An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 24, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 47-76

  Moreno, Diego ^a   Wooders, John ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009336478     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0624     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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3. Aumann, R. (1987). "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica 55, 667-677.
4. Bernheim, B., Peleg, B., and Whinston, M. (1987). "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I: Concepts," J. Econom. Theory 42, 1-12.
5. Einy, E., and Peleg, B. (1995). "Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria," in Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics (W. A. Burnett, H. Moulin, M. Sales, and N. J. Schofield, Eds.), Chap. 13. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press.
6. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. (1996). "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games Econom. Behav. 17, 113-128.
7. Moreno, D., and Wooders, J. (1996). "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games Econom. Behav. 17, 80-112.
8. Mood, A., Graybill, F., and Boes, D. (1974). Introduction to the Theory of Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
9. Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
10. Nash, J. F., Jr. (1951). "Non-Cooperative Games," Ann. of Math. 54, 289-295.
11. Ray, I. (1996). "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition," Games Econom. Behav. 17, 56-79.