Tudjman's victory: Croatia, the U.N., NATO and the U.S.

Nationalities Papers

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 501-514

  Miller, Robert F ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0007528011     PISSN: 00905992     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00905999708408521     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. On the dangers for Croatia of conflict with the combined Serbian forces just over a month before Tudjman's decision to remove UNPROFOR see Emil Vedušić, "Zašto Hrvatska izbjegava rat," Nedjeljna Dalmacija, No. 1231, 2 December 1994, pp. 2-3.
2. Among them, a report from the number two representative in the Croatian interest office in Belgrade, Dr Dusan Bilandžić, a noted political economist with considerable experience in Belgrade. Bilandžić had reported that the Yugoslav economy had been harder hit by U.N. sanctions than had generally been believed.
3. Misha Glenny presents a vivid account of Croatian and Serbian actions and reactions in these regions in The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, new Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 121-126.
4. For another good treatment of these events see Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 232-236.
5. In this connection former U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann's characterisation of Tudjman in his recent Foreign Affairs article is particularly insightful. He portrays Tudjman, with all his evident faults, as, unlike Milošević, someone who "... really wants to be a Western statesman," and "... therefore listens to Western expressions of concern and criticism and often does something about them," Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador - A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, cited in BOSNEWS Digest, No. 408, 26 November 1995.
6. Fran Visnar, "Nakon uspostava hrvatsko-bošnjackoga vojnog stožera: savez u pravi trenutak," Vjesnik, 8 March 1995, from a selection of the Croatian press, on e-mail from the Serbian Information Initiative, 11 March 1995. On the VRS see the chart "Formacija srpske vojske u BiH," Globus, 11 November 1994, p. 4, which gives the total size of the VRS as 80-82,000 soldiers.
7. Fran Visnar, "Nakon uspostava hrvatsko-bošnjackoga vojnog stožera: savez u pravi trenutak," Vjesnik, 8 March 1995, from a selection of the Croatian press, on e-mail from the Serbian Information Initiative, 11 March 1995. On the VRS see the chart "Formacija srpske vojske u BiH," Globus, 11 November 1994, p. 4, which gives the total size of the VRS as 80-82,000 soldiers.
8. The obscure details behind these events are recounted in Vesna Fabris-Peruničić's, "[to donosi najav] jeno ujedinjenje 'svih srpskih država,'" Vjesnik, 23 May 1995, reproduced by e-mail Hrvatski tisak, 25 May 1995.
9. For some insights into Croatian thinking on these issues on the eve of Tudjman's first declaration see Tihomir Dujmović, "Mandat za Unproforov odlazak," Nedjeljna Dalmacija, No. 1237, 13 January 1995, pp. 2-3.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Mirko Galić, "Granić s Kinkelom i Juppeom: 'odledjivanje' pregovora s Hrvatskom," Vjesnik, 21 March 1995, as transmitted from "Izbor iz tiska" in the Serbian Information Initiative, 22 March 1995 on e-mail.
14. This list of conditions is derived from a number of different sources, some of which are more credible than others, but all have been mentioned in one place or another. For a useful summary and analysis see Bruno Lopandić, "5,000 'plavaca' na hrvatskim granicama," Nedjeljna Dalmacija, No. 1246, 17 March 1995, pp. 2-3.
15. Ibid.
16. See, for example, the interview with Anto Djapić, spokesman for the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), by Tihomir Dujmović, "Potrošili smo kredit u narod," Nedeljnja Dalmacija, No. 1246, 17 March 1995, pp. 5-6.
17. Tanja Torbarina, "Ono tamo: Energično je zauzet stav: Ako strani promatrači ne stanu na hrvatske granice onda ništa," Globus, 17 March 1995, transmitted from Hrvatski-Vjesnik on e-mail.
18. The semi-secret involvement of the U.S. military in re-fashioning the Croatian army, most notably, the quasi-private organisation "Military Professional Resources Inc.," headed by a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Carl Vuono, and by the former head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Ed Soyster, and the implications for U.S.-Croatian relations the role of Croatia in Washington's Balkan plans and relationships within the U.S. alliance system in Europe are discussed in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "American Bow to Forces of Realpolitik in Bosnia," The Sunday Telegraph, 26 November 1995, cited in Reuters Textline, 26 November 1995.
19. Torbarina herself was not remiss in expressing her glee over the rapidity of the Croatian operation "storm" in the Krajina. In a column on 11 August she noted that the one fault of the Croatian troops was that they were not fast enough to keep up with the retreating Serbs, whom she designated as "the fastest army in the world," Globus, 11 August 1995, by e-mail from Hrvatski vjesnik, 11 August 1995.
20. The U.N. pours between US$2.5 and US$3.0 million per day, which is a major contribution to the limping Croatian economy. The patent irrationality of sacrificing this income was interpreted by some as evidence that Tudjman was never really serious about expelling UNPROFOR. Alen Anić, "The Art of Sabre Rattling," Balkan War Report, No. 32, March 1995, p. 36.
21. Even Germany, formerly Croatia's main patron in the West and now somewhat sidetracked by Washington's military and diplomatic "leadership" in the region, found some of the Croatians' policies toward the remnant Serb population hard to take. See, for example, Kuno Kruse, "Eine Nation auf Bewährung," Die Zeit (Hamburg), 20 October 1995, pp. 13-16. am grateful to Prof. Peter Hill of Hamburg University for sending me this article. On the other hand, Roy Gutman, who won the Pulitzer Prize for his reportage on Serbian atrocities, has recently predicted that human violations by Croat troops and authorities in formerly Serbian inhabited territories will cause difficulties for relations with the U.S., as well. Interviewed by Ivor Alborghetti in Globus, No. 259, 24 November 1995.
22. Even Germany, formerly Croatia's main patron in the West and now somewhat sidetracked by Washington's military and diplomatic "leadership" in the region, found some of the Croatians' policies toward the remnant Serb population hard to take. See, for example, Kuno Kruse, "Eine Nation auf Bewährung," Die Zeit (Hamburg), 20 October 1995, pp. 13-16. am grateful to Prof. Peter Hill of Hamburg University for sending me this article. On the other hand, Roy Gutman, who won the Pulitzer Prize for his reportage on Serbian atrocities, has recently predicted that human violations by Croat troops and authorities in formerly Serbian inhabited territories will cause difficulties for relations with the U.S., as well. Interviewed by Ivor Alborghetti in Globus, No. 259, 24 November 1995.
23. Ibid., for example.
24. Nearly complete results reported by Reuters on 31 October had the HDZ receiving about 44.8% of the total vote. Cited in the Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Report, No. 213, 1 November 1995.
25. Davor Butković, "Predsjednik Franjo Tudjman odbio je Dražena Budišu, Gorana Granića i Dr. Zdravko Tomca kao kandidate za gradonačelnika i zaprijetio da će u Zagrebu raspisati nove izbore!" Globus, No. 257, 10 November 1995.
26. There has been a well orchestragted campaign to sell the Dayton outcome as the only possible one for Croatia under present international conditions. See, for example, the interview on 24 November 1995 with Foreign Minister Mate Granić in Večernji list by Mate Piskor, "The Only Peace Agreement Possible," transmitted by e-mail 〈croatian-news/stribor.srce.hr〉, 24 November 1995 (in English).
27. Evans-Pritchard, loc. cit.