Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problem

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-18

  Border, Kim C ^a   Segal, Uzi ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Nash bargaining solution; Quadratic utility functions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008349932     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171811     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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