Turkey's Kurdish question: Critical turning points and missed opportunities

Middle East Journal

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 57-77

  Barkey, Henri J ^a   Fuller, Graham E ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0010412142     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. This article is a prelude to a book-length study on Turkey's Kurdish problem commissioned by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
2. According to a US State Department report submitted to Congress in May 1995, there were then 250,000-300,000 Turkish security forces operating in the southeast. The troops deployed enjoy close air support by fighters and have increasingly made use of helicopters and other modern equipment. Turkey: Human Rights Report, 1995 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 1995).
3. Authors' estimation based on discussions with military experts and on the number of troops, village guards, and special team members deployed in the region, government salaries, etc. What this figure does not include are the opportunity costs of the insurrection, such as lost tourism revenues and lost industrial output.
4. Ismet Imset, PKK: Ayrilikci Şiddetin 20 Yili: 1973-1992 (The PKK: Twenty Years of Separatist Violence) (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, 1993).
5. The two million figure is an estimate made by the US State Department, see Turkey: Human Rights Report, 1996 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 1996). "According to the Interior Minister, as of March, 2,297 villages had been evacuated or burnt down. In July the emergency region governor stated that 987 villages and 1,676 hamlets (settlement units of 3 or 4 houses) had been depopulated 'for various reasons,' including residents evacuated by security forces for security reasons; residents who left of their own accord for security or economic reasons; and residents who left because of PKK pressure," Ibid . The government claimed that by the end of 1994, 988 villages and 1,676 hamlets had been destroyed resulting in an outflow of 311,000 residents, Milliyet (Istanbul), 28 July 1995.
6. The two million figure is an estimate made by the US State Department, see Turkey: Human Rights Report, 1996 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 1996). "According to the Interior Minister, as of March, 2,297 villages had been evacuated or burnt down. In July the emergency region governor stated that 987 villages and 1,676 hamlets (settlement units of 3 or 4 houses) had been depopulated 'for various reasons,' including residents evacuated by security forces for security reasons; residents who left of their own accord for security or economic reasons; and residents who left because of PKK pressure," Ibid . The government claimed that by the end of 1994, 988 villages and 1,676 hamlets had been destroyed resulting in an outflow of 311,000 residents, Milliyet (Istanbul), 28 July 1995.
7. The two million figure is an estimate made by the US State Department, see Turkey: Human Rights Report, 1996 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 1996). "According to the Interior Minister, as of March, 2,297 villages had been evacuated or burnt down. In July the emergency region governor stated that 987 villages and 1,676 hamlets (settlement units of 3 or 4 houses) had been depopulated 'for various reasons,' including residents evacuated by security forces for security reasons; residents who left of their own accord for security or economic reasons; and residents who left because of PKK pressure," Ibid . The government claimed that by the end of 1994, 988 villages and 1,676 hamlets had been destroyed resulting in an outflow of 311,000 residents, Milliyet (Istanbul), 28 July 1995.
8. A. Rezzak Oral, "Kalmak mi Dönmek mi Zor?" (Is it Harder to Stay or to Return?) Part 2, Milliyet, 26 July 1996. One district headman described how the number of his constituents increased from 6,000 to 63,000 in a matter of a few years.
9. David McDowall, "The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review," in Philip Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds., The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 17.
10. For a discussion on the nature of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, see Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Torment: Toward a Solution to the Kurdish Problem (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
11. Kemalists are the followers of Kemal Atatürk.
12. Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State (London: Zed Books, 1992), p. 278-79.
13. Hidir Göktaş, Kürtler: Isyan-i Tenkil (Kurds: Suppressing a Revolt), vol. 1 (Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1991), p. 37.
14. The motivations for the 1925 Shaykh Sa'id revolt were a mix of Kurdish nationalist and reactionary politics. Sa'id himself was a Nakşibendi shaykh who was upset by the Kemalists decision to abolish the Caliphate. This action, in view of the fact that religion was the principal bond between the Turkish and Kurdish populations of the Ottoman Empire, symbolically at least severed the links between the two communities. For an analysis of the Shaykh Sa'id rebellion see Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Yet, the Shaykh Sa' id rebellion and the two more nationalist ones of 1926-30 and 1937 failed to appeal to the totality of the Kurds. In fact, they were all regionally bound and there were few attempts on the part of the Kurds elsewhere to join in.
15. Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 281.
16. British Foreign Office Document, 4 January 1927, reproduced in Bilal Simsir, Ingiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de "Kürt Sorunu" (Turkey's "Kurdish Problem" Through the Perspective of English Documents) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991), p. 98.
17. Immediately before the formation of the DP, Inönü offered Bayar a deal whereby both parties would abstain from creating party organizations in the sensitive eastern and southeastern provinces of the country. Although the deal was rejected by Bayar, Inönü's suggestion is indicative of the circumspection with which the regime treated all Kurdish issues.
18. Cem Erogul. Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve Ideolojisi (Democrat Party: Its History and Ideology) (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1990), p. 49.
19. Many Kurds were elected to Parliament on the Democrat Party ticket. In a typical fashion the descendants of some of these members have continued to represent the same constituencies to this day. Naci Kutlay, 49'lar Dosyasi (The 49er's File) (Istanbul: Firat Yayinlari, 1994), p. 223.
20. In a celebrated case, 49 intellectuals, some of whom were to become founding members of Kurdish nationalist parties in the 1990's, were tried for separatist activities. Ibid.
21. David McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 398.
22. Starting with the Democrats, Turkish governments, in order to discredit them, chose to brand all domestically-generated Kurdish organizations as communist inspired or driven even where this characterization was inappropriate. However, the overthrow of the monarchy by 'Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq, in 1958, and the return of the legendary Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani did provide Turkish Kurds with an example of a state attempting to bridge the ethnic divide and hence the growing sympathy for the left-wing ideas of the new Iraqi regime.
23. The TLP, increasingly fractured over the Kurdish issue, was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971. On the left, the most important of the movements included, Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth) and Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left). The Kurdish offshoot of these, Devrimci Dogu Kültür Ocaklari (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths), was formed in 1969.
24. The 1988 Anfal campaign had as its aim the destruction of Kurdish villages in the north, the killing of large numbers of Kurds, and the forcible displacement of entire populations to other parts of Iraq. For one specific account, see Middle East Watch, The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993).
25. The Turkish constitution gives most executive powers to the prime minister, and not to the president.
26. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 9 December 1991.
27. Some of these former SHP members had been purged from the SHP in 1989 for having attended a Kurdish conference in Paris.
28. This is despite the fact that many of the HEP constituency and even some of its members were sympathetic to the PKK. It should be noted that over 50 of the new members of parliament elected in late 1991 were of Kurdish origin. Those included the foreign minister, minister of state in charge of human rights and other cabinet members.
29. Ismet Imset, PKK: Ayrilikçi Şiddetin 20 Yili: 1973-1992, p. 301. The idea of a cease-fire was first suggested to Öcalan in 1991 by PUK officials and their leader Talabani. At the time, the PKK had reached its zenith in military power and could have afforded to stop its military campaign. Öcalan refused to agree according to PUK emissaries. Author interview, northern Iraq, 16 May 1993.
30. Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," International Affairs 69, no. 4 (1993).
31. The store was owned by the family of the then super governor of the southeast. This was a clear case of reprisal.
32. The extent of Özal's role in the days leading to and immediately following the cease-fire has yet to be fully accounted for. Among those arguing for an extensive involvement by Özal is A. Osman Ölmez, Türkiye Siyasetinde DEP Depremi (The DEP Earthquake in Turkish Politics) (Ankara: Doruk Yayinlari, 1995), pp. 219-45.
33. The effectiveness of the Turkish operation has been debated ever since. It was more substantial than what the PKK led everyone to believe but also nowhere near Turkish claims.
34. Milliyet, 1 April 1993.
35. Abdullah Öcalan, PKK5. Kongresi'ne Sunulan Politik Rapor (The Political Report Submitted to the PKK's Fifth Congress) (Köln, Germany: Wesanen Serxwebun, 1995), pp. 327-28.
36. The court case against the HEP, initiated on the grounds that the party advocated separatist goals, came to fruition in July 1993.
37. Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma." Survival 35, no. 4 (Winter 1993-94).
38. Rifat Balli, Kürt Dosyasi (The Kurdish File) (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1991), pp. 38-40.
39. The military regime introduced a new law, Law 2932, which declared that the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens was Turkish. Cumhur Keskin, "Türkiye'nin Kürt Politikasi ve Resmi Ideoloji," (Turkey's Kurdish Policies and Official Ideology) in Seyfettin Gürsel, et al., Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu (Turkey's Kurdish Problem) (Istanbul: TÜSES, 1996), p. 75.
40. Bülend Ulusu, commander of the naval forces and one of the architects of the 1980 coup, and prime minister during military rule, told a journalist in an interview a year before the coup that when the army went on maneuvers in the southeast, it was met with slogans calling for their eviction. "The East is boiling; the communists and the Kurds are in complete cooperation there," Cüneyt Arcayürek, Müdahalenin Ayak Sesleri, 1978-1979 (The Intervention's Footsteps, 1978-1979) (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1985), p. 272. This interview, conducted on 6 September 1979, did not see the light until Arcayürek published his book.
41. Baskin Oran, "Kürt Milliyetçiligi: Doguşu ve Gelişmesi" (Kurdish Nationalism: Its Emergence and Development), in Seyfettin Gürsel et al., Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu, pp. 39-46.
42. Sabri Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," The Middle East Journal 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 18-19.
43. A force based in Turkey and composed of primarily US but also French, British and Turkish contingents designed to deter Baghdad.
44. In his memoirs, General Necip Torumtay, the chief of staff, who resigned during the Gulf Crisis because he disagreed with Özal on the nature and method of the foreign policy being followed, describes how the president, almost from the beginning, set out to impose his vision on the National Security Council. See Orgeneral Necip Torumtay'in Anilari (General Necip Torumtay's Memoirs) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), p. 111.
45. Graham E. Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade: Will Iraq Survive until 2002? RAND, N-3591-DAG, 1993.
46. Both Syria and Iraq have reacted negatively to the development of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by its Turkish acronym, GAP, which consists of 22 dams and a variety of irrigation projects. The downstream countries perceive this mammoth and partially completed project as a major threat to the quality and quantity of the water made available to them.
47. Even this move was greeted with skepticism by the Iraqi Kurds, who suspected the aid, and the aid organizations provided a convenient cover for Turkish intelligence agencies.
48. Notable exceptions are a much smaller number of bolder and more liberal politicians and columnists who have written about the deeper implications of the conflict in the southeast and explicitly addressed the problem of Kurdish identity; several television talk shows on non-state controlled television have also conducted long and searching discussions of the Kurdish problem that begin to offer the Turkish public a truer appreciation of the depth of the problem.