Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 202-217

  Ochs, Jack ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009941386     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1030     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. BLOOMFIELD, R. (1993). "Learning Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in the Laboratory," mimeo.
2. BROWN, J., and ROSENTHAL, R. (1990). "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis, A Reexamination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica 58, 1065-1081.
3. CRAWFORD, V. (1985). "Learning Behavior and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," J. Econ. Behav. Organization 6, 6-78.
4. EREV, I., and ROTH, A. (1995). "On the Need for Low Game Theory: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," Mimeo.
5. JORDAN, I. (1993). "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games Econ. Behav. 5, 368-386.
6. MCKELVF, Y. R., and PALFREY, T. (1993). "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," manuscript.
7. O’NEILL, B., "Nonmetric Test of Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zerosum Games (1987)," in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., Vol. 84, No. 7, pp. 2106-2109.
8. RAPOPORT, A., and BOEBEL, R. (1992). "Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis," Games Econ. Behav. 4, 261-283.
9. ROTH, A., and EREV, I. (1995). "Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term," Games Econ. Behav. 8, 163-212.
10. ROTH, A., and MALOUF, M. (1979). "Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining," Psych. Rev. 86, 574-594.