Everyday ethics in international relations

Millenium

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 669-693

  Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007600862     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298980270030401     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 2, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff, H. Gerth, A.M. Henderson, F. Kolegar, C.W. Mills, T. Parsons, M. Rheinstein, G. Roth, E. Shils, and C. Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 911.
2. Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 48-49.
3. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 12-27.
4. I have borrowed 'the last word' as a turn of phrase from Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 1997), though with little sympathy for his position.
5. I have revised the conception of justification that I adopted in Onuf, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 248-57 and 277-78, by making it more inclusive and, thus, more in keeping with ordinary use.
6. On the 'ideal observer' or 'world agent' as a philosophical conceit, see Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 215-21; R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 44-45; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 82-84. See also Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator', who looks upon us from within and passes judgement on our conduct, in Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Mactie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 82-85 and 128-32.
7. On the 'ideal observer' or 'world agent' as a philosophical conceit, see Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 215-21; R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 44-45; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 82-84. See also Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator', who looks upon us from within and passes judgement on our conduct, in Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Mactie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 82-85 and 128-32.
8. On the 'ideal observer' or 'world agent' as a philosophical conceit, see Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 215-21; R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 44-45; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 82-84. See also Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator', who looks upon us from within and passes judgement on our conduct, in Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Mactie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 82-85 and 128-32.
9. On the 'ideal observer' or 'world agent' as a philosophical conceit, see Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 215-21; R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 44-45; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 82-84. See also Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator', who looks upon us from within and passes judgement on our conduct, in Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Mactie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 82-85 and 128-32.
10. Christine M. Korsgaard, 'The Normative Question', in Christine M. Korsgaard with G.A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, The Sources of Normaitvity, ed. O. O'Neill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 9-10, emphasis in original. This short book is an especially useful guide to the main issues of contemporary ethical theory.
11. Korsgaard, op. cit., in note 7, p. 8, emphasis in original. Conversely, there cannot be 'non-moral forms of nonnativity (prudential, aesthetic, etc.)'. Here I quote Bernard Williams, 'History, Morality and the Test of Reflection', in Korsgaard et al., op. cit., in note 7, p. 210, whose position is otherwise. Prudential and aesthetic recommendations- should have looked up'; 'you'll love this vase' - are neither normative nor moral. See below for more on what counts as normative.
12. Korsgaard, op. cit., in note 7, p. 8, emphasis in original. Conversely, there cannot be 'non-moral forms of nonnativity (prudential, aesthetic, etc.)'. Here I quote Bernard Williams, 'History, Morality and the Test of Reflection', in Korsgaard et al., op. cit., in note 7, p. 210, whose position is otherwise. Prudential and aesthetic recommendations- should have looked up'; 'you'll love this vase' - are neither normative nor moral. See below for more on what counts as normative.
13. Korsgaard et al., op. cit., in note 7, p. 255.
14. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter V (1095022-31).
15. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Seventh Edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 30-31. See also Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 116-18, for a sketchy but useful characterisation of such codes. See also Alasdair Maclntyre's description of 'heroic societies' in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), pp. 121-30, and Rom Harre's description of 'expressive orders', in Rom Harre, Social Being, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 192-203.
16. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Seventh Edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 30-31. See also Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 116-18, for a sketchy but useful characterisation of such codes. See also Alasdair Maclntyre's description of 'heroic societies' in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), pp. 121-30, and Rom Harre's description of 'expressive orders', in Rom Harre, Social Being, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 192-203.
17. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Seventh Edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 30-31. See also Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 116-18, for a sketchy but useful characterisation of such codes. See also Alasdair Maclntyre's description of 'heroic societies' in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), pp. 121-30, and Rom Harre's description of 'expressive orders', in Rom Harre, Social Being, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 192-203.
18. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Seventh Edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 30-31. See also Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 116-18, for a sketchy but useful characterisation of such codes. See also Alasdair Maclntyre's description of 'heroic societies' in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), pp. 121-30, and Rom Harre's description of 'expressive orders', in Rom Harre, Social Being, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 192-203.
19. See, Sidgwick, op. cit., in note 11, pp. 337-72.
20. Donagan, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 4-9. When E.H. Carr wrote of 'the moral code of the ordinary man', as against the 'moral code of the philosopher', he may have been thinking of something like Donagan's 'common morality'. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Second Edition (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 146-69, quoting p. 146.
21. Donagan, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 4-9. When E.H. Carr wrote of 'the moral code of the ordinary man', as against the 'moral code of the philosopher', he may have been thinking of something like Donagan's 'common morality'. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Second Edition (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 146-69, quoting p. 146.
22. G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A.W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Sections 33 and 142-57, pp. 62-64 and 189-98.
23. Ibid., Sections 114 and 156, pp. 141 and 197; emphasis in translation.
24. Ibid., Section 151, p. 195; emphasis in translation.
25. Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA: M1T Press, 1993), pp. 1-17.
26. The words just quoted are David Hume's. See Korsgaard et al., op. cit., in note 7, pp. 117, 127, and, more generally on practical identity, pp. 110-30, which Korsgaard developed by drawing on what she called a communitarian perspective, pp. 118-19, but I think is more properly a republican perspective. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 17-18.
27. The words just quoted are David Hume's. See Korsgaard et al., op. cit., in note 7, pp. 117, 127, and, more generally on practical identity, pp. 110-30, which Korsgaard developed by drawing on what she called a communitarian perspective, pp. 118-19, but I think is more properly a republican perspective. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 17-18.
28. See, further, Nicholas Onuf, 'Constructivism: A User's Manual', in Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 71-72.
29. F.H. Bradley's essay, 'My Station and Its Duties', inspired me to adopt the term 'station' in this context. See F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 152-58. Although Bradley's discussion does not discriminate among statuses, offices, and roles, it focuses on the first of these categories. By conferring status, I might add, roles and offices also become statuses when agents hold them for long.
30. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Sir R. Livingstone (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), Book V, Sections 84-117, pp. 266-74, quoting Section 111, p. 272.
31. On states as agents with agents, see Onuf, op. cit., in note 18, pp. 145-47, on fictions, see pp. 74-75.
32. For a comprehensive assessment, see Gregory Raymond, 'Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms', Mershon International Studies Review (Vol. 41, Supp. 2, 1997), pp. 205-45.
33. Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996).
34. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, p. 54. For similar formulations, see also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, pp. 5 and 483; Andie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-23; and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997), p. 33.
35. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, p. 54. For similar formulations, see also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, pp. 5 and 483; Andie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-23; and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997), p. 33.
36. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, p. 54. For similar formulations, see also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, pp. 5 and 483; Andie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-23; and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997), p. 33.
37. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, p. 54. For similar formulations, see also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, pp. 5 and 483; Andie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-23; and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997), p. 33.
38. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, p. 54. For similar formulations, see also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, pp. 5 and 483; Andie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-23; and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997), p. 33.
39. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, p. 54. For similar formulations, see also Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., in note 24, pp. 5 and 483; Andie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-23; and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997), p. 33.
40. Robin M. Williams, Jr., 'Norms: The Concept of Norms', in David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume II (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1968), p. 204.
41. Ibid., p. 205.
42. David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 19.
43. Katzenstein, op. cit., in note 25, p. 21.
44. Jack P. Gibbs, Norms. Deviance, and Social Control: Conceptual Matters (New York, NY: Elsevier, 1981), pp. 7-9.
45. See also Raymond, op. cit., in note 23, p. 217.
46. Here see also Copp, op. cit., in note 28, pp. 3-4 and 19-22.
47. Hare, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 15-17 and 186-87. Note, however, that Hare's prescriptivism calls for universal standards. Mine does not, for reasons that I have already indicated and later develop.
48. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 25-27.
49. See also Onuf, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 78-84, and Onuf, op. cit., in note 19, pp. 66-69.
50. See also Onuf, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 78-84, and Onuf, op. cit., in note 19, pp. 66-69.
51. According to James W. Forrester, any deontic statement may be used directively 'to cause people to act or refrain from acting in certain ways'. James W. Forrester, Why You Should: The Pragmatics of Deonlic Speech (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1989), p. 35. Yet, demanding something of someone may not cause the demanded act, even if this is the intention of the agent issuing the demand. Conversely, speech acts that are not imperatives - not directive speech acts - can cause people to act as intended. Finally, any speech act can cause effects altogether unrelated to the speakers' intentions.
52. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 10. For a helpful discussion of speech acts, see also pp. 28-34.
53. Kowert and Legro, op. cit., in note 25, p. 470.
54. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, 'Global Law-Making and Legal Thought', in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (ed.), Law-Making in the Global Community (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1982), pp. 1-81, and Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 264-421.
55. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, 'Global Law-Making and Legal Thought', in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (ed.), Law-Making in the Global Community (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1982), pp. 1-81, and Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 264-421.
56. See also Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'Is International Law "Proper" Law?' Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (Vol.49, No. 1, 1983), pp. 13-46.
57. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, Second Edition, rev. Robert W. Tucker (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 556-65. In Kelsen's formulation, the rule that 'states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved' is the 'basic norm' behind which there can be no other. Ibid., p. 565.
58. 'Nay, habit is but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin'. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, Second Edition, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Book I, III, xvi, p. 179. On the claim that people possess a moral faculty, see Book III, I, i-ii, pp. 455-76.
59. Kowert and Legro, op. cit., in note 25, p. 486. Similarly: 'Norms are ubiquitous', Raymond, op. cit., in note 23, p. 208.
60. Kowert and Legro, op. cit., in note 25, p. 486. Similarly: 'Norms are ubiquitous', Raymond, op. cit., in note 23, p. 208.
61. Kowert and Legro, op. cit., in note 25, p. 483.
62. Marvin Harris, Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), pp. 269-70.
63. Ibid., pp. 271-73.
64. 'The world community's prescriptions about coercion, like other world prescriptions, march and must march in pairs of complementary opposites'. Myres S. McDougal and Florentino S. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 127.
65. Harris, op. cit., in note 45, p. 273. To say that every rule has an alternative surely claims too much on behalf of 'cognitive idealists' to whom he attributes this position. See also Robert B. Edgerton, Rules, Exceptions, and Social Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
66. Harris, op. cit., in note 45, p. 273. To say that every rule has an alternative surely claims too much on behalf of 'cognitive idealists' to whom he attributes this position. See also Robert B. Edgerton, Rules, Exceptions, and Social Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
67. Harris, op. cit., in note 45, pp. 273-75. Edgerton, op. cit., in note 48, pp. 5-6, traced this arresting phrase to anthropologist Paul Bohannan.
68. Harris, op. cit., in note 45, pp. 273-75. Edgerton, op. cit., in note 48, pp. 5-6, traced this arresting phrase to anthropologist Paul Bohannan.
69. Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 26-37.
70. Forrester, op. cit., in note 36, pp. 49-59.
71. Weber called this process 'formal rationalization'. Weber, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 809-15.
72. Nagel, op. cit., in note 4, p. 5. See also pp. 119-22; Hare, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 107-16; and Williams, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 82-86.
73. Nagel, op. cit., in note 4, p. 5. See also pp. 119-22; Hare, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 107-16; and Williams, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 82-86.
74. Nagel, op. cit., in note 4, p. 5. See also pp. 119-22; Hare, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 107-16; and Williams, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 82-86.
75. Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 105-8. [H]eroic societies commonly have a well-defined status to which any stranger who arrives in the society from outside can be assigned....A stranger has to be received with hospitality, limited but well-defined', according to Maclntyre, op. cit., in note 11, p. 124,
76. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 67-70.
77. 'Right is, generally, the expression of the universal....To have rights is to be (or to be presumed to be) capable of realizing the universal command consciously as such'. Bradley, op. cit., in note 20, pp. 186-87, footnote deleted. See also Hegel, op. cit., in note 14, Sections 29-30, 66, and 114, pp. 58-59, 95-97, and 141-42.
78. 'Right is, generally, the expression of the universal....To have rights is to be (or to be presumed to be) capable of realizing the universal command consciously as such'. Bradley, op. cit., in note 20, pp. 186-87, footnote deleted. See also Hegel, op. cit., in note 14, Sections 29-30, 66, and 114, pp. 58-59, 95-97, and 141-42.
79. See also Weber, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 815-31.
80. See David Kennedy, 'Primitive Legal Scholarship', Harvard International Law Journal (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1986), pp. 1-98
81. , and Yasuaki Onuma (ed.), A Normative Approach to War: Peace. War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
82. See also Onuf, op. cit., note 39, pp. 66-81.
83. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff, H. Gerth, A.M. Henderson, F. Kolegar, C.W. Mills, T. Parsons, M. Rheinstein, G. Roth, E. Shils, and C. Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 217-26, and Weber, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 865-80.
84. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff, H. Gerth, A.M. Henderson, F. Kolegar, C.W. Mills, T. Parsons, M. Rheinstein, G. Roth, E. Shils, and C. Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 217-26, and Weber, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 865-80.
85. See further, Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, 'International Codification: Interpreting the Last-Half Century', in Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), pp. 274-76.
86. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, 'The Principle of Nonintervention, the United Nations, and the International System', International Organization (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1971), pp. 209-27, and Dorothy V. Jones, 'The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 42-61.
87. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, 'The Principle of Nonintervention, the United Nations, and the International System', International Organization (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1971), pp. 209-27, and Dorothy V. Jones, 'The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 42-61.
88. Onuf, op. cit., note 62, pp. 223-26, and Jones, op. cit., in note 62, pp. 52-57.
89. Onuf, op. cit., note 62, pp. 223-26, and Jones, op. cit., in note 62, pp. 52-57.
90. See also Onuf, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 182-84.
91. Jones, op. cit., in note 62, pp. 44-45.
92. Hegel, op. cit., in note 14, Sections 188-208 and 226-39, and Onuf, op. cit., in note 18, pp. 263-70.
93. Hegel, op. cit., in note 14, Sections 188-208 and 226-39, and Onuf, op. cit., in note 18, pp. 263-70.
94. Goffman, op. cit., note 2, pp. 48-49.