Some play fair, some don't: Reciprocal fairness in a stylized principal-agent problem

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 113-131

  Höffler, Felix ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; C72; D64; D82; D83; Fairness; Learning; Principal agent problems; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007984643     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00124-3     Document Type: Article

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