Emotions and morality

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 195-212

  Ben Ze'ev, Aaron ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0008653268     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004236823330     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. A. Ben-Ze'ev, The perceptual system: A philosophicalandpyschologicalperspective (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).
2. A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Typical emotions," in W. O'Donohue and R. Kitchener (eds.), Philosophy ofpyschology (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 228-243.
3. Nicomachean Ethics in The complete works of Artistotle: The revised Oxford translation, ed. J. Barnes. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 11149a, 26-29.
4. J. Oakley, Morality and the emotions (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 4.
5. J. Horder, Provocation and responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 1-2.
6. See also W.P. Alston, "Emotion and feeling," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 479-486; E. Bedford, Emotions. Proceedings of the Artistotelian Society, 57 (1957), pp. 281-304; W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 6-8; and G. Pitcher, "Emotion," Mind, 74 (1965), pp. 326-345. Kant, who refers to emotions as simple feelings for which we are not responsible, indeed considers them to be irrelevant or even obstacles to responsible moral behavior. For criticism of Kant's view, see P. Lauritzen, "Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (1991), 5-21. Various places in Kant's writings may suggest that his view on the role of emotions in morality is more complex than a simple rejection of such a role; see N. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," in O. Flanagan and A.O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, character, and morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990).
7. See also W.P. Alston, "Emotion and feeling," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 479-486; E. Bedford, Emotions. Proceedings of the Artistotelian Society, 57 (1957), pp. 281-304; W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 6-8; and G. Pitcher, "Emotion," Mind, 74 (1965), pp. 326-345. Kant, who refers to emotions as simple feelings for which we are not responsible, indeed considers them to be irrelevant or even obstacles to responsible moral behavior. For criticism of Kant's view, see P. Lauritzen, "Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (1991), 5-21. Various places in Kant's writings may suggest that his view on the role of emotions in morality is more complex than a simple rejection of such a role; see N. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," in O. Flanagan and A.O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, character, and morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990).
8. See also W.P. Alston, "Emotion and feeling," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 479-486; E. Bedford, Emotions. Proceedings of the Artistotelian Society, 57 (1957), pp. 281-304; W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 6-8; and G. Pitcher, "Emotion," Mind, 74 (1965), pp. 326-345. Kant, who refers to emotions as simple feelings for which we are not responsible, indeed considers them to be irrelevant or even obstacles to responsible moral behavior. For criticism of Kant's view, see P. Lauritzen, "Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (1991), 5-21. Various places in Kant's writings may suggest that his view on the role of emotions in morality is more complex than a simple rejection of such a role; see N. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," in O. Flanagan and A.O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, character, and morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990).
9. See also W.P. Alston, "Emotion and feeling," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 479-486; E. Bedford, Emotions. Proceedings of the Artistotelian Society, 57 (1957), pp. 281-304; W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 6-8; and G. Pitcher, "Emotion," Mind, 74 (1965), pp. 326-345. Kant, who refers to emotions as simple feelings for which we are not responsible, indeed considers them to be irrelevant or even obstacles to responsible moral behavior. For criticism of Kant's view, see P. Lauritzen, "Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (1991), 5-21. Various places in Kant's writings may suggest that his view on the role of emotions in morality is more complex than a simple rejection of such a role; see N. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," in O. Flanagan and A.O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, character, and morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990).
10. See also W.P. Alston, "Emotion and feeling," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 479-486; E. Bedford, Emotions. Proceedings of the Artistotelian Society, 57 (1957), pp. 281-304; W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 6-8; and G. Pitcher, "Emotion," Mind, 74 (1965), pp. 326-345. Kant, who refers to emotions as simple feelings for which we are not responsible, indeed considers them to be irrelevant or even obstacles to responsible moral behavior. For criticism of Kant's view, see P. Lauritzen, "Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (1991), 5-21. Various places in Kant's writings may suggest that his view on the role of emotions in morality is more complex than a simple rejection of such a role; see N. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," in O. Flanagan and A.O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, character, and morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990).
11. See also W.P. Alston, "Emotion and feeling," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 479-486; E. Bedford, Emotions. Proceedings of the Artistotelian Society, 57 (1957), pp. 281-304; W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 6-8; and G. Pitcher, "Emotion," Mind, 74 (1965), pp. 326-345. Kant, who refers to emotions as simple feelings for which we are not responsible, indeed considers them to be irrelevant or even obstacles to responsible moral behavior. For criticism of Kant's view, see P. Lauritzen, "Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 25 (1991), 5-21. Various places in Kant's writings may suggest that his view on the role of emotions in morality is more complex than a simple rejection of such a role; see N. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," in O. Flanagan and A.O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, character, and morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990).
12. See also A.R. Hochschild, "The economy of gratitude," in D.D. Franks and E.D. McCarthy (eds.), The sociology of emotions (New York: JAI Press, 1989), ch. 4; and Lyons, op. cit.
13. See also A.R. Hochschild, "The economy of gratitude," in D.D. Franks and E.D. McCarthy (eds.), The sociology of emotions (New York: JAI Press, 1989), ch. 4; and Lyons, op. cit.
14. N. Sherman, "Emotion," in W. Reich (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics (New York: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 664-671.
15. Artistotle, op. cit., 1106b, 16-23; J. Horder, Provocation and responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 44; and N. Sherman, "The role of emotions in Artistotelian virtue," Proceedings of the Boston area colloquium in ancient philosophy, IX (1993), pp. 1-33. The indirect nature of emotional regulation has been indicated by other philosophers as well. For example, Descartes argues that our passions "cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our will, but only indirectly through the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we wish to have and opposed to the passions we wish to reject." Similarly, Spinoza claims: "An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained."
16. Artistotle, op. cit., 1106b, 16-23; J. Horder, Provocation and responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 44; and N. Sherman, "The role of emotions in Artistotelian virtue," Proceedings of the Boston area colloquium in ancient philosophy, IX (1993), pp. 1-33. The indirect nature of emotional regulation has been indicated by other philosophers as well. For example, Descartes argues that our passions "cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our will, but only indirectly through the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we wish to have and opposed to the passions we wish to reject." Similarly, Spinoza claims: "An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained."
17. Artistotle, op. cit., 1106b, 16-23; J. Horder, Provocation and responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 44; and N. Sherman, "The role of emotions in Artistotelian virtue," Proceedings of the Boston area colloquium in ancient philosophy, IX (1993), pp. 1-33. The indirect nature of emotional regulation has been indicated by other philosophers as well. For example, Descartes argues that our passions "cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our will, but only indirectly through the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we wish to have and opposed to the passions we wish to reject." Similarly, Spinoza claims: "An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained."
18. R. Scruton, "Emotion, practical knowledge and common culture," in A. Rorty (ed.), Explaining emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 525.
19. R. Gordon, The structure of emotions (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 125-127.
20. See also J. Elster, "Sadder but wiser? Rationality and the emotions," Social Science Information, 24 (1985), pp. 375-406; P. Greenspan, Emotions and reasons (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 10 and 155; and E. Sankowski, "Responsibility of persons for their emotions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1977), pp. 829-840.
21. See also J. Elster, "Sadder but wiser? Rationality and the emotions," Social Science Information, 24 (1985), pp. 375-406; P. Greenspan, Emotions and reasons (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 10 and 155; and E. Sankowski, "Responsibility of persons for their emotions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1977), pp. 829-840.
22. See also J. Elster, "Sadder but wiser? Rationality and the emotions," Social Science Information, 24 (1985), pp. 375-406; P. Greenspan, Emotions and reasons (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 10 and 155; and E. Sankowski, "Responsibility of persons for their emotions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1977), pp. 829-840.
23. A. Ferguson, An essay on the history of civil society (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1980), p. 53.
24. Along these lines, Ferguson argues: "As jealousy is often the most watchful guardian of chastity, so malice of often the quickest to spy the fallings of our neighbour. . . the worst principles of our nature may be at the bottom of our pretended zeal for morality," op. cit., p. 36. See also A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Envy and inequality," Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992), pp. 551-581.
25. Along these lines, Ferguson argues: "As jealousy is often the most watchful guardian of chastity, so malice of often the quickest to spy the fallings of our neighbour. . . the worst principles of our nature may be at the bottom of our pretended zeal for morality," op. cit., p. 36. See also A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Envy and inequality," Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992), pp. 551-581.
26. A. Ben-Ze'ev, "You always hurt the one you love," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 27 (1993), pp. 487-495;
27. and D. Tannen, You just don't understand (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990), ch. 4.
28. Sherman, "The role of emotions in Aristotelian virtue," op. cit.
29. G.A. Hartz, "Desire and emotion in the virtue tradition," Philosophia, 20 (1990), pp. 145-165; and R.C. Solomon, The passions (New York: Doubleday, 1976).
30. G.A. Hartz, "Desire and emotion in the virtue tradition," Philosophia, 20 (1990), pp. 145-165; and R.C. Solomon, The passions (New York: Doubleday, 1976).
31. J. Martin, Miss Manners' guide for the turn-of-the-Millennium (New York: Fireside, 1990).
32. S. Toulmin, "The tyranny of principles," The Hastings center report, December 1981; see also A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Emotional and moral evaluation," Metaphilosophy, 23 (1992), pp. 214-229.
33. S. Toulmin, "The tyranny of principles," The Hastings center report, December 1981; see also A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Emotional and moral evaluation," Metaphilosophy, 23 (1992), pp. 214-229.
34. J.O. Grunebaum, "Friendship, morality, and special obligation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1993), pp. 51-61; H. Sigwick, Methods of ethics (New York: Dover, 1966), p. 434; and R.C. Solomon, A passion for justice: Emotions and the origins of the social contract (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1990), p. 47.
35. J.O. Grunebaum, "Friendship, morality, and special obligation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1993), pp. 51-61; H. Sigwick, Methods of ethics (New York: Dover, 1966), p. 434; and R.C. Solomon, A passion for justice: Emotions and the origins of the social contract (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1990), p. 47.
36. J.O. Grunebaum, "Friendship, morality, and special obligation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1993), pp. 51-61; H. Sigwick, Methods of ethics (New York: Dover, 1966), p. 434; and R.C. Solomon, A passion for justice: Emotions and the origins of the social contract (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1990), p. 47.
37. L. A. Blum, Moral perception and particularity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 3; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984), pp. 134-171; See also J. Cottingham, "Ethics and impartiality," Philosophical Studies, 43 (1983), pp. 83-99; J. Cottingham, "Partiality, favouritism and morality," Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (1986), pp. 357-373.
38. L. A. Blum, Moral perception and particularity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 3; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984), pp. 134-171; See also J. Cottingham, "Ethics and impartiality," Philosophical Studies, 43 (1983), pp. 83-99; J. Cottingham, "Partiality, favouritism and morality," Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (1986), pp. 357-373.
39. L. A. Blum, Moral perception and particularity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 3; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984), pp. 134-171; See also J. Cottingham, "Ethics and impartiality," Philosophical Studies, 43 (1983), pp. 83-99; J. Cottingham, "Partiality, favouritism and morality," Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (1986), pp. 357-373.
40. L. A. Blum, Moral perception and particularity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 3; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984), pp. 134-171; See also J. Cottingham, "Ethics and impartiality," Philosophical Studies, 43 (1983), pp. 83-99; J. Cottingham, "Partiality, favouritism and morality," Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (1986), pp. 357-373.
41. It is interesting to note that sensitivity to the particular person is also part of Kant's morality which requires that we respect individuals in their own right as ends having intrinsic value.
42. M.C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of thought: A theory of the emotions (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), ch. 6.
43. See also Nussbaum, Ibid.
44. M.W. Martin, Self-deception and morality (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1986), p. 65.
45. Sherman, "The place of emotions in Kantian morality," op. cit., pp. 152-153.
46. See also K. Oatley, Best laid schemes: The psychology of emotions (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 175.
47. See also N. Sherman, "Kant on sentimentalism and stoic apathy," in H. Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th international Kant world congress, Vol. 1 (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 705-711.
48. R.E. Ewin, "Loyalty and virtues," Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (1992), pp. 403-419; S. Nathanson, "In defense of 'moderate patriotism'," Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 535-552; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality "Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13 (1984), 134-171.
49. R.E. Ewin, "Loyalty and virtues," Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (1992), pp. 403-419; S. Nathanson, "In defense of 'moderate patriotism'," Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 535-552; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality "Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13 (1984), 134-171.
50. R.E. Ewin, "Loyalty and virtues," Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (1992), pp. 403-419; S. Nathanson, "In defense of 'moderate patriotism'," Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 535-552; I.P. Railton, "Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality "Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13 (1984), 134-171.
51. R.M. Adams, "Involuntary sins," The Philosophical Review, 94 (1985), pp. 3-31.
52. This, for instance, is Maimonides' belief, and hence in his view, the virtuous person should imitate this behavior of God. See D.H. Frank, "Anger as a vice: A Maimonidean critique of Artistotle's ethics," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 7 (1990), pp. 269-281.
53. Frank, op. cit, pp. 269-281; Sherman, "The role of emotions in Aristotelian virtue," op. cit., pp. 1-33.
54. Frank, op. cit, pp. 269-281; Sherman, "The role of emotions in Aristotelian virtue," op. cit., pp. 1-33.
55. Blum, op. cit., ch. 3.