An analysis of value destruction and recovery in the alliance and proposed merger of Volvo and Renault

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 125-166

  Bruner, Robert F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Alliances; G20; G34; Institutional investors; L33; L90; Mergers; Privatization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010734455     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00046-4     Document Type: Article

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