India's post-Cold War armaments policy: An analysis until 1993

Contemporary South Asia

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 125-148

  Maass, Citha D ^a   Bautzmann, Georg ^a  

^a GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS   (Germany)

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EID: 0008257611     PISSN: 09584935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09584939608719786     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. The first geopoliticial configuration was formed by the four capitals Moscow-New Delhi vs. Washington-Islamabad and the second by Moscow-New Delhi vs. Islamabad-Beijing.
2. The text of the treaty signed on 1 January 1993, is printed in: Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), FE/1600, A1/2-4, 30 January 1993. Contrary to the 1971 treaty, which in Article 9 provided for mutual consultations and appropriate effective measures in case of threats by a third party, the 1993 treaty contains merely the provision 'to coordinate' their mutual positions in case of 'a threat to peace or violation of peace', with the aim of 'removing such a threat and re-establishing peace'.
3. Both governments, after extensive consultations, have agreed to the following settlement: India's debts amount to a total of Rbl 9.87 billion. Due to the falling rouble this would equal only US $20 million, which would not suit Russia's claim. Therefore, during the next 12 years, India is to repay about 63% of the debt at a 2.4% interest rate using the 1990 exchange rate of Rbl 1: Rs 19.9. The remaining 37% of the principal is repayable over 45 years with no interest and at the January 1992 exchange rate of Rbl 1: Rs 3.1. Cf. Rita Manchanda, 'Roubles for Rao. Russian president strengthens his Indian connection', Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1993, p 18.
4. Cf. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1993 (New York/Oxford, 1993), Table 3, p 141.
5. Neither the official numbers on the defence budget nor its share of the GNP reveal the actual military costs and the subsequent burden of the Indian economy. Although these two quantities are being used as the most important indicators within an international comparison, considerable methodical problems arise with regard to their national calculation, their conversion to official exchange rates in US dollars and their credibility in a worldwide comparison.
6. Exemplary for this is General (retd.) Krishnaswami Sundarji. Cf. K. Sundarji, 'Guns vs. butter', Frontline, 26 March 1993, p 82. Sundarji, responsible for armaments expansion during the 1980s, admits, however, that the budget, at constant prices, doubled within 16 years.
7. Cf. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 1990 (Washington, 1991), p 4.
8. Since the rupee was constantly devalued against the dollar, distortions occur when converting to US dollars. This can be illustrated by data released in 1991. During this year the rupee was devalued by 22% in a short time. As seen in Table 1, column 6, the wrong impression, therefore, is given that in 1991 military expenditure (9.0 constant US dollars) was actually reduced. Cf. also Sandy Gordon, 'Indian defense spending. Treading water in the fiscal deep', Asian Survey, Vol 32, No 10, 1992, p 940.
9. Cf. General K. Sundarji, 'Disputed legacy', India Today, 15 May 1988, p 34.
10. India was especially hard hit by the financial effects caused by the Gulf war. Not only the raised international price of oil burdened the balance of payments. India also figured the loss of its foreign exchange remittances, not transferred by its migrant workers from the Gulf region, at US $200 million and the costs of airlifting 130,000 workers also at about US $200 million. Even if these numbers should have been set too high in view of compensation from the US it, nevertheless, amounted to an enormous financial strain, cf. the letter from India's UN ambassador to the Security Council, United Nations, S/22013, 19 December 1990, Appendix I.
11. India's Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, also followed this argumentation while justifying the 1993/1994 defence budget. Compared to the year before, the budget of 191.8 billion Rs (US $6.72 billion) had grown by 16.8 billion Rs. This corresponds to a nominal increase by 9%, reduced to a real growth rate of 2% when taking an inflation rate of 7% into account. Also the budget actually grew, and Manmohan Singh did not see any chances for effective reductions. He weakened criticism by arguing that the defence budget's share was only 2.4% of the GNP and would decrease proportionally with continuous economic growth. Cf. Deutsche Welle, Monitor-Dienst, 4 March 1993, p 8.
12. A comparison between India and Pakistan may illustrate this. Pakistan's population is barely an eighth of that of India and its GNP is also about an eighth. In order to set up a military power 35-40% equivalent to that of India's forces, Pakistan has to spend two and a half times more of its GNP than India.
13. Deviating methods are used when listing 'hidden' costs. Regarding SIPRI criteria, cf. Daniel P. Hewitt, 'Military expenditure: international comparison of trends', IMF Working Paper, Unpublished manuscript, International Monetary Fund, May 1991, p 2. Deviations occur not only when converting fiscal into calendar years and when using the GDP or GNP, but also by a restricted or extended definition of the militarily relevant paramilitary forces, by administrative costs, by pensions for retired military personnel, etc. For a detailed listing, see Gordon, 'Indian defense spending', Ref 8, p 937.
14. Deviating methods are used when listing 'hidden' costs. Regarding SIPRI criteria, cf. Daniel P. Hewitt, 'Military expenditure: international comparison of trends', IMF Working Paper, Unpublished manuscript, International Monetary Fund, May 1991, p 2. Deviations occur not only when converting fiscal into calendar years and when using the GDP or GNP, but also by a restricted or extended definition of the militarily relevant paramilitary forces, by administrative costs, by pensions for retired military personnel, etc. For a detailed listing, see Gordon, 'Indian defense spending', Ref 8, p 937.
15. 4% of the GNP, methodically figured out by Gordon, should be viewed as the lower value of the actual costs, since non-quantifiable expenditures, as for example, the nuclear weapons programme, are not included. Cf. Gordon, 'Indian Defense Spending', Ref 8, pp 937-938. Rikhye arrives at 5% of the GNP for 1988 after having listed the 'hidden' items systematically for the first time. Cf. Ravi Rikhye, 'Indian defence budget: fact and fantasy', Economic and Political Weekly, 29 April 1989, pp 905.
16. 4% of the GNP, methodically figured out by Gordon, should be viewed as the lower value of the actual costs, since non-quantifiable expenditures, as for example, the nuclear weapons programme, are not included. Cf. Gordon, 'Indian Defense Spending', Ref 8, pp 937-938. Rikhye arrives at 5% of the GNP for 1988 after having listed the 'hidden' items systematically for the first time. Cf. Ravi Rikhye, 'Indian defence budget: fact and fantasy', Economic and Political Weekly, 29 April 1989, pp 905.
17. Cf. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993, p 136, cf. also India's ranking according to estimates by the ACDA, WMEAT 1990, Ref 7, pp 36-45. India's high military burden can also be seen in the 'Economic-social standing' by R. L. Sivard, according to which India in 1987 reached merely a rank of 110 out of 142. Cf. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (WMSE) 1991, Washington 1991, p 54.
18. Cf. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993, p 136, cf. also India's ranking according to estimates by the ACDA, WMEAT 1990, Ref 7, pp 36-45. India's high military burden can also be seen in the 'Economic-social standing' by R. L. Sivard, according to which India in 1987 reached merely a rank of 110 out of 142. Cf. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (WMSE) 1991, Washington 1991, p 54.
19. Cf. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993, p 136, cf. also India's ranking according to estimates by the ACDA, WMEAT 1990, Ref 7, pp 36-45. India's high military burden can also be seen in the 'Economic-social standing' by R. L. Sivard, according to which India in 1987 reached merely a rank of 110 out of 142. Cf. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (WMSE) 1991, Washington 1991, p 54.
20. It should also be taken into account that a greater portion of education expenditures is spent on state-, not union level.
21. Cf. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993, p 103.
22. Cf. Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, 'Military security and the economy: defence expenditure in India and Pakistan', in: Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), The Economies of Defence Spending (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p 189.
23. India's failure to produce indigenously its own main battle tank led to the fact that after 14 years of development the engine had to be designed anew and, finally, had to be procured from abroad. The 'indigenous' part was reduced to a mere 55%, the remainder being purchased with scarce hard currency. Cf. Dieter Braun, Indien als Machtfaktor in Asien (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1990), S 358. p 75.
24. Ibid., p 73.
25. Cf. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 'Global arms trade commerce in advanced military technology and weapons', Washington, June 1991, p 154.
26. Ibid.
27. Cf. Amit Gupta, 'India and Arms Bazaar of the Nineties', EPW, 22 September 1990, p 2129.
28. Part of the economic reforms (since summer 1991) also entails a cooperation with private companies. Cf. Rahul Bedi, 'Indian industry opens up', Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 March 1993, p 29.
29. India in the 1990s has increasingly started to offer its products during international defence industry exhibitions. In February 1993, India offered more than 100 systems in the Gulf region for the first time during an exhibition in Abu Dhabi. Cf. 'India moving towards defence exports', in: Times of India, 12 February 1993, p 11.
30. Saudi Arabia, between 1985-1989, ranked first with US $23.0 billion, followed by Iraq with US $22.8 billion. Pakistan, with which India legitimatised its own imports, spent ca. US $2 billion and was not even among the 25 leading countries. Cf. ACDA, WMEAT 1990, Ref 7, pp 10-11.
31. Cf. Braun, 'Indien als Machtfaktor', Ref 19, pp 47 and 72. Between 1985 and 1989, the former Soviet Union delivered 73% of India's imports, France ranked second with 12%. Cf. ACDA, WMEAT 1990, Ref 7, p 11.
32. Cf. Mohammed Ayoob, 'Dateline India: deepening crisis', Foreign Affairs, No. 85, Winter 1991/1992, pp 182-183.
33. Cf. Gordon, 'Indian defense spending', Ref 8, p 941.
34. Cf. Bedi, 'Indian industry opens up', Ref 24, p 29
35. Cf. Shekhar Gupta, 'Defence: a middle-aged military machine', India Today, 30 April 1993, p 22ff.
36. Cf. Ref 3.
37. According to a general whose name was not given, quoted in, 'India today, defence: a middle-aged military machine, ibid, p 23.
38. Gordon points out to the basic character of this controversy, Ref 8, p 946 f.
39. Measured according to personnel strength, India thus ranks behind China (3.03 million), Russia (2.72 million) and the US (1.91 million). Cf. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military balance 1992-1993 (London, 1992), pp 18, 92, 131 and 145.
40. The army is organized into ten corps, comprising 34 divisions and other units. The degree of modernisation is seen in the relation of modernised and armoured divisions to infantry divisions.
41. India not only has the military means but also the political willpower to carry out such operations beyond its boundaries, as shown by the intervention of its 'Peace-keeping forces' in Sri Lanka (1987-1990) and during the 'Rescue operation' for President Gayoom of the Maledives in November 1988. Cf. Devin T. Hagerty, 'India's regional security doctrine', Asian Survey, Vol 31, No 4, 1991, p 351 ff.
42. This includes 5 destroyers, 21 frigates, 14 corvets and 8 missile carrying fast patrol boats.
43. According to Xinhua, the Chinese news agency, Mallikarjun announced this on 3 March, 1993, while addressing the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Parliament). He argued that the navy would be constantly modernized, taking the threat perception into account as well as the country's maritime interests, the possible tasks the navy might have to deal with, and the availability of budgetary funds. Quoted according to Deutsche Welle, Monitor-Dienst, Asien, 8 March 1993, p 7.
44. 'Blue Water' capability implies the projection of power on the high seas beyond one's own boundaries. In this context the two aircraft carriers and increased transport capacities should be seen, creating a basis for an extended means for intervening in the Indian Ocean area. The navy's expansion is described in: Ashley J. Tellis, 'Securing the barrack: the logic, structure and objectives of India's naval expansion', in: Mathew Thomas (ed.), Indian Defence Review New Delhi, July 191, p 133 ff, particularly pp 139-140 (reprint of a two-part article, published in the 1990 Summer and Fall edition of the periodical US Naval War College Review).
45. 'Blue Water' capability implies the projection of power on the high seas beyond one's own boundaries. In this context the two aircraft carriers and increased transport capacities should be seen, creating a basis for an extended means for intervening in the Indian Ocean area. The navy's expansion is described in: Ashley J. Tellis, 'Securing the barrack: the logic, structure and objectives of India's naval expansion', in: Mathew Thomas (ed.), Indian Defence Review New Delhi, July 191, p 133 ff, particularly pp 139-140 (reprint of a two-part article, published in the 1990 Summer and Fall edition of the periodical US Naval War College Review).
46. The author is grateful to Brigadier General (retd.), Georg Bautzmann, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, for having made the following evaluation.
47. Should India decide on a strategic defence, it would forgo an invasion of Pakistan in case of war, limiting itself to protect its own territory. This does not exclude limited offensive actions.
48. Even General (retd.) K. Sundarji refers to only 21 Chinese mountain divisions in a comparative analysis. Cf. K. Sundarji, 'Guns vs Butter', Ref 6, p 83.
49. Cf. Dieter Braun and Karlernst Ziem, 'Die nukleare Komponente eines latenten wie akuten Regionalkonflikte in der Dritten Welt. Autonomie und Fremdbestimmung, (Baden-Baden, 1989), p 278.
50. Cf. Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, 'Nuclear ambitions. The spread of nuclear weapons 1989-1990, Boulder et al, 1990, p 72.
51. Ibid.
52. New Delhi's nuclear 'ambivalence' is forcing Indian scientists to juggle semantically and to secretly mention India's 'having atom bombs'. D. Mukerjee sums up the conclusion made by US media by saying that 'India is just a screw driver's turn and an honest word away from being a full-fledged and acknowledged nuclear power'. Dilip Mukerjee, 'The nuclear option. Ambiguity difficult to maintain', Times of India, 9 June 1992, p 12.
53. The missiles are being developed within the framework of the 'Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme' (IGMDP), for which a research amount of 8 billion Rs (US $280 million) has been allocated. Cf. Hormuz Mama, 'Improved Prithvi missile launched'. International Defense Review, Vol 25, No 8, August 1992, p 784. In order not to endanger the space research, commenced in 1970, by possible Western sanctions, the IGMDP, which is militarily oriented, was institutionally put on a separate basis and came under respective defence agencies. Cf. Dieter Braun, 'Indien als Machtfaktor', Ref 19, p 79.
54. The missiles are being developed within the framework of the 'Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme' (IGMDP), for which a research amount of 8 billion Rs (US $280 million) has been allocated. Cf. Hormuz Mama, 'Improved Prithvi missile launched'. International Defense Review, Vol 25, No 8, August 1992, p 784. In order not to endanger the space research, commenced in 1970, by possible Western sanctions, the IGMDP, which is militarily oriented, was institutionally put on a separate basis and came under respective defence agencies. Cf. Dieter Braun, 'Indien als Machtfaktor', Ref 19, p 79.
55. Referring to the Hindustan Times, western news agencies reported that the missiles were so positioned at the border that they could reach the Pakistani cities of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore and Faisalabad. Cf. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 24 May 1993, p 7. According to India Today, 15 June 1993, p 21, the 11th Army Corps was the first to be provided with the Prithvi missile.
56. Referring to the Hindustan Times, western news agencies reported that the missiles were so positioned at the border that they could reach the Pakistani cities of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore and Faisalabad. Cf. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 24 May 1993, p 7. According to India Today, 15 June 1993, p 21, the 11th Army Corps was the first to be provided with the Prithvi missile.
57. Cf. Office of Technology Assessment, Global Arms Trade, Ref 21, p 158. The director of the Agni programme, Dr. A. P. J. A. Kalam, commented: 'Agni gives us the confidence that we are capable of designing any kind of missile. We are now self-sufficient, both in design and missile technology'. Quoted in: India Today, 'Agni. chariot of fire', 15 June 1989, p 12.
58. India is holding on to these plans, even taking differences with the US into account. Exemplary for this was the purchase of liquid hydrogen cryogenic rocket engines which India's space agency (ISRO), against US warnings, made with the Russian company Glavkosmos in May 1992. Subsequently, Washington imposed a 2-year sales embargo on both contract partners, argumenting this involves nuclear usable components, thus violating rules set by the 'Missile Technology Control Regime' (MTCR). Cf. Bernard Imhasly, 'Sanktionen der USA gegen Indien und Rußland', Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ), 15 May 1992, p 4; Daniel Revelle, 'U.S. muscle misses mark', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, p 10 ff.
59. India is holding on to these plans, even taking differences with the US into account. Exemplary for this was the purchase of liquid hydrogen cryogenic rocket engines which India's space agency (ISRO), against US warnings, made with the Russian company Glavkosmos in May 1992. Subsequently, Washington imposed a 2-year sales embargo on both contract partners, argumenting this involves nuclear usable components, thus violating rules set by the 'Missile Technology Control Regime' (MTCR). Cf. Bernard Imhasly, 'Sanktionen der USA gegen Indien und Rußland', Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ), 15 May 1992, p 4; Daniel Revelle, 'U.S. muscle misses mark', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, p 10 ff.
60. Cf. Braun, 'Indien als Machtfaktor', Ref 19, p 60.
61. George K. Tanham emphasizes the primarily reactive character, contrary to an active planning approach. G. K. Tanham, 'Indian strategic thought: an interpretative essay'. Rand Corporation (R-4207-USDP) 1992, p 50. The reactive element favours a greater flexibility and a pragmatic procedure in an actual conflict. Exemplary for this was the respective interpretation of India's non-alignment policy which, according to its perception, was not questioned following the conclusion of the 1971 friendship treaty with the former Soviet Union and the security clause contained therein.
62. The Hindu term for political sovereignty is 'purna swaraj'. It was a battle slogan during the independence movement and characterizes today's security perception. Cf. Surjit Mansingh, 'India's search for power. Indira Gandhis's foreign policy 1966-1982', Beverly Hills et al. (Sage Publishers) 1984, p 33.
63. Cf. Tanham, 'Indian strategic thought', p 11 and 23f. Indian social scientists tend to point out the 'indo-centric' socio-political character of the subcontinent.
64. The treaties which independent India signed in 1949 with Bhutan and in 1950 with Nepal not only contained the same wording as the former colonial treaties, but also reflected the lasting valid inclusion of the Himalayan states in India's security zone. Cf. Citha D. Maass, 'Indien-Nepal-Sri Lanka: Sued-Sued-Beziehungen zwischen Symmetrie und Dependenz', Wiesbaden 1982, pp 62-63.
65. Nawaz Sharif revealed his initiative during a speech on foreign policy while addressing the National Defence College in Islamabad. Cf. Dawn (Karachi), 7 June 1991, p 1. An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman justified the Indian rejection the same day by saying that the proposal contains 'nothing new' and was 'pure propaganda'. Cf. Monitor Dienst, Asien, 10 June 1991, Ref 39, p 5.
66. The Indian magazine India Today reported that the Central Government, during the fourth year of the separation struggle in the Kashmir Valley, was less than ever able to enforce its controllability, even when deploying massive military and paramilitary forces. For the first time the Kashmiri separatists were establishing three 'liberated' zones, resembling heavily armed garrisons, which not even regular troops could enter. Cf. Harinder Baweja, 'Kashmir, losing control', India Today, 31 May 1993, p 25 ff.
67. Regular troops were called up for internal security duties 369 times in five years between 1980 and 1984, as compared to only 476 times during 20 years between 1951 and 1970. Presently, 20% of regular soldiers are constantly deployed internally. Cf. Dinesh Kumar, 'Hour of the soldier. The frequent deployment of the army for internal security duties is a cause for concern', Times of India, 24 January, 1993, p 13. It can be increasingly observed that the paramilitary units, conceived for internal security, cannot cope therewith, or have discredited themselves by having attacked civilians or, as was recently the case, took sides with the Hindu majority during hindu-muslim riots.
68. During the 1991-1992 fiscal year alone, the Ministry of Defence spent 24 million Rs of its annual budget on internal security duties. In July 1991, the then Defence Minister Shared Pawar accused Central Government officials: 'It has become a fashion to pick up the phone and ask for deployment of the army', cf. ibid.
69. Cf. Citha D. Maass 'Reorientation of Indian foreign policy after the Cold War', Aussenpolitik, Vol 44, 1st Quarter 1993, p 36 ff.
70. Despite scarce foreign currency, the Ministry of Defence has started to procure Western defence systems. Cf. Rahul Bedi, 'Indian arms buys defy cash shortfall', Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 May 1993, p 29f.