Sollbruchstelle: Deep uncertainty and the design of monetary institutions

International Finance

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 391-411

  Lohmann, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010795167     PISSN: 13670271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2362.00058     Document Type: Article

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