Antitrust sanctions and a firm's ability to pay

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 171-183

  Craycraft, Catherine ^a   Craycraft, Joseph L ^b   Gallo, Joseph C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust enforcement; Sherman Act

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008279785     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007718618005     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Becker, Gary (1968) 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
2. Beckenstein, Alan R. and H. Landis Gabel (1985). 'The Economics of Antitrust Compliance', Southern Economic Journal, 52, 673-692.
3. Blair, Roger D. (1985) 'A Suggestion for Improving Antitrust Enforcement', The Antitrust Bulletin, 30, 433-456.
4. Block, Michael K. and Gregory Joseph Sidak (1980), 'The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?', Georgia Law Review, 68, 1131.
5. Breit, William and Kenneth Elzinga (1986) Antitrust Penalty Reform: An Economic Analysis. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
6. Bryant, Peter G. and E. Woodward Eckard (1991) 'Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught', Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 531-536.
7. Clabault, James M. and Michael K. Block (1981) Sherman Act Indictments: 1955-1980, Vols. I & II. New York: Federal Legal Publications.
8. Commerce Clearing House (1962-current) Trade Regulation Reporter, United States Antitrust Case Summaries (looseleaf 1955-current).
9. Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1983) 'Sentencing Antitrust Offenders: Reconciling Economic Theory with Legal Theory', William Mitchell Law Review, 9, 75-100.
10. Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1990) 'An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-shaping Policy', Duke Law Review, 1, 1-38.
11. Elzinga, Kenneth G. and William Breit (1976) The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
12. Gallo, Joseph C., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph L. Craycraft and Charles J. Parker (1994) 'Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Law and Economics', Research in Law and Economics, 16, 25-71.
13. Gallo, Joseph C., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph L. Craycraft, and Charles J. Parker (1995) 'The First Century of Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement', Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Cincinnati.
14. Griffiths, William E., Carter R. Hill, and George G. Judge (1993) Learning and Practicing Econometrics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
15. Joyce, Jon M. and Robert H. McGuckin (1985) 'Assignment of Rights to Sue under Illinois Brick: An Empirical Assessment', DOJ, Antitrust Division, Economic Policy Office, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 85-6.
16. Joyce, Jon M. (1989). 'Firm Financial Strength, Defendant Fines, and Antitrust Deterrence: A Preliminary Empirical Exploration', DOJ, Antitrust Division, Economic Policy Office, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 89-9.
17. Landes, William M. (1983) 'Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations', University of Chicago Law Review, 50, 652-678. Moody's Industrial Manual.
18. Posner, Richard A. (1976) Antitrust Law: An Economic Prospective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
19. Posner, Richard A. (1980) 'Optimal Sanctions for White Collar Crime', American Criminal Law Review, 17, 409-418.
20. Werden, Gregory J. and Marylin J. Simon (1987) 'Why Price Fixers Should go to Prison', Antitrust Bulletin, 57, 569-577.