Contingent knowledge and technology development

Technology Analysis and Strategic Management

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 383-398

  Fleck, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008660561     PISSN: 09537325     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09537329708524293     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Thanks to the recent encouragement of research by the research councils and the Department for Trade and Industry, innovation has become a very broad 'good thing' with overtones of creativity and originality, and almost indistinct from invention. This is a pity, because it loses the specific value inherent in the definition of innovation as 'the first commercial use of a new technique'. Technology development often includes innovation (even so-called organizational innovation), but is more general, with an ambiguity about whether the particular development need be, or will ultimately prove to be, commercially viable.
2. See, for example, W. E. Bjiker, T. P. Hughes & T. Pinch (Eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1987).
3. For example, our group in Edinburgh, with links to the Science Studies Unit, including Donald Mackenzie, Wendy Faulkner, Alfonso Molina, Robin Williams and myself; the group at Warwick led by Harry Scarbrough, which is exploring the management of expertise approach first mooted by the Edinburgh group when he was working with them (see R. Fincham, J. Fleck, R. Procter, H. Scarbrough, M. Tierney & R. Williams, Expertise and Innovation: Information Technology Strategies in the Financial Services Sector (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994); the group at Lancaster led by Frank Blackler, who are focusing more on knowledge workers and knowledge as a dynamic process employing activity theory; and the group at Sussex and Brighton Universities, who are exploring the role of knowledge in the development of complex production systems.
4. J. R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971) provides one of the best analyses of how science and technological knowledge become codified through a process of 'entropic smoothing'. Most philosophy of science focuses on a restricted subset of codified knowledge, scientific theories, often only as far as they can be codified, preferably in mathematical form. This form is often seen as sufficient and complete in itself, as argued by K. R. Popper (Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary Approach, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972).
5. J. R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971) provides one of the best analyses of how science and technological knowledge become codified through a process of 'entropic smoothing'. Most philosophy of science focuses on a restricted subset of codified knowledge, scientific theories, often only as far as they can be codified, preferably in mathematical form. This form is often seen as sufficient and complete in itself, as argued by K. R. Popper (Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary Approach, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972).
6. Tacit knowledge is a hot topic at present. Polanyi's characterization (M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) provides a common starting point, but then quite large differences open up between the different approaches. It is often simply seen as everything except codified knowledge, a rather loose and consequently less useful view. Some, taking a holistic view, see tacit knowledge as, in part at least, irreducible to codified knowledge (e.g. H. M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, 4, 1974, pp. 165-186). Others, especially some psychologists, see tacit knowledge as the acquired facility through practice of doing something which started out as more coded (e.g. the internalization experience in learning to drive a car). Others see tacit knowledge as a continual rich source which in principle offers no absolute limits to codification, via sophisticated computer programs, for instance. This underlines much knowledge engineering in the development of expert systems. I like Blackler's characterization as 'embrained' knowledge (F. Blackler, 'Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview and Interpretation', Organization Studies, b, 1995, pp. 1021-1046), although I prefer to see such knowledge as more generally human-embodied, i.e. physically embodied, as with sporting and musical skills. Moreover, because of the way in which I believe the many different components of knowledge necessarily have to work together, I do not think tacit knowledge can be completely codified; not because it is a mystical holistic 'intuitive' property, but because in the course of effective action, new tacit knowledge elements are continually being generated.
7. Tacit knowledge is a hot topic at present. Polanyi's characterization (M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) provides a common starting point, but then quite large differences open up between the different approaches. It is often simply seen as everything except codified knowledge, a rather loose and consequently less useful view. Some, taking a holistic view, see tacit knowledge as, in part at least, irreducible to codified knowledge (e.g. H. M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, 4, 1974, pp. 165-186). Others, especially some psychologists, see tacit knowledge as the acquired facility through practice of doing something which started out as more coded (e.g. the internalization experience in learning to drive a car). Others see tacit knowledge as a continual rich source which in principle offers no absolute limits to codification, via sophisticated computer programs, for instance. This underlines much knowledge engineering in the development of expert systems. I like Blackler's characterization as 'embrained' knowledge (F. Blackler, 'Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview and Interpretation', Organization Studies, b, 1995, pp. 1021-1046), although I prefer to see such knowledge as more generally human-embodied, i.e. physically embodied, as with sporting and musical skills. Moreover, because of the way in which I believe the many different components of knowledge necessarily have to work together, I do not think tacit knowledge can be completely codified; not because it is a mystical holistic 'intuitive' property, but because in the course of effective action, new tacit knowledge elements are continually being generated.
8. Tacit knowledge is a hot topic at present. Polanyi's characterization (M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) provides a common starting point, but then quite large differences open up between the different approaches. It is often simply seen as everything except codified knowledge, a rather loose and consequently less useful view. Some, taking a holistic view, see tacit knowledge as, in part at least, irreducible to codified knowledge (e.g. H. M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, 4, 1974, pp. 165-186). Others, especially some psychologists, see tacit knowledge as the acquired facility through practice of doing something which started out as more coded (e.g. the internalization experience in learning to drive a car). Others see tacit knowledge as a continual rich source which in principle offers no absolute limits to codification, via sophisticated computer programs, for instance. This underlines much knowledge engineering in the development of expert systems. I like Blackler's characterization as 'embrained' knowledge (F. Blackler, 'Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview and Interpretation', Organization Studies, b, 1995, pp. 1021-1046), although I prefer to see such knowledge as more generally human-embodied, i.e. physically embodied, as with sporting and musical skills. Moreover, because of the way in which I believe the many different components of knowledge necessarily have to work together, I do not think tacit knowledge can be completely codified; not because it is a mystical holistic 'intuitive' property, but because in the course of effective action, new tacit knowledge elements are continually being generated.
9. This was the topic of a recent special issue of The International Journal of Technology Management, 11, 1996.
10. See, for example, S. A. Sackmann, Cultural Knowledge in Organizations: Exploring the Collective Mind (London, Sage Publications, 1991).
11. For example, J. Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination: The Silliman Lectures (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1978).
12. See S. Winter, 'Knowledge and Competence as Strategic Assets', in: D. J. Teece (Ed.), The Competitive Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal (Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1987), pp. 159-184.
13. W. G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
14. J. Fleck, 'Informal Information Flow and the Nature of Expertise in Financial Services', International Journal of Technology Management, 11, 1996, pp. 104-128.
15. D. de Solla Price, 'The Science/Technology Relationship: The Craft of Experimental Science and Policy on the Improvement of High Technology Innovation', Research Policy, 13, 1984, pp. 3-20
16. For instance, G. Cooper & S. Woolgar, 'Software Quality as Community Performance', in: R. Mansell (Ed.), Management of Information and Communication Technologies: Emerging Patterns of Control (London, Aslib, 1994), pp. 54-67.
17. E. W. Constant II, 'Communities and Hierarchies: Structure in the Practice of Science and Technology', in: R. Laudan (Ed.), The Nature of Technological Knowledge (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1984), pp. 27-46.
18. This is argued by E. Von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1987), Chapter 6.
19. D. J. Teece, 'The Market for Knowhow and the Efficient International Transfer of Technology', Annals of the American Acadamy of Political and Social Science, 458, 1981, pp. 81-96.
20. S. Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power (Oxford, Heineman Professional, 1988).
21. With the evocative term 'thought collective', Ludwik Fleck showed how an understanding of what is now the modern conception of syphilis was initially restricted only to those who knew how to use the Wassermann reaction: L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1979; translation of original published in 1935).
22. See, for example, Basalla's discussion of the diffusion of silk weaving: G. Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
23. For instance: D. Nelkin, 'Creation vs Evolution: The Politics of Science Education', Sociology of the Sciences, 1, 1977, pp. 265-287.
24. A. Pacey, The Culture of Technology (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992).
25. R. Whipp & P. A. Clark, Innovation and the Auto Industry: Product, Process and Work Organization, (London, Frances Pinter, 1986). C. D. Smith, J. Childs & M. Rowlinson, Innovations in Work Organizations: The Cadbury Experience (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).
26. R. Whipp & P. A. Clark, Innovation and the Auto Industry: Product, Process and Work Organization, (London, Frances Pinter, 1986). C. D. Smith, J. Childs & M. Rowlinson, Innovations in Work Organizations: The Cadbury Experience (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).
27. H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1979), pp. 46-53.
28. S. A. Sackmann, op cit., Ref. 7, p. 33.
29. M. E. Olsen, The Process of Social Organization (London, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 3.
30. S. Macdonald, 'Nothing Is Either Good or Bad: Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer', International Journal of Technology Management, 8, 1993, pp. 95-105.
31. J. Fleck, 'The Introduction of the Industrial Robot in Britain', Robotica, 2, 1984, pp. 169-175.
32. J. Fleck, 'Continuous Evolution: Corporate Configurations of Information Technology', in: R. Mansell (Ed.), Management of Information and Communication Technologies: Emerging Patterns of Control (London, ASLIB 1994), pp. 178-206.
33. See, for example, D. Leonard-Barton, 'Implementation as Mutual Adaptation of Technology and Organization', Research Policy, 17, 1988, pp. 251-267, or J. Fleck, 'Learning by Trying: The Implementation of Configurational Technology', Research Policy, 23, 1994, pp. 637-652.
34. See, for example, D. Leonard-Barton, 'Implementation as Mutual Adaptation of Technology and Organization', Research Policy, 17, 1988, pp. 251-267, or J. Fleck, 'Learning by Trying: The Implementation of Configurational Technology', Research Policy, 23, 1994, pp. 637-652.
35. J. Fleck, 'Configurations; Crystallising Contingency', International Journal of Human Factors in Manufacturing, 3, 1993, pp. 15-36.