Japan and the Spratlys dispute: Aspirations and limitations

Asian Survey

Volumn 36, Issue 10, 1996, Pages 995-1009

  Er, Lam Peng ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009025202     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645630     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Soeya Yoshihide writes: "The South China Sea conflict is one of the few cases where Japan's national and security interests are evidently at stake in the post-Cold War era." Yoshihide Soeya, "The South China Sea Conflict: Implication for Regional Security and Japan's Response," paper prepared for the international conference on Security Implications and Conflict in the South China Sea: Perspectives from the Asia-Pacific, Institute for Strategic Studies and Pacific Forum, CSIS, November 1995, Manila.
2. Soeya Yoshihide writes: "The South China Sea conflict is one of the few cases where Japan's national and security interests are evidently at stake in the post-Cold War era." Yoshihide Soeya, "The South China Sea Conflict: Implication for Regional Security and Japan's Response," paper prepared for the international conference on Security Implications and Conflict in the South China Sea: Perspectives from the Asia-Pacific, Institute for Strategic Studies and Pacific Forum, CSIS, November 1995, Manila.
3. See Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shinshutsu" [Chinese naval advance in the South China Sea], Kokubo [The national defence], 40:12, December 1991, p. 10; and Takeshita Hidekuni, "Minami shinakai funso no keii to ryoyuken mondai" [The details of the South China Sea conflict and the question of territorial rights], Ajia Torendo [Asian trends], 3:59, 1992, p. 64.
4. See Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shinshutsu" [Chinese naval advance in the South China Sea], Kokubo [The national defence], 40:12, December 1991, p. 10; and Takeshita Hidekuni, "Minami shinakai funso no keii to ryoyuken mondai" [The details of the South China Sea conflict and the question of territorial rights], Ajia Torendo [Asian trends], 3:59, 1992, p. 64.
5. In a roundtable discussion in June 1995 with a group of retired Japanese generals and admirals from the Defence Research Center, the author observed that most of them favored a non-military role for Japan in the Spratlys, or even complete non-involvement; as one general put it: "sawaranu kami ni tatarinashi" [no touch, no divine retribution, or no touch, no trouble]. Tomoda Seki writes: "Japan, who had occupied both Paracel and Spratly islands before World War Two and abandoned all its territorial claims and rights on the islands in the Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco, have a priori refrained from any act susceptible of inviting suspicion from abroad of its redemptionist ambition there." See, "Factors of Tension in Southeast Asia: How to Deal with Potential Tension in South China Sea and Cambodia," in Asia-Pacific and Vietnam Relations, Institute for International Relations, papers from the second workshop, Hanoi, September 1994, p. 25.
6. Interview with a Japanese Foreign Ministry official from the Regional Policy Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, assigned to watch over the Spratlys dispute, 23 June 1995.
7. The head of the Defence Agency has expressed concern that China is modernizing its nuclear and naval capability. Moreover, he perceives the Chinese navy as "expanding the scope of its activities" especially in the Spratly Islands (Sankei Shinbun, 14 September 1995). The director of the First Research Department, National Institute for Defence Studies, writes: "Despite the fact that China and Japan have a close relationship, it remains essentially fragile. . . . Japan is becoming apprehensive about China's military build-up, particularly the naval modernization, its continued supply of missiles to areas of potential conflict, and its testing of nuclear weapons . . . . The evolution of the Chinese navy from a defensive coastal force into an offensive blue-water fleet would be destabilizing because it would change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This will happen if the Chinese economy continues to expand rapidly." (Masashi Nishihara, "Japan Has Cause to Worry About Chinese Ambition," International Herald Tribune, 12 July 1994). Also, the lead articles on the "China naval threat" in Gunji Kenkyu (Japan military review), 30:10 (October 1995); and Kojima Tomoyuki, "Chugoku shudo no ajia chitsujo o nerau" [Aiming for a Chinese-led Asian order], Toa [East Asia], no. 327 (September 1994).
8. The head of the Defence Agency has expressed concern that China is modernizing its nuclear and naval capability. Moreover, he perceives the Chinese navy as "expanding the scope of its activities" especially in the Spratly Islands (Sankei Shinbun, 14 September 1995). The director of the First Research Department, National Institute for Defence Studies, writes: "Despite the fact that China and Japan have a close relationship, it remains essentially fragile. . . . Japan is becoming apprehensive about China's military build-up, particularly the naval modernization, its continued supply of missiles to areas of potential conflict, and its testing of nuclear weapons . . . . The evolution of the Chinese navy from a defensive coastal force into an offensive blue-water fleet would be destabilizing because it would change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This will happen if the Chinese economy continues to expand rapidly." (Masashi Nishihara, "Japan Has Cause to Worry About Chinese Ambition," International Herald Tribune, 12 July 1994). Also, the lead articles on the "China naval threat" in Gunji Kenkyu (Japan military review), 30:10 (October 1995); and Kojima Tomoyuki, "Chugoku shudo no ajia chitsujo o nerau" [Aiming for a Chinese-led Asian order], Toa [East Asia], no. 327 (September 1994).
9. The head of the Defence Agency has expressed concern that China is modernizing its nuclear and naval capability. Moreover, he perceives the Chinese navy as "expanding the scope of its activities" especially in the Spratly Islands (Sankei Shinbun, 14 September 1995). The director of the First Research Department, National Institute for Defence Studies, writes: "Despite the fact that China and Japan have a close relationship, it remains essentially fragile. . . . Japan is becoming apprehensive about China's military build-up, particularly the naval modernization, its continued supply of missiles to areas of potential conflict, and its testing of nuclear weapons . . . . The evolution of the Chinese navy from a defensive coastal force into an offensive blue-water fleet would be destabilizing because it would change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This will happen if the Chinese economy continues to expand rapidly." (Masashi Nishihara, "Japan Has Cause to Worry About Chinese Ambition," International Herald Tribune, 12 July 1994). Also, the lead articles on the "China naval threat" in Gunji Kenkyu (Japan military review), 30:10 (October 1995); and Kojima Tomoyuki, "Chugoku shudo no ajia chitsujo o nerau" [Aiming for a Chinese-led Asian order], Toa [East Asia], no. 327 (September 1994).
10. Foreign Minister Kono Yohei expressed these concerns in his meetings with the Chinese prime minister and foreign minister (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 December 1995).
11. For example, Liu Jiangyong, "Distorting History Will Misguide Japan: To Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Victory over Japanese Aggression," Contemporary International Relations, 5:9 (September 1995).
12. For example, articles by Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shinshutsu: Chugoku no ryokaiho to senkakushoto mondai" [China's territorial waters law and the Senkaku islands issue], Kokubo 41:9, 1992; "Nansashoto o meguru chuetsu funso to chugokukaigun" [The Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the Spratlys islands and the Chinese navy] in Mio Tadashi, Posto reisen no indoshina [Indochina in the post-cold war era] (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, 1993); and "Nansashoto no jikko shihai ni noridashita chugoku" [China embarking to seize effective control of the Spratlys islands], Sekai Shuho [World report], 7 March 1995.
13. For example, articles by Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shinshutsu: Chugoku no ryokaiho to senkakushoto mondai" [China's territorial waters law and the Senkaku islands issue], Kokubo 41:9, 1992; "Nansashoto o meguru chuetsu funso to chugokukaigun" [The Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the Spratlys islands and the Chinese navy] in Mio Tadashi, Posto reisen no indoshina [Indochina in the post-cold war era] (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, 1993); and "Nansashoto no jikko shihai ni noridashita chugoku" [China embarking to seize effective control of the Spratlys islands], Sekai Shuho [World report], 7 March 1995.
14. For example, articles by Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shinshutsu: Chugoku no ryokaiho to senkakushoto mondai" [China's territorial waters law and the Senkaku islands issue], Kokubo 41:9, 1992; "Nansashoto o meguru chuetsu funso to chugokukaigun" [The Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the Spratlys islands and the Chinese navy] in Mio Tadashi, Posto reisen no indoshina [Indochina in the post-cold war era] (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, 1993); and "Nansashoto no jikko shihai ni noridashita chugoku" [China embarking to seize effective control of the Spratlys islands], Sekai Shuho [World report], 7 March 1995.
15. Yanai Shunji, "Reisengo no wagakuni no anzen hosho seisaku" [Japan's security policy in the post-cold war era], Gaiko Forumu [Diplomacy forum], no. 82 (July 1995), p. 48. Yanai is chief, Comprehensive Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
16. Yosan iinkai dai ni bunkakai giroku [Diet's second budget subcommittee proceedings], 21 February 1995.
17. Ha Hong Hai writes: "In case an emergency situation involving armed conflicts occurred there [South China Sea], it would pose to Japan difficult problems concerning sea-lanes protection. Most of the disputed sea areas, however, lie beyond the 1,000 nautical mile limit set by Japan for the purpose of naval and air operations to protect the SLOCs. Any military option by a party concerned would be far more serious for Japan than any regional disputes in the recent past." Ha Hong Hai, "Major Powers' Attitudes Toward Spratly Disputes and Their Implications for the Solution," paper delivered at ASEAN-ISIS Conference, Hanoi, October 1995, p. 5.
18. Sekai [World], December 1994, p. 39; Koichi Sato, "The Japan Card," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995. See also Sato Koichi, "Tonan ajia no anzen hosho to nihon no koken" [The security of Southeast Asia and Japan's contribution], Gaiko Jiho [Revue diplomatique], no. 1318 (May 1995), pp. 80-83.
19. Sekai [World], December 1994, p. 39; Koichi Sato, "The Japan Card," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995. See also Sato Koichi, "Tonan ajia no anzen hosho to nihon no koken" [The security of Southeast Asia and Japan's contribution], Gaiko Jiho [Revue diplomatique], no. 1318 (May 1995), pp. 80-83.
20. Sekai [World], December 1994, p. 39; Koichi Sato, "The Japan Card," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995. See also Sato Koichi, "Tonan ajia no anzen hosho to nihon no koken" [The security of Southeast Asia and Japan's contribution], Gaiko Jiho [Revue diplomatique], no. 1318 (May 1995), pp. 80-83.
21. Interview with Kimura Kazuo, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defence Studies, JDA, 20 June 1995.
22. Sankei Shinbun, 8 March 1995.
23. According to the Sankei Shinbun (8, 15 March 1995), there were two schools of thought within the Foreign Ministry about the appropriateness of raising the issue in Copenhagen. One opinion stated that Murayama should express Japan's concerns about the Spratlys to China. Another said that the planned meeting of only 20 minutes between the two PMs was too short and could not accommodate a discussion on the Spratlys; Japan should instead discuss the issue of suspected North Korean nuclear development.
24. Japan Times, 12 April 1995.
25. Beijing made the following statement at the first ARF meeting in 1994: "The Chinese side has taken note of the suggestion by some countries that the question of South China Sea be included in the agenda of the forum its senior officials meeting. The position of the Chinese Government on this question is well-known as consistent. The Nansha Islands (Spratlys) have since ancient times been a Chinese territory, and China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands and its adjacent waters. Some countries do not agree with us on this question. These differences can be settled through bilateral negotiations. If they cannot be resolved for the timebeing, the parties concerned may shelve the dispute while going for joint development. The Chinese government is always opposed to internationalizing the question of the Nansha Islands. Consequently, we do not believe that the Forum or its senior officials should discuss this question." (Press release, 4 April 1994). However, at the ARF meeting in Brunei in August 1995, China agreed to limited multilateral discussion of the Spratlys between itself and ASEAN members only.
26. See Sato Koichi, "Minami shina kai o meguru kokusai kankei: Taito suru chugoku kyoi ron to ASEAN" [International relations concerning the South China Sea], Kokusai Mondai [International issues], October 1993, pp. 41, 45-48. Even though participation in the Workshops is not on a governmental basis but in principle "track two," China has rejected any Japanese participation.
27. For the view of an organizer of the Manila Conference, see Ralph A. Cossa, "A Ripple Effect in the South China Sea," Japan Times, 7 December 1995.
28. Information received from Professor Soeya Yoshihide, a member of the Japanese delegation to the November 1995 Manila Workshop, who learned of it in discussions with Ambassador Hashim Djalal.
29. According to a U.S. Department of Defense publication: "Contested claims to islands and territorial waters in the South China Sea are a source of tension in Southeast Asia that could carry serious consequences for regional stability. . . . [T]he United States regards the high seas as an international commons. Our strategic interest in maintaining the lines of communication linking Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean make it essential that we resist any maritime claims beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention" (emphasis added). Office of International Security Affairs, DoD, United States Security for the East Asia-Pacific Region, February 1995, pp. 19-20.
30. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, 96-075, 17 April 1996.
31. Ibid., 96-101, 23 May 1996; also, 96-114, 12 June 1996.
32. Interview with a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Southeast Asia Second Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, 23 June 1995.
33. A joint Defence Agency and LDP defense policy group highlighted the Spratlys as an example of conflict in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region that makes it difficult for Japan to reduce its defense budget (Sankei Shinbun, 18 July 1995). The Spratlys have also seeped into the consciousness of Japanese air force officers. When the air force conducted a poll among its officers about hardware requirements, the preference was for "AWACs that has a range that can fly to the Spratlys." The newspaper reported that this did not mean that the air force planned to expand its scope to the Spratlys (Asahi Shinbun, 2 December 1995). Shinshinto, the main opposition party, prepared its "Outline on Security Policy Towards the New Century," mentioning the following as issues for concern: North Korea's suspected nuclear development, instability in the Korean Peninsula, China's nuclear development, and the Spratlys problem (Sankei Shinbun, 28 November 1995).