Oneself as oneself and not as another

Husserl Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-17

  Johnstone, Albert A ^a  

^a WESTERN OREGON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009271163     PISSN: 01679848     EISSN: 15728501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00117140     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 3.
2. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K., Smith (London: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 244-247.
3. See especially Ricoeur, pp. 3, 31, 332.
4. Husserl charges skepticism generally with being self-destroying and nonsensical on the grounds that it denies its own presuppositions. See his Logical Investigations, Volume I, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 136-7, 115-17 (Hua XVIII, 120-21, 94-95);
5. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Pure Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 185, (Hua III, 174). He brings a similar charge of self-refutation and incoherence against Hume and Hume's account of induction.
6. See The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: North-western University Press, 1970), p. 88 (Hua VI, 91),
7. and Experience and Judgment, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 392-3.
8. Ricoeur, p. 31;
9. Peter F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), pp. 101-105.
10. Strawson, pp. 100-103.
11. In Chapters 8 and 9 of Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991).
12. Ricoeur, pp. 329-331.
13. In an unpublished paper, "Play by Oneself."
14. Ricoeur, p. 323.
15. Ricoeur, p. 332.
16. Ricoeur, p. 332, footnote 38.
17. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. xiv.
18. The term is borrowed from Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Thinking (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 5.
19. The notion that the flesh is in danger of fragmentation may be attributed apparently to the French Freudian analyst, Jacques Lacan, who characterizes the infant's body as fragmented ('le corps morcelé'). Lacan offers little apparent support for his view of infantile bodies beyond the obvious fact that infants are quite unskilled in goal-directed movement and the general assumption that troubling repetitive images and psychotic symptoms must mirror some infantile stage. The 'fragmented body' appears in particular in Lacan's Ecrits: a Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977), p. 4.
20. Didier Franck, Chair et corps: sur la phénoménologie de Husserl, (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981), pp. 167, 97, 98, note 22.
21. The passage to which Franck mistakenly appeals, may be found in Husserl, Ideas II, p. 167 (Hua IV, 159). It runs as follows: "... on the other hand I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my Body, or my Body from me, and accordingly the manifolds of appearance of the Body are restricted in a definite way: certain of my corporeal parts can be seen by me only in a peculiar perspectival foreshortening, and others (e.g., the head) are altogether invisible to me. The same Body that serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me in the perception of it itself and is a remarkably imperfectly constituted thing."
22. Ricoeur, pp. 325-326, 333.
23. See, for instance, Husserl, Ideas II, pp. 135-136 (Hua IV, 127-28);
24. Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 60, 97 (Hua I, 95, 128);
25. Experience and Judgment, pp. 83-84;
26. Dorian Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 3-8, 79.
27. The point is more fully developed in my paper "The Role of Ich Kann in Husserl's answer to Humean Skepticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XLVI, (June 1986): 591-5.
28. Husserl, Ideas II, p. 87 (Hua IV, 82).
29. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 105-120 (Hua I, 135-150).
30. Ricoeur, pp. 332-333.
31. Franck, p. 101.
32. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 116 (Hua I, 146).
33. William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume Two (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), pp. 450-453.
34. Andrew N. Meltzoff and Keith Moore, "Newborn Infants Imitate Adult Facial Gestures," Child Development 54 (1983): pp. 702-709.
35. Ricoeur, pp. 332, 333, 336.
36. Ricoeur, pp. 333-339;
37. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 67;
38. Franck, p. 125.
39. George Berkeley, Of the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part First, par. 139, in Berkeley: Essay, Principles, Dialogues with Selections from Other Writings, ed. Mary W. Calkins (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 205;
40. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 317-318.
41. Husserl, Ideas II, p. 107 (Hua IV, 101).
42. Sartre, pp. 340-400.
43. Ricoeur, pp. 33-34, 39.
44. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 84 (Hua I, 117).
45. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 83, 24, 25 (Hua I, 116, 63, 64).