Nehru's policy towards Kashmir: Bringing politics back in again

Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 55-74

  Mitra, Subrata K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0007634189     PISSN: 03063631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14662049708447745     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and at the 14th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, held at Copenhagen, 21-24 August, 1996. I am grateful to Hans Blomqvist, Peter Lehr, David Potter and T.V. Sathyamurthy for their comments.
2. See Subrata K. Mitra, 'Politics in India', in Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (eds.), Comparative Politics Today (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 668-729 for a discussion of the grey areas of India's democracy.
3. The Parliament of India resolved, unanimously, on 23 February 1994 that: (a) The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means (b) India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity (c) Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression (d) all attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.
4. This is sometimes referred to as the 'K factor' of Pakistan politics - 'Karachi, Kashmir, Kabul and Kalashnikov'. See Iftikhar Malik, 'Pakistan: Fortyeight Years After', The Muslim (Islamabad), 25 Dec. 1995, 7.
5. See Peter Bacharach and Morton Baraz, 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 947-52 for a theory of non-issue making. It is a strategy for the dominant side to a conflict to convince the world - that is, the other side to the conflict, third parties and itself - that there is not actually a conflict. The discourse of conflict is conducted with the express desire of making the original cause of conflict disappear behind a smoke screen of harmony, or to be so interwoven with a larger conflict as to lose its specificity.
6. For a theory of conflict resolution that asserts the identification of interest as distinguished from the rhetorical positions from which actors speak as a precondition of successful conflict resolution, see Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In (London: Century Business, 1991). Fisher and Ury stipulate, as a basic assumption, that the actors accept as a fact that a conflict exists.
7. For the definition and operationalisation of the two key parameters of political negotiations, see Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, especially Chapter 1, 'The Problem: Don't Bargain Over Positions'.
8. The committee, with Karan Singh as its chairman, has been constituted by Farooq Abdullah to examine all aspects of the status of Kashmir. The fact that Abdullah's National Conference emerged victorious with two-thirds majority in the assembly in the recent Kashmir polls, with support spread out over the three distinct cultural regions of Jammu and Kashmir, endows the event with great significance. Given proper backing by Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri public opinion, the committee might produce a solution acceptable to all the parties. See Ramesh Vinayak, 'Jammu and Kashmir: First Steps into the Future', and the interview with Farooq Abdullah, 'I won't walk into the traps of the past', India Today, 31 Oct. 1996, 32-6.
9. G. Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru; Letters to Chief Ministers, vol. 1, 1947-1964 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 239.
10. Nehru to Krishna Menon, 18 Nov. 1948, in Servepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol. two: 1947-1956 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 32.
11. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 75.
12. For Nehru, Kashmir was crucial for the security of India as well. 'In his statement on Kashmir on 5 March 1948, Nehru stated that India had only two objectives in Jammu and Kashmir state: "to ensure the freedom and the progress of the people there, and to prevent anything happening that might endanger the security of India".' G. Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru; Letters to Chief Ministers, vol. 1, 1947-1964 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 81, n. 15.
13. Nehru even went as far as comparing Pakistan with Nazi Germany: 'It is extraordinary how these developments remind one of the technique adopted by Hitler. Indeed, the whole policy of the Muslim League during the past few years has been singularly reminiscent of the Nazi tactic. ... Another feature of Pakistan's attack on Kashmir, which also reminds one of Nazi Germany, is the fierce, blatant and false propaganda that has been carried on by their radio and press.' Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, 6-7.
14. Sonia Gandhi (ed.), Two Alone, Two Together: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, 1940-1964 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), 13-14.
15. In his letter to Chief Ministers of 18 January 1950, Nehru wrote: 'The Kashmir issue still remains on the agenda of the Security Council. For the moment, it has been rather pushed out by the dispute over Chinese membership of the Security Council, and it is doubtful if it will be taken up there during January.' Pathasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru; Letters to Chief Ministers, vol. 2, 1950-1952, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), 5-6.
16. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 20.
17. Gopal writes, 'His [Nehru's] visit to London and Paris brought home to him how much India was being judged by her conduct in Kashmir and Hyderabad. (Nehru to Patel from Paris, 27 October 1948.) He was forced to recognize that his policies did not appear as impeccable to others as they did to him.' Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 33.
18. Gopal comments: 'whatever Nehru's romantic attachment to the mountains of Kashmir, it did not influence his policy, and the decisions on Kashmir were not, as has been frequently suggested, being taken by him alone in an overwhelming mood of sentiment.' Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 20.
19. For a good chronology of events in Kashmir, see Verinder Grover (ed.), The Story of Kashmir: Yesterday and Today (Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), 3 vols.
20. Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah, 4 Nov. 1947, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 21.
21. 'Nehru informed the American Ambassador that India would stick by what she considered right in Kashmir, whatever the cost. There were moral issues involved, and Pakistan's behaviour in Kashmir had been disgraceful from beginning to end. It was utterly wrong to balance India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question, and India was not going to surrender feebly to aggression.' Nehru to Vijaylakshmir, 24 Aug. 1949, Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 28.
22. The 'Baghdad Pact' (later 'CENTO').
23. Interview of Sheikh Abdullah published in the Statesman, 14 April 1949, reported in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 118.
24. Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah, 4 July 1950, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 118.
25. Sheikh Abdullah to Nehru, 10 JuIy 1950, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 118-19.
26. Ibid., 48.
27. Nehru's speeches in Rajya Sabha, 20 March. Debates, vol.16, 231-45. And in Lok Sabha, 21 March 1957.
28. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 50.
29. Nehru to M.C. Chagla, High Commissioner in London, 2 Aug. 1962, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 216.
30. Nehru to Khruschev, 22 Oct. 1962, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 222.
31. Speech to the conference of information ministers of the states, 25 Oct. 1962, published in the National Herald, 26 Oct. 1962. Nehru clarified this statement on two later occasions in the Rajya Sabha, 25 Feb. 1963, Debates, vol.42, 915-42, and 3 Sept. 1963, Debates, vol.44, 2001-29, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 223.
32. Speech to the conference of information ministers of the states, 25 Oct. 1962, published in the National Herald, 26 Oct. 1962. Nehru clarified this statement on two later occasions in the Rajya Sabha, 25 Feb. 1963, Debates, vol.42, 915-42, and 3 Sept. 1963, Debates, vol.44, 2001-29, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 223.
33. Speech to the conference of information ministers of the states, 25 Oct. 1962, published in the National Herald, 26 Oct. 1962. Nehru clarified this statement on two later occasions in the Rajya Sabha, 25 Feb. 1963, Debates, vol.42, 915-42, and 3 Sept. 1963, Debates, vol.44, 2001-29, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 223.
34. Speech to the conference of information ministers of the states, 25 Oct. 1962, published in the National Herald, 26 Oct. 1962. Nehru clarified this statement on two later occasions in the Rajya Sabha, 25 Feb. 1963, Debates, vol.42, 915-42, and 3 Sept. 1963, Debates, vol.44, 2001-29, in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 223.
35. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 262. 'In fact', commented Nehru dryly, 'it would strengthen your position much more if you lost a few seats to bonafide opponents.' Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mahomed, 4 March 1962, ibid.
36. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 263.
37. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 263-4.
38. Ibid., 264.
39. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, 128.
40. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.3, 264.
41. Asian Recorder, 18-24 March 1964, 5726.
42. There is some controversy as to whether Johnson used food aid to pressurise India into taking a less intransigent view of the Pakistani claim to Kashmir. Srivastava, Shastri's biographer does not believe that to have been the case. See C.P. Srivastava, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 1964-1966: A Life of Truth in Politics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 174-6. But Lewis, who was Johnson's aid at that time, thinks otherwise. See John P. Lewis, India's Political Economy: Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 96-8.
43. There is some controversy as to whether Johnson used food aid to pressurise India into taking a less intransigent view of the Pakistani claim to Kashmir. Srivastava, Shastri's biographer does not believe that to have been the case. See C.P. Srivastava, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 1964-1966: A Life of Truth in Politics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 174-6. But Lewis, who was Johnson's aid at that time, thinks otherwise. See John P. Lewis, India's Political Economy: Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 96-8.
44. Srivastava, Shastri, 186.
45. Ibid., 186.
46. Ibid., 198.
47. Sunjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (Delhi: Sage, 1984). See Bharat Wariavwala, 'Security Issues in Domestic Polities', in Subrata K. Mitra and James Chiriyankandath (eds.), Electoral Politics in India: A Changing Landscape (Delhi: Segment, 1992) for an analysis of the use of security as an issue in domestic politics in what he calls the 'plebiscitary polities' of Indira Gandhi.
48. Sunjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (Delhi: Sage, 1984). See Bharat Wariavwala, 'Security Issues in Domestic Polities', in Subrata K. Mitra and James Chiriyankandath (eds.), Electoral Politics in India: A Changing Landscape (Delhi: Segment, 1992) for an analysis of the use of security as an issue in domestic politics in what he calls the 'plebiscitary polities' of Indira Gandhi.
49. In this sense, the policy reflects reality, for the argument that Kashmir is a guarantee of Indian secularism has no bearing on reality. It certainly does not deter the Hindu mobs in violent communal riots, nor does it bring any comfort to the hapless Muslim citizens of Kashmir facing the double threat of Muslim terrorists and Indian soldiers, nor to the Hindu refugees from Kashmir, forgotten by the rest of the world, who languish in camps in Delhi.
50. For an analysis of the linkmen, see Subrata Mitra, 'Room to Maneuver in the Middle: Local Elites, Political Action and the State in India', World Politics. 43, 3 (April 1991), 390-413.