Corporate governance, ownership dispersion and efficiency: Empirical evidence from Austrian cooperative banking

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 119-140

  Gorton, Gary ^a,c   Schmid, Frank ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Austrian cooperative banking; Corporate governance; G21; G32; G34; Ownership dispersion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009893987     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00019-4     Document Type: Article

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