The new Cameroonian constitutional council in a comparative perspective: Progress or retrogression?

Journal of African Law

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 172-186

  Fombad, Charles Manga ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007989284     PISSN: 00218553     EISSN: 14643731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0021855300011815     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. The extensive nature of the so-called amendments has given rise to a lively debate on whether a constitution of 39 articles could be amended with and replaced by a more elaborate and lengthy one of 69 articles or whether this is, in reality, a new constitution. See M. Kamto, “Révision constitutionelle ou écriture d'une nouvelle constitution” Lex Lata (1996) 23–24 17–20.
2. See H. S. Spaeth, Supreme Court Policy Making; Explanation and Prediction, San Francisco, 1979, 13
3. generally, R. A. Licht (ed.), Is the Supreme Court the Guardian of the Constitution?, Washington, 1993.
4. See Kamto Cranch n. 1.
5. See generally, C. M. Fombad, “The constitutional and legal framework of Cameroonian freedom of expression” forthcoming
6. generally, the same author in ‘Judicial power in Cameroon's amended constitution of 18 January, 1996” (1996) Lesotho Law Journal 1–11.
7. See articles 14, 19 and 33 of the Federal Constitution of 1961 and, in general, C. Anyangwe, The Cameroon Judicial System, Yaounde, 1987, 137–139
8. H. N. A. Enochong, Cameroon Constitutional Law: Federalism in a Mixed Common-Law and Civil-Law System, Yaounde, 1967, 223–234.
9. See further Anyangwe Cameroon Constitutional Law: Federalism in a Mixed Common-Law and Civil-Law System n. 6 at 136–147.
10. This can be translated thus: “… a system characterised by many juridical brakes founded notably on a political control organ which is judge and party at the same time, an almost paralysed juridical control organ and a certain impregnability of the domain of laws and statutory rules which negatives respect for legality.” This is found in his article, “Vers un nouveau modele de controle de la constitutionalite des lois au Cameroun,” in G. Conac (ed.), Les Cours Supremes en Afrique. Tome 2 La Jurisprudence, Paris, 1989, 46.
11. Les Cours Supremes en Afrique, at 45–46. This can be translated thus “… the principle of justiciability which gives the constitution of every state the supremacy indispensable for its prevalence over the other legal norms and thus constitutes the indispensable base to democracy, does not appear to have found effective consecration in the Cameroonian political system; in particular, the ineffectiveness of the control of the constitutionality of laws …”
12. A. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law, Cambridge, 1989, 252.
13. See H. A. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 2nd ed, New York, 1968, 296.
14. The Judicial Process, at 296–297.
15. See Abraham, The Judicial Process n. 17 at 299.
16. See J. M. Breton and N. Makoundiz-Wolo, “L'organisation et le régime du contrôle de constitutionnalité en Republique Populaire du Congo de 1962 á 1986” in G. Conac (ed.), Tome II The Judicial Process 79.
17. A law of 21 April, 1983, amending the Congolese Constitution combines the French with the US and German systems and in principle makes the Congolese citizen one of the best protected in the world. See further Breton and Makoundzi-Wolo, The Judicial Process 79–80.
18. It is doubtful if art. 65, which declares the preamble to be “part and parcel of the constitution”, actually adds anything. See further J. M. Kobilla, “Le préambule du texte constitutionelle du 18 Janvier, 1996: De L'énseigne décorative a I'étalage utilitaire” (1996) 23–24 Lex Lata, 33–38.
19. This is probably inspired by the reform initiated in 1974 in France by the then-president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. See further G. Vede “Le Conseil Constitutional Francais et sa Jurisprudence”, in G. Conac (ed.), Les Cours Suprêmes en Afrique, Tome I, Organisation, Finalités, Procedure, Paris, 1988, 38.
20. Les Cours Suprêmes en Afrique, Tome I, Organisation, Finalités, Procedure. at 39.
21. See generally, F. Moderne, “Les jurisdictions constitutionelles en Afrique” in G. Conac (ed.). Tome II Les Cours Suprêmes en Afrique, Tome I, Organisation, Finalités, Procedure. 3–43.
22. Les Cours Suprêmes en Afrique, Tome I, Organisation, Finalités, Procedure, at 27–37.
23. See generally, Brewer-Carias, Les Cours Suprêmes en Afrique, Tome I, Organisation, Finalités, Procedure 251–260
24. M. Cappelleti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, Indianapolis, 1971, 1–6.
25. See Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World
26. See by contrast the evolution of the French Constitutional Council in Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, 259–260.
27. Spaeth, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 22.
28. See Abraham, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 297.
29. See Breton and Makoundzi-Wolo, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 93.
30. In Conac (ed.), Tome 1, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 34.
31. Cited by Abraham, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 297.
32. See William Pickles, The French Constitution, London, 1960, 30.
33. See Abraham, The French Constitution 299.
34. See generally, Brewer-Carias, The French Constitution 260.
35. The French Constitution
36. The French Constitution
37. See generally Gerard Conac, “Le juge constitutionnel en Afrique censeur ou pedagogue”, in Conac (ed.), The French Constitution Tome II.
38. See Moderne in Conac (ed.), The French Constitution 22–23.
39. See E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Ghana's uncertain political opening”, (1994) 5 Journal of Democracy 80–81.
40. See the examples cited by Kontchou-Kuomegni, Journal of Democracy 54–55.
41. Journal of Democracy, at 62–63.