"Thing-centered" holism in Buddhism, Heidegger, and deep ecology

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 359-375

  James, Simon P ^a  

^a NONE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0009645862     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics20002243     Document Type: Review

References (69)

1. See, for example, Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
2. I am taking intrinsic value to refer to non-instrumental value rather than, say, objective value. On the different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value, see John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics (London: Routledge, 1993), chap. 2.
3. From Ted Honderich, ed., Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
4. E.g., Eric Katz, "Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem,'" in Eric Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Individualism, Holism, and Environmental Ethics," Ethics and the Environment 1, no. 1 (1996): 55-69.
5. E.g., Eric Katz, "Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem,'" in Eric Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Individualism, Holism, and Environmental Ethics," Ethics and the Environment 1, no. 1 (1996): 55-69.
6. There have been a number of comparisons of Buddhist thought and Heidegger. Environmental philosophers are referred to Michael Zimmerman, "Heidegger, Buddhism and Deep Ecology," in Charles Guignon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Reinhard May, Heidegger's Hidden Sources, trans. Graham Parkes (London: Routledge, 1989), and Graham Parkes, ed., Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
7. There have been a number of comparisons of Buddhist thought and Heidegger. Environmental philosophers are referred to Michael Zimmerman, "Heidegger, Buddhism and Deep Ecology," in Charles Guignon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Reinhard May, Heidegger's Hidden Sources, trans. Graham Parkes (London: Routledge, 1989), and Graham Parkes, ed., Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
8. There have been a number of comparisons of Buddhist thought and Heidegger. Environmental philosophers are referred to Michael Zimmerman, "Heidegger, Buddhism and Deep Ecology," in Charles Guignon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Reinhard May, Heidegger's Hidden Sources, trans. Graham Parkes (London: Routledge, 1989), and Graham Parkes, ed., Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
9. Although I here refer to emptiness as a concept, it is essential to realize that the term is not to be understood purely "intellectually." On the contrary, as Nāgar̄junamaintained, emptiness is merely a "provisional name" for something to be directly experienced.
10. The Mahayana (Greater Vehicle) tradition distinguishes itself from Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) Buddhism by its emphasis on its compassionate and worldly enlightened ideal, the bodhisattva. Developments in the tradition led to both Tibetan Buddhism and Zen. For a good introduction to these traditions, see Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11. Note that I am here referring to a bodhisattva as an enlightened being - one who sees reality "as it is" - rather than as a being dedicated to the path to enlightenment.
12. Edward Conze, Buddhist Scriptures (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959), pp. 162-63.
13. See for example Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, ed. William LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp. 126-27.
14. Paul Williams, "Buddhist Concept of Emptiness," in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, version 1.0 online (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
15. Quoted in David E. Cooper, "Ineffability," in Aristotelian Society Supplement, vol. 65 (1991), p. 12. The emptiness that Harvey is here speaking of is, of course, "dynamic" or self-emptying emptiness (as opposed to mere "static" emptiness-as-opposed-to-form).
16. In the following account of these two errors, I am indebted to Masao Abe's various discussions in Abe, Zen, especially his essays "Zen and Western Thought," and "Non-Being and Mu - the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West."
17. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 181.
18. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 245.
19. In Heidegger, Poetry, pp. 165-86. Also see Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Basic Writings, pp. 143-212.
20. In Heidegger, Poetry, pp. 165-86. Also see Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Basic Writings, pp. 143-212.
21. Heidegger, Poetry, p. 174.
22. Ibid., p. 206.
23. Heidegger, Basic Writings, pp. 351.
24. Heidegger, Poetry, p. 172.
25. Ibid., p. 173 (emphasis in the original).
26. Ibid., p. 206.
27. In, for instance, The Question of Being (London, Vision Press, 1959). Masao Abe adopts a similar strategy to express śūnyatā (quoted in Steve Odin, "Derrida and the Decentred Universe of Chan/Zen Buddhism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 [1990]: 69).
28. In, for instance, The Question of Being (London, Vision Press, 1959). Masao Abe adopts a similar strategy to express śūnyatā (quoted in Steve Odin, "Derrida and the Decentred Universe of Chan/Zen Buddhism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 [1990]: 69).
29. E.g., Heidegger, Poetry, p. 179.
30. Martin Heidegger, The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 44.
31. Heidegger, Poetry, p. 202.
32. Ibid., p. 206.
33. "Pain is the dif-ference itself." Ibid., p. 204.
34. Ibid., p. 207.
35. Ibid., p. 182.
36. See ibid., p. 207. Heidegger is, I think, making a similar point in his dialogue, "Conversation along a Country Path about Thinking," when he claims that "That-which-regions" "abides into the expanse of its own resting." Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John Anderson, and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 66.
37. See ibid., p. 207. Heidegger is, I think, making a similar point in his dialogue, "Conversation along a Country Path about Thinking," when he claims that "That-which-regions" "abides into the expanse of its own resting." Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John Anderson, and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 66.
38. See Lambert Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature: The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990 (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991).
39. See for instance Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 190-01; Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 251.
40. See for instance Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 190-01; Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 251.
41. Perhaps this could be thought of as a phenomenological source of the concept of intrinsic value. See Erazim Kohak, "Perceiving the Good," in Max Oelschlaeger, The Wilderness Condition (Washington: Island Press, 1992), pp. 173-87.
42. Admittedly, it does not seem quite correct to speak of either emptiness or world as a "whole". However, that said, it does not seem absolutely correct to speak of either term as denoting any thing at all!
43. Consider, say, metaphysical interpretations of Gaia as a superorganism or Freya Mathews' idea of an ecological cosmic Self. See Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1994).
44. There is a case for arguing that if awakened perception did not involve a perception of things, the enlightened subject would be unable to operate in a world of recognizably distinct things. Heidegger makes this point by claiming that awakening is indelibly linguistic, an awakening to language. Prima facie, this conception seems to be diametrically opposed to the conventional interpretation of Buddhist enlightenment as an escape from the confines of language. However, Dale S. Wright has, I think, presented a compelling case that at least Zen enlightenment (satori) can, like Heideggerian enlightenment, be thought of as an awakening to rather than from language. See Dale S. Wright, "Rethinking Transcendence: The Role of Language in Zen Experience," Philosophy East and West 42, no, 1 (1992): 113-38.
45. See Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), p. 2. This articulation of "thing-centeredness" is very close to that outlined by Alfred North Whitehead in his philosophy of organism. Compare, for example, Alfred N. Whitehead Science and the Modern World (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 73, 96. Note also Whitehead's use of the term value to denote the "intrinsic reality" of a holistic event (p. 95).
46. See Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), p. 2. This articulation of "thing-centeredness" is very close to that outlined by Alfred North Whitehead in his philosophy of organism. Compare, for example, Alfred N. Whitehead Science and the Modern World (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 73, 96. Note also Whitehead's use of the term value to denote the "intrinsic reality" of a holistic event (p. 95).
47. Heidegger, Poetry, p. 206.
48. Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 442.
49. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100.
50. Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985). Incidentally, Devall and Sessions tend to equivocate over the meaning of intrinsic value, sometimes associating it with non-instrumental value, sometimes with objective value. For a discussion of the different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value, see John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics (London: Routledge, 1993), chap. 2.
51. Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985). Incidentally, Devall and Sessions tend to equivocate over the meaning of intrinsic value, sometimes associating it with non-instrumental value, sometimes with objective value. For a discussion of the different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value, see John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics (London: Routledge, 1993), chap. 2.
52. Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambala Publications, 1990).
53. Taking his cue from Naess' ideal of Self-Realization, Fox argues that this experience involves the subject's identification with nature to the extent that her self-interest expands to include all beings.
54. do not wish to be exclusive: "naturalist," "romantic," "ecologist," etc. could here take the place of "deep ecologist." Furthermore, I do not wish to claim in the following that all deep experiences of nature are of a piece. There are undoubtedly a variety of suitably "deep" experiences or intuitions of nature: For instance, it seems possible that the Transcendentalists' experiences of the "ferity" or "wildness" of nature could be quite different from the thing-centered experience I describe below.
55. Arne Naess, "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes" in Michael Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology (Santa Monica: IMT Productions, 1985). By "strong mystical traditions," Naess is probably referring to something like the experience of certain Advaitin Hindu mystics for whom enlightenment involves dissolution into the undifferentiated reality of Brahman. For Buddhists, such a nihilistic experience is at best a precursor to true enlightenment (see Abe, Zen, P. 4).
56. Arne Naess, "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes" in Michael Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology (Santa Monica: IMT Productions, 1985). By "strong mystical traditions," Naess is probably referring to something like the experience of certain Advaitin Hindu mystics for whom enlightenment involves dissolution into the undifferentiated reality of Brahman. For Buddhists, such a nihilistic experience is at best a precursor to true enlightenment (see Abe, Zen, P. 4).
57. Here I use the phrases "thing-centered," "thing-centered experience," and "thing-centeredness" to stand for the tongue-twisting "thing-centeredly holistic," "thing-centered experience of holism," and "thing-centered holisticality."
58. See especially Suzuki's discussion of Chiyo's "Morning-glory" haiku in D. T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 244-48
59. Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 338; Heidegger, Question concerning Technology, p. 33.
60. Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 338; Heidegger, Question concerning Technology, p. 33.
61. I do not mean to suggest that the enlightened deep ecologist must suppose hat nature is wholly benign. It seems likely that, from an enlightened perspective, all things disclose themselves as being in some sense precious - even things that the unenlightened consider revolting or distasteful. In this regard it is pertinent to note that haiku often centered on such ostensibly distasteful subjects as urination or defecation. See Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, pp. 237-38.
62. As Frederick Streng points out, this demarcation of the limits of reason is taken by Buddhists to be an important religious implication of the concept of emptiness. Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 159
63. Compare Maurice Ash's "Wittgensteinian" understanding of environment as a limit in which "justifications come to an end," in The Fabric of the World: Towards a Philosophy of Environment (Guildford: Green Books, 1992), p. 59.
64. For a discussion of concerns of these sort, see Holmes Rolston, III, "Can the East Help the West to Value Nature?" Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (1987): 172-90. For a classic statement of scepticism regarding the value of mysticism, see chap. 7, "Removing the Rubbish," in John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974). Murray Bookchin provides a comprehensive critique of "mystical" environmental ethics in his Re-Enchanting Humanity (London: Cassell, 1995).
65. For a discussion of concerns of these sort, see Holmes Rolston, III, "Can the East Help the West to Value Nature?" Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (1987): 172-90. For a classic statement of scepticism regarding the value of mysticism, see chap. 7, "Removing the Rubbish," in John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974). Murray Bookchin provides a comprehensive critique of "mystical" environmental ethics in his Re-Enchanting Humanity (London: Cassell, 1995).
66. For a discussion of concerns of these sort, see Holmes Rolston, III, "Can the East Help the West to Value Nature?" Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (1987): 172-90. For a classic statement of scepticism regarding the value of mysticism, see chap. 7, "Removing the Rubbish," in John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974). Murray Bookchin provides a comprehensive critique of "mystical" environmental ethics in his Re-Enchanting Humanity (London: Cassell, 1995).
67. The Mahayana idea of the bodhisattva may prove relevant here. The Mahayana literature abounds with warnings against becoming attached to enlightenment. It is for this reason that the bodhisattva is taken to forego Nirvana in order to return to the world and the task of curing the unenlightened masses of their attachments and suffering. Perhaps, in the context of the preceding discussion, this idea could provide a means to square Bookchin's warning of the dangers of "mystical" doctrines with a commitment to a thing-centered experience of the world: maybe one cold associate basking in the light of an enlightened experience of things with an imperfect enlightenment - the enlightenment, as Mahayana Buddhists say, of an arhat. By contrast, true enlightenment, the enlightenment of a bodhisattva, would involve forsaking the solace of enlightenment and returning to the pragmatic concerns of the world.
68. Of course, in all these cases, silence has its place. Sometimes it will be appropriate for, say, a music teacher to keep quiet and let the music "speak for itself."
69. Plato Phaedrus and The Seventh and Eighth Letters, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 100. I thank Dawn Phillips for drawing my attention to this connection with Plato.