Davidson's identity crisis

Dialectica

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 45-61

  Hutto, Daniel D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010093004     PISSN: 00122017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1998.tb00040.x     Document Type: Article

References (60)

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