Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 45-57

  Stensholt, Eivind ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Beta distributions; Condorcet's paradox; D71; Impartial anonymous cultures; Preference structures

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010477666     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00016-X     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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