HORIZONS: HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE EVE OF MARCH 1994 ELECTIONS (1994); Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE (1995).
10. See Somalia: Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses, 5 AFRICA WATCH 28 (7 Mar. 1993); see also Human Rights Watch-Africa, supra note 3, at 15.
11. See Somalia: Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses, 5 AFRICA WATCH 28 (7 Mar. 1993); see also Human Rights Watch-Africa, supra note 3, at 15.
12. See generally The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, UN Reference Paper (15 Mar. 1994).
13. Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on Unisom II Personnel which Led to Casualties Among Them.
14. I discovered this in the course of preparing my report for the Secretary-General concerning the question of who had initiated the attacks on UN forces in Mogadishu. The full report is available at the office of the Under-Secretary General For Peacekeeping. See also JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 115 (1995).
15. Id. at 87-93, 103-06.
16. Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/ 1. (3 Jan. 1995), reprinted in BOUTROS BOUTROS-GALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 1995 (1995) [hereinafter Supplement].
17. Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/ 1. (3 Jan. 1995), reprinted in BOUTROS BOUTROS-GALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 1995 (1995) [hereinafter Supplement].
18. Id. ¶ 33.
19. See Aaron Karp, The Demise of the Middle East Arms Race, 18 WASH. Q. 27 (1995); see generally WILLIAM QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967 (1993).
20. See Aaron Karp, The Demise of the Middle East Arms Race, 18 WASH. Q. 27 (1995); see generally WILLIAM QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967 (1993).
21. See C.R. MITCHELL, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 274-76 (1981).
22. For an account of President Bush's decision to deploy troops to Somalia, see HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 8, at 35-47.
23. Id. at 44-47.
24. The peacekeeping budget for 1993 was $3.3 billion, Gareth Evans, Cooperative Security and Interstate Conflict, 96 FOR. POL'Y 22 Sept. 1994, at 3. The annual cost of the stealth bomber program is approximately $2 billion, Louis Freedberg, Many Programs Left Untouched, S.F. CHRON., 27 Oct. 1995, at A6.
25. The peacekeeping budget for 1993 was $3.3 billion, Gareth Evans, Cooperative Security and Interstate Conflict, 96 FOR. POL'Y 22 Sept. 1994, at 3. The annual cost of the stealth bomber program is approximately $2 billion, Louis Freedberg, Many Programs Left Untouched, S.F. CHRON., 27 Oct. 1995, at A6.
26. Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council - once it has found that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression - to take or authorize action on the territory of a state with or without the consent of the state's de jure or de facto authorities.
27. U.N. Security Council Res. 814, 26 Mar. 1993, at ¶ B.8, B.13, & B.14 (emphasis added).
28. Id. ¶ B.12.
29. Id. ¶ A.2.
30. Tom Farer, From Warlord to Peacelord? Like it or Not, the West Needs to Enlist Aideed - or Face Disaster, WASH. POST, 12 Sept. 1993, at C2.
31. See id.
32. Tom Farer, Report to the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. S-3727 (1993) (summarized in Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on Behalf of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/26351 (1993)).
33. U.N. Security Council Res. 814, supra note 18, ¶ A.2.
34. See generally Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES, 37-47 (Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1986).
35. Terry Karl, Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986).
36. The text of the pacts of Benidorm (1956), of the "Frente Civico" (1957), and of Sitges (1957) are contained in Camilo Vazquez-Cobo Carrizosa, El frente nacional, and Jorge Cardenas Garcia, El frente nacional y los partidos politicos (1958). For discussions of those pacts, see ALEXANDER WILDE, LA QUIEBRA DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA (1982) and ROBERT H. DIX, COLOMBIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHANCE (1967).
37. The text of the pacts of Benidorm (1956), of the "Frente Civico" (1957), and of Sitges (1957) are contained in Camilo Vazquez-Cobo Carrizosa, El frente nacional, and Jorge Cardenas Garcia, El frente nacional y los partidos politicos (1958). For discussions of those pacts, see ALEXANDER WILDE, LA QUIEBRA DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA (1982) and ROBERT H. DIX, COLOMBIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHANCE (1967).
38. "To define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269, 250-83 (1950). See also ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971). On the relationship between elections and democracy in developing countries, see COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Myron Weiner & Ergun Ōzbudun eds., 1987).
39. "To define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269, 250-83 (1950). See also ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971). On the relationship between elections and democracy in developing countries, see COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Myron Weiner & Ergun Ōzbudun eds., 1987).
40. "To define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269, 250-83 (1950). See also ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971). On the relationship between elections and democracy in developing countries, see COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Myron Weiner & Ergun Ōzbudun eds., 1987).
41. For general information about the United Nation's peacekeeping mission in Angola, see Reference Paper: The United Nations and the Situation in Angola, May 1991-June 1994, Dept. of Public Information.
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) at art. 25 (stating that "Every citizen shall have the right [t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; [t]o vote and to be elected. . . .").
43. Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 119 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT].
44. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AFRICA, supra note 3, at 6.
45. For a discussion of the clan structure in Somalia, see HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 8, at 3-16.
46. Id. at 115-48.
47. Supplement, supra note 10, ¶ 36.
48. Id. ¶ 77.
49. Id. ¶ 80.
50. See Daniel Williams, US Replaces Envoy Associated with Discarded Somalia Policy, WASH. POST, 27 Oct. 1993, at A28.
51. See The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Department of State Publication 10161, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, May 1994, at 5.
52. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-42.
53. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1994 105 (1993).
54. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979). For a discussion of several models of intervention through agreement, see David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1995).
55. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979). For a discussion of several models of intervention through agreement, see David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1995).
56. On the origins and development of the war and the response of multilateral institutions, see generally TOM J. FARER, WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE WIDENING STORM (1979).
57. Melinda Beck et al., America's Secret Military Forces, 105 NEWSWEEK, 22 Apr. 1985, at 22-23.
58. For an emphasis of the view that the US foreign policymaking process through the middle of the century has been one of Congress taking the back seat to a president driven car-of-state, see ROBERT A. PASTOR, WHIRLPOOL: US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1992).
59. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE IN BRAZIL, 1964-1985 (1988); ROBERT WESSON, THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL: LIMITS OF INFLUENCE 18-19, 39-40 (1981).
60. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE IN BRAZIL, 1964-1985 (1988); ROBERT WESSON, THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL: LIMITS OF INFLUENCE 18-19, 39-40 (1981).
61. U.N. CHARTER arts. 43-47.
62. See Tom J. Farer, The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 166, 170-80 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1993); see also Tom J. Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT supra note 31, at 331-39.
63. See Tom J. Farer, The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 166, 170-80 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1993); see also Tom J. Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT supra note 31, at 331-39.
64. Compare Tom J. Farer, The United States as Guarantor of Democracy in the Caribbean Basin: Is there a Legal Way?, 11 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. (1989) with Wippman, supra note 42.