Social Constructivism: A Flawed Debate over Conceptual Foundations

Capitalism, Nature, Socialism

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 97-125

  Mariyani Squire, Edward ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0009627037     PISSN: 10455752     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10455759909358888     Document Type: Article

References (103)

1. Traditional materialism sees reality, in the final analysis, as a mindindependent "Object," the "Subject" being a register of it. Idealism sees reality, in the final analysis, as the mind-dependent "Subject," the "Object" being an epiphenomenon.
2. Here, "immanent critique" means the provisional acceptance of the basic assumptions and criteria of the body of thought in question, and then the demonstration that said body does not cohere with those very assumptions and/or criteria. It is a technique that uses the body of thought to attack itself. The pointing out of these "internal" difficulties is the act of criticism, in this definition.
3. It should be noted that at this stage I have made no firm judgment as to whether or not some revised version of Social Constructivism might be useful.
4. These are terms derived from Karl Marx. Marx stated that "first nature" consisted of basic material processes associated with the land and animals, while "second nature" referred to the human constructed or transformed environment (presumably linked to Marx's more famous concept of "humanized nature"). On "humanized nature" see K. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 143.
5. The debate over the "nature of Nature" can be distinguished from the debate over "natural limits" because the latter does not necessarily entail a division between materialism and idealism, while the former obviously does. Nonetheless, it should be noted that conclusions arising from one debate can impact upon the other. On the "natural limits" debate see T. Benton, "Marxism and Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and Reconstruction," New Left Review, 178, November-December, 1989; R. Grundmann, "The Ecological Challenge to Marxism," New Left Review, 187, May-June, 1991; A. Vlachou, "Reflections on the Ecological Critiques and Reconstructions of Marxism," Rethinking Marxism, 7, 3, Fall, 1994.
6. The debate over the "nature of Nature" can be distinguished from the debate over "natural limits" because the latter does not necessarily entail a division between materialism and idealism, while the former obviously does. Nonetheless, it should be noted that conclusions arising from one debate can impact upon the other. On the "natural limits" debate see T. Benton, "Marxism and Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and Reconstruction," New Left Review, 178, November-December, 1989; R. Grundmann, "The Ecological Challenge to Marxism," New Left Review, 187, May-June, 1991; A. Vlachou, "Reflections on the Ecological Critiques and Reconstructions of Marxism," Rethinking Marxism, 7, 3, Fall, 1994.
7. The debate over the "nature of Nature" can be distinguished from the debate over "natural limits" because the latter does not necessarily entail a division between materialism and idealism, while the former obviously does. Nonetheless, it should be noted that conclusions arising from one debate can impact upon the other. On the "natural limits" debate see T. Benton, "Marxism and Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and Reconstruction," New Left Review, 178, November-December, 1989; R. Grundmann, "The Ecological Challenge to Marxism," New Left Review, 187, May-June, 1991; A. Vlachou, "Reflections on the Ecological Critiques and Reconstructions of Marxism," Rethinking Marxism, 7, 3, Fall, 1994.
8. This is, at least, my reading of S. Rosewarne, "Marxism, the Second Contradiction, and Socialist Ecology," CNS, 8, 2, June, 1997, esp. pp. 114-16.
9. Ibid., p. 116 (my italics).
10. W-A. Suchting, "Constructivism Deconstructed," Science and Education, 1, 1992, pp. 246-47; M. Devitt, Realism and Truth, revised edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 157-59, 235-37.
11. W-A. Suchting, "Constructivism Deconstructed," Science and Education, 1, 1992, pp. 246-47; M. Devitt, Realism and Truth, revised edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 157-59, 235-37.
12. See Vogel, op.cit.
13. W.A. Suchting, "On Some Unsettled Questions Touching the Character of Marxism, Especially as Philosophy," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 14, 1, p. 162.
14. With respect to this concept, Hegel claimed that in each of the dualisms and conceptual oppositions evident throughout philosophy's history (and human history generally), the two opposing concepts presupposed each other, and that a "synthesis" of them would result in a higher-order, non-contradictory "Notion" (Begriff). This Notion in turn presupposed a contradictory other, and so on.
15. "The subject" for Hegel was humanity's spirit as a whole entity (Geist).
16. I would suggest that if one extracted Vogel's four arguments for Social Constructivism from their immediate context (see Vogel, op.cit., pp. 35-39), one would be hard pressed to find any serious disagreements between them and conclusions derived from a Kantian position.
17. Vogel, op.cit., p.36.
18. Ibid.
19. See, e.g., Devitt, op.cit., pp. 241ff.; Dickens, op.cit., ch. 3; Hayward, op.cit., p. 38; Soper, op.cit., ch. 5.
20. See, e.g., Devitt, op.cit., pp. 241ff.; Dickens, op.cit., ch. 3; Hayward, op.cit., p. 38; Soper, op.cit., ch. 5.
21. See, e.g., Devitt, op.cit., pp. 241ff.; Dickens, op.cit., ch. 3; Hayward, op.cit., p. 38; Soper, op.cit., ch. 5.
22. See, e.g., Devitt, op.cit., pp. 241ff.; Dickens, op.cit., ch. 3; Hayward, op.cit., p. 38; Soper, op.cit., ch. 5.
23. Note that Rosewarne draws support from the anti-positivist Stanley Aronowitz, and Vogel draws support from, among others, Thomas Kuhn and Bruno Latour.
24. K.J. Gergen, "The Social Constructionist Movement In Modern Psychology," American Psychologist, March, 1985, p. 267.
25. Devitt, op.cit., p. 237.
26. Vlachou, op.cit., p. 122.
27. For the first and, for many, the last word on the "sociological turn" in the philosophy of science, see D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).
28. Evernden, op.cit., p. 15.
29. Ibid, p. 18ff.
30. A-O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, Primativism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (New York: Octagon Books, 1973).
31. Evernden, op.cit., p. 18ff.; cf. J. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition (Boston: Beacon Press, [1948] 1957); C. Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980).
32. Evernden, op.cit., p. 18ff.; cf. J. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition (Boston: Beacon Press, [1948] 1957); C. Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980).
33. Evernden, op.cit., p. 18ff.; cf. J. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition (Boston: Beacon Press, [1948] 1957); C. Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980).
34. Cf. A. Seller, "Realism versus Relativism: Towards a Politically Adequate Epistemology," in M. Griffiths and M. Whitford, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988); P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: Verso, [1978] 1982).
35. Cf. A. Seller, "Realism versus Relativism: Towards a Politically Adequate Epistemology," in M. Griffiths and M. Whitford, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988); P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: Verso, [1978] 1982).
36. Cf. A. Seller, "Realism versus Relativism: Towards a Politically Adequate Epistemology," in M. Griffiths and M. Whitford, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988); P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: Verso, [1978] 1982).
37. Rosewarne, op.cit., p.118.
38. This denial allows for the possibility of the crystallisation of injustices and social power relations as eternal givens such that, potentially at least, the statement: "that is just the way it is," can become a (fallacious) justifiable response to all situations -both positive and normative.
39. "To grasp this fact [i.e., that Nature is socially constructed] is to see the world we inhabit as something for which we are responsible, in both the causal and moral sense of that word" (Vogel, op.cit., p. 167).
40. Evernden, op.cit., p.27; cf. Vlachou, op.cit., p. 119; Berger and Luckmann, op.cit.
41. Evernden, op.cit., p.27; cf. Vlachou, op.cit., p. 119; Berger and Luckmann, op.cit.
42. Evernden, op.cit., p.27; cf. Vlachou, op.cit., p. 119; Berger and Luckmann, op.cit.
43. With respect to what follows, I am not suggesting that advocates of Social Constructivism necessarily hold to any of the analytical outcomes that I suggest follow from the doctrine of Social Constructivism. Equally, however, it would be a fallacious defense to say that just because an advocate of Social Constructivism did not intend for such outcomes to follow, they do not actually follow.
44. Soper, op.cit., p. 151. Roy Bhaskar calls this an "epistemic fallacy," i.e., ontological claims are "reduced to" or "transposed into" knowledgeclaims (R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science [Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975], p. 36).
45. Soper, op.cit., p. 151. Roy Bhaskar calls this an "epistemic fallacy," i.e., ontological claims are "reduced to" or "transposed into" knowledgeclaims (R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science [Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975], p. 36).
46. Devitt, op.cit., p. 239.
47. Vogel, op.cit., p. 35.
48. R. Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986), p. 73ff.; J.F. Harris, Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defence of Method (Illinois: Open Court, 1992), p. 85ff.
49. R. Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986), p. 73ff.; J.F. Harris, Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defence of Method (Illinois: Open Court, 1992), p. 85ff.
50. Evernden, op.cit., p. 28. For the record, Evernden does not lay claim to this proposition himself.
51. One might say that strictly speaking it is not impossible for there to be more than one omnipotent "constructor," thus negating the charge of solipsism. However, it does seem to be analytically true that if there were more than one, it would be necessary for them to act as if there were only one, otherwise the theorist gets into difficulties over how one truly omnipotent being could oppose another.
52. P. Hoyningen-Huene, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, trans., A.T. Levine (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 270.
53. Ibid, p. 271.
54. See Devitt, op.cit., p. 238 and Vogel, op.cit., p. 36. (Vogel correctly notes the Hegelian source of this objection, whereas Devitt does not.)
55. See Devitt, op.cit., p. 238 and Vogel, op.cit., p. 36. (Vogel correctly notes the Hegelian source of this objection, whereas Devitt does not.)
56. S. Vogel, "Nature, Practice, and Construction: Response to Critics," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 9, 3, 1998, p. 35.
57. Thus, Vogel finds the "constraint" on complete control located in the (currently?) mysterious thing called the "ineliminable moment of concreteness" (ibid., p. 36).
58. This performative contradiction (i.e., advocating one thing while doing the opposite) is pointed out by Norman Geras in relation to John Keane's "self-consistent relativism" (N. Geras, "Seven Types of Obliquy: Travesties of Marxism," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 14, 1, 1991, p. 96ff).
59. M. Sprinker, "The Royal Road: Marxism and the Philosophy of Science," New Left Review, 191, January/February, 1992, pp. 126-27; cf. Benton, op.cit., p. 58.
60. M. Sprinker, "The Royal Road: Marxism and the Philosophy of Science," New Left Review, 191, January/February, 1992, pp. 126-27; cf. Benton, op.cit., p. 58.
61. A. Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy (London: Verso, 1994), p. 88.
62. Ibid, p. 89.
63. As John Maze observes: "Social constructionism is in danger of falling into the same kind of error as certain behaviourists, in treating organisms as passive, empty vessels waiting to be filled in by training" (J.R. Maze, "Social Constructionism, Deconstructionism and Classification" in C. Latimer and J. Michell, eds., At Once Scientific and Philosophic: A Festschrift for John Philip Sutcliffe [Brisbane: Boombana, 1996]), p. 77.
64. Of course, there are in fact "degrees of domination" here ranging from the complete domination of Plato and Hegel to the milder control of the "philosophical underlaborer" of Locke and Hume.
65. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
66. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
67. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
68. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
69. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
70. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
71. See various articles in C.J. Bontempo and S.J. Odell, eds, The Owl Of Minerva: Philosophers On Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Cahoone, op.cit., H.-N. Castañeda, "Philosophy as a Science and as a Worldview" in A. Cohen and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? (Illinois: Open Court, 1989); A. Cohen, "The 'End-of-Philosophy:' An Anatomy of a Cross Purpose Debate," in ibid; Dewey, [1948] 1957, op.cit.; R. Gunn, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism," Capital and Class, 37, Spring, 1989, p. 90; Suchting, op.cit., pp. 157-63.
72. This is not to say that the above critique is not in fact an immanent one. It is merely to say that such types of critique tend to be made by those of a materialist persuasion as a means of supporting their own position. See Devitt's comments on abduction (Devitt, op.cit., pp. 111-13).
73. Bhaskar, op.cit.
74. No one leaves a room via the tenth floor window safe in the knowledge that spattering on ground below is merely an idea, concept or interpretation from which one can recover with ease. No one hermeneutically solves food crises by simply reinterpreting arsenic and uranium rods as loaves and fishes.
75. D.-H. Ruben, Marxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge, second edition (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979), p. 107.
76. Suchting, op.cit., p. 200. See also W. Suchting, "Reflections upon Roy Bhaskar's 'Critical Realism'," Radical Philosophy, 61, Summer, 1992, p. 27.
77. Suchting, op.cit., p. 200. See also W. Suchting, "Reflections upon Roy Bhaskar's 'Critical Realism'," Radical Philosophy, 61, Summer, 1992, p. 27.
78. Andrew Collier argues that Bhaskar does not treat transcendental arguments as incorrigible proofs (see Collier, op.cit., pp. 23, 27). This is given a hint of plausibility in one or two lines by Bhaskar (R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy [London: Verso, 1989], p. 15). I regard this defense as weak. The vast bulk of Bhaskar's work is written as if it were completely infallible, and in the very few instances where it is conceded that his deductions may not be perfectly tight, it is invariably suggested that they are nonetheless the most plausible ones available. No mention is made of for whom or for what reason they are most plausible (see the above references for examples of this).
79. Andrew Collier argues that Bhaskar does not treat transcendental arguments as incorrigible proofs (see Collier, op.cit., pp. 23, 27). This is given a hint of plausibility in one or two lines by Bhaskar (R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy [London: Verso, 1989], p. 15). I regard this defense as weak. The vast bulk of Bhaskar's work is written as if it were completely infallible, and in the very few instances where it is conceded that his deductions may not be perfectly tight, it is invariably suggested that they are nonetheless the most plausible ones available. No mention is made of for whom or for what reason they are most plausible (see the above references for examples of this).
80. Devitt, op.cit., pp. 61-63.
81. Indeed, this is precisely what Devitt himself ends up doing in his defense of realism.
82. As R. G. Collingwood puts it: "Anyone, at any moment, without taking the smallest trouble, can put himself in a position where first-hand experience will prove to him that a 'realistic' theory of knowledge is true. All he need do is to let his mind drift until he is thinking in so casual and haphazard a way that he will find himself automatically doing exactly what the 'realists' tell us that we all do whenever we think" (R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics [Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, [1940] 1972], pp. 34-35). (One presumes that Collingwood is referring to G.E. Moore's commonsense realism here.)
83. Cohen, op.cit., p. 124.
84. All of Feyerabend's writings from the 1970s onward are in this vein, e.g., Feyerabend, op.cit., p. 164; P. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 73, and P. Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 41ff.
85. All of Feyerabend's writings from the 1970s onward are in this vein, e.g., Feyerabend, op.cit., p. 164; P. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 73, and P. Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 41ff.
86. All of Feyerabend's writings from the 1970s onward are in this vein, e.g., Feyerabend, op.cit., p. 164; P. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 73, and P. Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 41ff.
87. E. Grosz, "The in(ter)vention of feminist knowledges," in B. Caine, E. Grosz and M. deLeparvanche, eds., Crossing Boundaries (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 100.
88. Cahoone, op.cit., esp. Chapter 10; Gunn, op.cit., pp. 89-92; Ruben, op.cit., pp. 95-109; W.A. Suchting, "The Nature of Scientific Thought," Science and Education, 4, 1995, pp. 16-17.
89. Cahoone, op.cit., esp. Chapter 10; Gunn, op.cit., pp. 89-92; Ruben, op.cit., pp. 95-109; W.A. Suchting, "The Nature of Scientific Thought," Science and Education, 4, 1995, pp. 16-17.
90. Cahoone, op.cit., esp. Chapter 10; Gunn, op.cit., pp. 89-92; Ruben, op.cit., pp. 95-109; W.A. Suchting, "The Nature of Scientific Thought," Science and Education, 4, 1995, pp. 16-17.
91. Cahoone, op.cit., esp. Chapter 10; Gunn, op.cit., pp. 89-92; Ruben, op.cit., pp. 95-109; W.A. Suchting, "The Nature of Scientific Thought," Science and Education, 4, 1995, pp. 16-17.
92. Cf. A. Rudy, "Against Nature Constructivism, for Active Materialism," CNS, 5, 2, September, 1998, pp. 28-31.
93. W.A. Suchting, Marx and Philosophy: Three Studies. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1986), p. 73-74.
94. Gunn, op.cit,. pp. 48ff.; cf. Collingwood, op.cit., pp. 40-41.
95. Gunn, op.cit,. pp. 48ff.; cf. Collingwood, op.cit., pp. 40-41.
96. This term is taken from Collingwood. The central characteristics of "absolute presuppositions" are these: they are logically prior to all questions and thus are not answers to questions; they are not propositions (are not propounded) and thus are not classifiable as either true or false; they are logically unverifiable; and they are historically contingent and revisable. See Collingwood, op. cit., esp. Chapters 4 and 5 for elucidation on "absolute presuppositions." There is a reasonable degree of similarity here with Louis Althusser's notion of "theses" or "positions" (as opposed to substantive bodies of knowledge). See L. Althusser, "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists," in L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, G. Elliott, ed. (London, Verso, 1990); L. Althusser, "Lenin and Philosophy," in L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); T. O'Hagan, "Althusser: How To Be A Marxist In Philosophy," in G.H.R. Parkinson, ed., Marx And Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Suchting, 1995, op.cit., p. 17.
97. This term is taken from Collingwood. The central characteristics of "absolute presuppositions" are these: they are logically prior to all questions and thus are not answers to questions; they are not propositions (are not propounded) and thus are not classifiable as either true or false; they are logically unverifiable; and they are historically contingent and revisable. See Collingwood, op. cit., esp. Chapters 4 and 5 for elucidation on "absolute presuppositions." There is a reasonable degree of similarity here with Louis Althusser's notion of "theses" or "positions" (as opposed to substantive bodies of knowledge). See L. Althusser, "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists," in L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, G. Elliott, ed. (London, Verso, 1990); L. Althusser, "Lenin and Philosophy," in L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); T. O'Hagan, "Althusser: How To Be A Marxist In Philosophy," in G.H.R. Parkinson, ed., Marx And Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Suchting, 1995, op.cit., p. 17.
98. This term is taken from Collingwood. The central characteristics of "absolute presuppositions" are these: they are logically prior to all questions and thus are not answers to questions; they are not propositions (are not propounded) and thus are not classifiable as either true or false; they are logically unverifiable; and they are historically contingent and revisable. See Collingwood, op. cit., esp. Chapters 4 and 5 for elucidation on "absolute presuppositions." There is a reasonable degree of similarity here with Louis Althusser's notion of "theses" or "positions" (as opposed to substantive bodies of knowledge). See L. Althusser, "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists," in L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, G. Elliott, ed. (London, Verso, 1990); L. Althusser, "Lenin and Philosophy," in L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); T. O'Hagan, "Althusser: How To Be A Marxist In Philosophy," in G.H.R. Parkinson, ed., Marx And Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Suchting, 1995, op.cit., p. 17.
99. This term is taken from Collingwood. The central characteristics of "absolute presuppositions" are these: they are logically prior to all questions and thus are not answers to questions; they are not propositions (are not propounded) and thus are not classifiable as either true or false; they are logically unverifiable; and they are historically contingent and revisable. See Collingwood, op. cit., esp. Chapters 4 and 5 for elucidation on "absolute presuppositions." There is a reasonable degree of similarity here with Louis Althusser's notion of "theses" or "positions" (as opposed to substantive bodies of knowledge). See L. Althusser, "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists," in L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, G. Elliott, ed. (London, Verso, 1990); L. Althusser, "Lenin and Philosophy," in L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); T. O'Hagan, "Althusser: How To Be A Marxist In Philosophy," in G.H.R. Parkinson, ed., Marx And Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Suchting, 1995, op.cit., p. 17.
100. This term is taken from Collingwood. The central characteristics of "absolute presuppositions" are these: they are logically prior to all questions and thus are not answers to questions; they are not propositions (are not propounded) and thus are not classifiable as either true or false; they are logically unverifiable; and they are historically contingent and revisable. See Collingwood, op. cit., esp. Chapters 4 and 5 for elucidation on "absolute presuppositions." There is a reasonable degree of similarity here with Louis Althusser's notion of "theses" or "positions" (as opposed to substantive bodies of knowledge). See L. Althusser, "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists," in L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, G. Elliott, ed. (London, Verso, 1990); L. Althusser, "Lenin and Philosophy," in L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); T. O'Hagan, "Althusser: How To Be A Marxist In Philosophy," in G.H.R. Parkinson, ed., Marx And Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Suchting, 1995, op.cit., p. 17.
101. Suchting, 1991, op.cit., pp. 168-69.
102. Suchting, 1995, op.cit., p. 17.
103. Cf. G. Markus, "After the 'System:' Philosophy in the Age of the Sciences," in K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel, and M.W. Wartofsky, eds., Science, Politics and Social Practice Essays on Marxism and Science, Philosophy of Culture and the Social Sciences: In Honor of Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 159.