Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 97-106

  Arvan, Lanny ^a   Cabral, Luís ^b   Santos, Vasco ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^c NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Communication; Equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008703474     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00018-3     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Farrell J. Cheap talk, coordination, and entry. Rand Journal of Economics. 18:1987;34-39.
2. Farrell J. Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium. Economics Letters. 27:1988;209-214.
3. Farrell J., Gibbons R. Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory. 48:1989;221-237.
4. Matsui A. Cheap talk and cooperation in a society. Journal of Economic Theory. 54:1991;245-258.
5. Myerson R. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. International Journal of Game Theory. 7:1978;73-80.
6. Rabin M. A model of pregame communication. Journal of Economic Theory. 63:1994;370-391.
7. Seidmann D. Cheap talk games may have unique informative equilibrium outcomes. Games and Economic Behavior. 4:1992;422-425.
8. Watson J. Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games. Economics Letters. 35:1991;267-271.