Have your lawyer call my lawyer. Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1989, Pages 159-174

  Jones, Stephen R G ^a  

^a MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010774664     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(89)90011-5     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
2. Strategic interaction among nations: Negotiable and non-negotiable trade barriers
3. A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
4. Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining
5. A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem
6. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly
7. A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem with application to Nash equilibrium points
8. The role of negotiators in union-firm bargaining
9. Risk aversion and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem
10. Profit sharing in a collusive industry
11. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
12. A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
13. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
14. An essay on bargaining
15. The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives
16. Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
17. Delegation and the Theory of the Firm