Why theory of mind is modular;Perché la teoria della mente è modulare

Sistemi Intelligenti

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 31-52

  Surian, Luca ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009849808     PISSN: 11209550     EISSN: 19738226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1422/3558     Document Type: Article

References (71)

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