Do generalized expected utility theories capture persisting properties of individual decision makers?

Acta Psychologica

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 21-42

  Hartinger, Armin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF REGENSBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Decision making; Expected utility; Rank dependent; Sign dependent

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009107061     PISSN: 00016918     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0001-6918(99)00018-9     Document Type: Article

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