Stock-Returns and Inflation in a Principal-Agent Economy

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 223-247

  Jovanovic, Boyan ^a   Ueda, Masako ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009166338     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2434     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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