Hierarchical organization and incentives

European Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 3-5, 1996, Pages 687-695

  Caillaud, B ^a,d   Jullien, B ^b,d   Picard, P ^a,c  

^a CEPREMAP   (France)

^b CREST   (France)

^c THEMA   (France)

^d CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Decentralization; Incentive contracts; Negotiations; Organization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010113871     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00082-8     Document Type: Article

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