The substitution of bonding for monitoring in venture capitalist relations with high technology enterprises

Journal of High Technology Management Research

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 91-105

  Barney, Jay B ^a   Fiet, James O ^b   Busenitz, Lowell W ^b   Moesel, Douglas D ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010808976     PISSN: 10478310     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1047-8310(96)90017-6     Document Type: Article

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