Democracy, islam and the culture of modernism

Democratization

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 133-151

  Joffé, George ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0008920347     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349708403528     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Y. Choueiri, 'The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements,' and C. Tripp, 'Islam and the secular logic of the state in the Middle East', in A.S. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds.) Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp.24-5 and 62-3 respectively.
2. Y. Choueiri, 'The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements,' and C. Tripp, 'Islam and the secular logic of the state in the Middle East', in A.S. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds.) Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp.24-5 and 62-3 respectively.
3. See N. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: an introduction to Islamic political theory: the jurists (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp.87-103.
4. I leave aside here discussions of the inherent nature of democracy in the Middle Eastern and Islamic contexts, particularly the criticisms made of it from a post-modernist and Marxist point of view. See P. Gran, 'Studies of Anglo-American political economy: democracy, orientalism and the Left', in H. Sharabi (ed.), Theory. Politics and the Arab World: Critical Responses (London: Routledge 1990), pp.228-39.
5. Modernity may be best described as the age marked by constant change-but aware of being so marked ... In other words, modernity is an era conscious of its historicity. Human institutions are viewed as self-created and amenable to improvement ... The substitution of new designs for old will be a progressive move, a new step up the ascending line of human development. 'Modernity' in J. Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.592-3.
6. E. Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), p.80.
7. B. Dunham, The Heretics (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1963), pp.317-20.
8. G. de Santillana, The Crime of Galileo (London: Mercury Books,1961), p.329 - 'Eppur si muove' is the traditional phrase.
9. Dunham, pp.293-4, 424.
10. G.R. Elton, Reformation Europe 1517-1559 (London: Fontana, 1963), p.266. In fact, this Latin tag does not occur in the recess of the Diet of Augsburg which established religious peace in Germany during its deliberations between February and September 1555.
11. R. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1922), pp.20-21.
12. I. Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (London and New York: Verso, 1983), pp.18-19.
13. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1989), pp.20-38.
14. Qutb (Kotb), Sayyid, Social Justice in Islam (Washington, DC: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953), p.279.
15. Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, The Concept of Knowledge in Islam (London and New York: Mansell, 1989), p.12.
16. F. Braudel (trans. Mayne R. 1993), A History of Civilizations (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p.292.
17. Gellner, p.17.
18. Sabet A., Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.7, No.1 (1995), p.59.
19. J.L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.3-4.
20. P. Crone P. and M. Cook, Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
21. N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Region and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), pp.203-4.
22. See M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (London: Longman, 1983) for a detailed description of the Mutazili movement.
23. W. Montgomery-Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1962), p.97.
24. As Fakhry points out (p. 276): 'For Ibn Rushd this postulate [the unity of philosophical and religious truth] not only involved the methodological necessity of recourse to interpretation (taw'il); in addition it implied the tacit recognition of the parity of philosophy and Scripture, of reason and revelation, as the two primary and infallible sources of truth.' The important point, however, is that there is a parity between the two and that, through philosophy, religious truth is accessible. For the Quran (3:5) allows 'those confirmed in knowledge' to interpret scripture where ambiguity (mutashabih) exists. Ibn Rushd's concept of the soul, furthermore, emphasised his essential materialism which was similar to that of his mentor, Aristotle, and led to his attempt, which had been anticipated by Ibn Sina, to give religion a 'scientific status'. (J. Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.358.) Ibn Sina, following Aristotle, argued that God was engaged in self-contemplation and thus had no direct interest in the exterior worlds except in their creation. Reason was the means by which access to understanding was possible, because it reflected universal images which were themselves inherent in the universal science that was the only means of apprehending God. Truth, in this context, was a quality of the 'intelligible form' of knowledge: 'By truth is understood the state of the word and the intellect which refers to the state of the external thing, when it coincides with it ...Truth is the identification of the speech with things' - or, in the medieval reconstruction of Ibn Sina by St. Thomas Aquinas, 'Veritas est adequaetio orationis at rerum' or 'Veritas est adequaetio rei et intellectus'. In other words, it dealt with the real world, although it was linked to revealed truth (A.M. Giochon (trans. M.S. Khan, 1969), The Philosophy of Avicenna and its Influence on Medieval Europe (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1942), pp.92-3.) The result was that: In fact it was religion which was to pay the price of this 'agreement'. It was philosophy which was to discount the apodeictic truth; religion did no more than 'clothe' the images to bring them to the level of the mass of people. This accounts for the attempt of some Christian thinkers to interpret this attitude as the acceptance of a 'double truth' which the Commentator [Averroes - Ibn Rushd] would have professed and which they would have willingly accepted as their position. But in fact it meant destroying religion and theology, since it was estimated that on the essential points they would be in contradiction with reason (Schacht and Bosworth, p.384).
25. As Fakhry points out (p. 276): 'For Ibn Rushd this postulate [the unity of philosophical and religious truth] not only involved the methodological necessity of recourse to interpretation (taw'il); in addition it implied the tacit recognition of the parity of philosophy and Scripture, of reason and revelation, as the two primary and infallible sources of truth.' The important point, however, is that there is a parity between the two and that, through philosophy, religious truth is accessible. For the Quran (3:5) allows 'those confirmed in knowledge' to interpret scripture where ambiguity (mutashabih) exists. Ibn Rushd's concept of the soul, furthermore, emphasised his essential materialism which was similar to that of his mentor, Aristotle, and led to his attempt, which had been anticipated by Ibn Sina, to give religion a 'scientific status'. (J. Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.358.) Ibn Sina, following Aristotle, argued that God was engaged in self-contemplation and thus had no direct interest in the exterior worlds except in their creation. Reason was the means by which access to understanding was possible, because it reflected universal images which were themselves inherent in the universal science that was the only means of apprehending God. Truth, in this context, was a quality of the 'intelligible form' of knowledge: 'By truth is understood the state of the word and the intellect which refers to the state of the external thing, when it coincides with it ...Truth is the identification of the speech with things' - or, in the medieval reconstruction of Ibn Sina by St. Thomas Aquinas, 'Veritas est adequaetio orationis at rerum' or 'Veritas est adequaetio rei et intellectus'. In other words, it dealt with the real world, although it was linked to revealed truth (A.M. Giochon (trans. M.S. Khan, 1969), The Philosophy of Avicenna and its Influence on Medieval Europe (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1942), pp.92-3.) The result was that: In fact it was religion which was to pay the price of this 'agreement'. It was philosophy which was to discount the apodeictic truth; religion did no more than 'clothe' the images to bring them to the level of the mass of people. This accounts for the attempt of some Christian thinkers to interpret this attitude as the acceptance of a 'double truth' which the Commentator [Averroes - Ibn Rushd] would have professed and which they would have willingly accepted as their position. But in fact it meant destroying religion and theology, since it was estimated that on the essential points they would be in contradiction with reason (Schacht and Bosworth, p.384).
26. c]' In certain cases, human reason is incapable of acquiring a form of knowledge indispensable for man's felicity. In other cases, it is incapable because of accidental impediments or simply the difficulties inherent in the subject matter itself. In all such cases, revelation necessarily supplements rational knowledge (Fakhry, p.284). Ibn Rushd rejected al-Ghazzali's arguments on the grounds that they negated causality, yet the concept of 'efficient causation' (in Aristotle's formulation) was essential for there to be action and, without action, God could not act upon the world. Furthermore, he argued that 'genuine knowledge is essentially the act of eliciting the causes underlying a given process ... whoever repudiates causality repudiates reason' (Fakhry p.286). This, in turn, denies the concept of a wise Creator - who demonstrates wisdom by action - and is thus contrary to the Qur'an.
27. It should also be borne in mind that, as Montgomery-Watt points out, both Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd were to be marginal influences on the Islamic world. This was partly because of the Muslim preference for consensus as well as because of the intellectual dominance of al-Ghazzali, even though they were major influences on medieval Europe. A devout Muslim saw essential truth as revealed and not discoverable. Philosophy only had relevance if it defended and explained this position, 'Consequently he looked on the Falasifa with suspicion, for they were first and foremost believers in philosophy and science who then - but only in the second place - tried to reconcile revealed truth with philosophy' (W. Montgomery-Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1973), p.205).
28. Braudel, p.84.
29. cArabiyya li'l-Dirasat (Beirut), II, pp.318-19; cited in Y. Choueiri., Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Pinter Press, 1991), p.38.
30. cArabiyya li'l-Dirasat (Beirut), II, pp.318-19; cited in Y. Choueiri., Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Pinter Press, 1991), p.38.
31. As opposed to Cartesian logic, 'fuzzy logic' attempts to allow for non-linearity of systems in practice and reflects the concerns of chaos theory. It still, however, operates on the same basic logical rules adapted to allow for non-linearity.
32. F. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 152.
33. In his lecture to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) on 9 May 1995, Dr Ghannouchi stated: Islam is unique in that it alone recognises pluralism within and outside its own frontiers. Within, no religious wars are known to have ever taken place. While on the one hand Islam guarantees the right of its adherents to ijtihad in interpreting Quranic text, it does not recognise a church or an institution or a person as a sole authority speaking in its name or claiming to represent it. Decision-making, through the process of Sharia, belongs to the community as a whole. Thus, the democratic values of political pluralism and tolerance are perfectly compatible with Islam (p.58). He went on to say: 'Tunisian Islamists have never rejected modernization in the sense of rationalising politics, administration and the economy. They recognise human dignity and civil liberties, accept that the popular will is the source of political legitimacy and believe in pluralism and in the alternation of power through free elections' (p.62). The speech is reproduced in Maghreb Quarterly Report, 18 (1995), pp.56-66.
34. According to Soroush, the political application of Islam (what he calls 'Islamic ideology') deforms religion and prevents true popular participation in the process of government. The only form of religious government which does not do this is one that is democratic, for democracy is a form of government which is compatible with a multitude of political cultures including Islam. According to one commentator, he argues that, 'Any religious government that rules without societal consent, or restricts this right, abrogates the public's conception of justice and sacrifices its legitimacy.' In short: Democracy is both a value system and a method of governance. As a value system, it respects human rights, the public's right to elect its leaders and hold them accountable, and the defense of the public's notion of justice. As a method of governance, democracy includes the traditional notions of the separation of powers, free elections, free and independent press, freedom of expression, freedom of political assembly, multiple political parties and restrictions on executive power. Soroush argues that no government official should stand above criticism, and that all must be accountable to the public. Accountability reduces the potential for corruption and allows the public to remove, or restrict the power of incompetent officials. Democracy is, in effect, a method for 'rationalizing' politics. V. Vakili, Debating Religion and Politics in Iran: the Political Thought of Abdolkarim Soroush (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp.21-3).
35. cLughod L. (1990), 'Anthropology's Orient: The Boundaries of Theory on the Arab world', in H. Sharabi (ed.), Theory, Politics and the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.91-2.