Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 91-105

  Amann, Erwin ^a   Yang, Chun Lei ^b  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b ACADEMIA SINICA   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Asymptotic stability; C73; Cooperation; D83; Evolution; Prisoner's dilemma game; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008640156     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00078-X     Document Type: Article

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