An essay on scholarship, human rights, and state legitimacy: The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 544-593

  Afshari, Reza ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0007346019     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1996.0029     Document Type: Review

References (142)

1. The Shi'i branch of Islam became the religion of the majority of Iranians in the sixteenth century. In its basic understanding of the nature of God and the Holy Quran, it is almost identical to the Sunni Islam followed by the majority of Muslims in the world. The essential differences are related to the issue of authority in the Islamic polity after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The followers of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, became the Shi'i Muslims. Ali became the first Shi'i Imam, upheld as the rightful ruler of the Islamic community against the established Caliphs who were recognized by the Sunnis. The descendants of Ali became the Shi'i Imams. Iranians Shi'i Muslims recognize twelve Shi'i Imams, with the last ordered by God to enter the period of Occultation in 874. The Shi'i cosmology with this unique genealogy of twelve infallible Imams helps the believers to prepare for the Day of Judgment; the Shi'i Muslims rely with great intensity on intercessions by one or many Imams, whose names are constantly invoked at times of life-crisis. The Imams can facilitate one's entry into heaven.
2. Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 67-68 (1994).
3. Carol Corillon, the present director of the Committee, writes that "[t]he committee believes that pressure . . . works. And when a scientific institution that carries authority and prestige makes appeals for its colleagues, its concerns are not as easily dismissed by governments as those made by human rights groups sometimes are." CAROL CORILLON, OVERVIEW, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1988).
4. The Human Rights Quarterly published a number of papers that were presented at a symposium, "Universities and Human Rights," chaired by Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University. Hoffmann offered a set of flexible guidelines for the foreign involvement of American universities. He noted that: the guidelines suggested here do not aim at promoting human rights abroad or at improving other governments' records. Nor should they depend on the fluctuation of the nation's human rights policy. They have two goals that are quite different from this. One is to prevent an institution that is the very symbol of enlightenment, which cannot exist without freedom and is dedicated to the expansion of knowledge, from becoming an unwilling accomplice in the violation or destruction of human rights. The other one is to display a symbolic refusal to condone violations, to protest against them on behalf of the values which universities embody. Stanley H. Hoffmann, Universities and Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 5, 20 (1984).
5. The latest controversy involves the government of Turkey, which has helped to endow the Ataturk Chair of Turkish Studies at Princeton University. The chair went to Heath W. Lowry, who previously worked for the Turkish government as the executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies in Washington. The goal of the Institute was "to facilitate greater knowledge of Turkey." The main aim of the Turkish government has been to deny the Armenian genocide, and they hired Mr. Lowry as a consultant to help further this goal. See Amy Magaro Rubin, Critics Accuse Turkish Government of Manipulating Scholarship, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Oct. 27, 1995, at A44.
6. "The freedom of individual academics to choose their own area of study and to engage in research wherever they choose . . . is a prized part of academic freedom." Frank P. Grad, Decision-Making Procedures for University Projects Abroad, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 27, 31 n.8 (1984).
7. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (1989).
8. The International Bill of Rights is the name generally used for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights taken together. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A.Res 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR (Resolutions, part 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 127 (1949); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id. at 26.
11. Vladimir Kudriavtsev & Elena Lukasheva, Postcommunist New Thinking on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: FOUNDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE HOPE 94, 96 (Peter Juviler & Bertram Gross eds., 1993).
12. B.G. Ramcharan, Strategies for the International Protection of Human Rights in the 1990s, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 155, 167 (1991).
13. J. Paul Martin, Human Rights - Education for What?, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 414, 415 (1987).
14. A. Beiden Fields & Wolf-Dieter Narr, Human Rights as a Holistic Concept, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 20 (1992).
15. Use of the "yes . . . but. . ." formula is also less effective in international mobilization of shame. The following passage, related to China, offers an example of this formula: Since 1979, the Chinese economy has been growing at the rate of 9 percent to 10 percent a year, perhaps the longest and fastest record of growth in the world today. Despite increasing inequalities, the standard of living for the ordinary Chinese has risen substantially. And for the first time in modern history, China has become a major actor on the world stage. One must never forget Mr. Deng's military crackdown on the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, or the repression of Tibetan religious leaders, human rights spokesmen and political dissidents. These are terrible and lasting blights on his record. Yet it is also true that for the first time since the Communist takeover in 1949, people have been allowed a degree of freedom in their personal, economic and social lives. . . . Mr. Deng made China's second revolution possible, and it was a revolution that avoided the terror, mass mobilizations and personality cult of his predecessor. Merle Goldman, A Hero to His Daughter, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., 12 Feb. 1995, at 15. With their impressive economic growth, the exceptional cases like China (or South Korea, before recent rights improvements) might offer some justification for the use of this formula. However, this evaluation differs from a judgment based on a holistic examination of the entire system within the context of the human rights discourse. At any given moment of a country's history, evaluation should be based on present possibilities and future potentialities, not on past brutalities. An evaluation should not be made in comparison to the dark recesses of a bygone era. Obviously, given the absence of impressive economic growth in a country like Iran, the formula grossly shortchanges ethical principles demanded by the human rights discourse. It is also indicative of a poorly integrated scholarship.
16. Andrei Sakharov, Actors in the Drama Speak Out, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 11, at 20-21.
17. Mohsen M. Milani, Power Shifts in Revolutionary Iran, 26 IRANIAN STUD. 359, 372 (1993).
18. Bijan Khajehpour, Iran's Petrochemicals Come out of Isolation, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Sept. 1995, at 46, 47.
19. Following their victory in 1979, the clerics took over the assets that belonged to the Pahlavi dynasty and expropriated the properties of wealthy secular Iranians. Depending on the clerical factional alignments of the time, a number of foundations were created to manage the properties, which included large industrial establishments and businesses. They have become a source of income for clerics who control them independently from the government. These foundations are not accidental to the regime the clerics have constructed for themselves; they are organically linked with the entire edifice, providing some of the material underpinnings that hold the structure together. They cannot be dismantled without undermining clerical control over the country. The Foundation of the Oppressed's "holdings are estimated at $12 billion, and its independent manufacturing and trade, shipping, transportation, airline and tourism agencies have earned $300 million from 1989 to 1993, with estimated earnings of more than $100 million in 1994." Iranian Foundation Head Denies Accusations of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, 8 Jan. 1995, at A8.
20. Interview with the President Hashimi Rafsanjani, JUMHURI-I ISLAMI, 26 Dec. 1994, at 14.
21. For example, the mixing of the sexes at weddings or receptions is prohibited by law. Recently, in the city of Mashhad, 127 of 128 guests at a ceremony were sentenced to be flogged or fined because they attended a wedding where the male and female guests intermingled. The bride's sentence was eighty-five lashes. "The only wedding guest acquitted was a youngster. The groom's father was the only one sentenced to a jail term - 18 months - plus a fine of $16,700 and seizure of some of his property." The bride gets 85 Iashes, IRAN TIMES (Wash.), 8 Sept. 1995, at 16.
22. Jack Donnelly discusses three trade offs that had been widely advocated: the need trade off, the equality trade off, and the liberty trade off. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 163-202.
23. Sami Zubaida, Islam, the State & Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt, MIDDLE EAST REP., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 2, 3.
24. Amnesty International, Memorandum from Amnesty International regarding its concerns in the Islamic Republic of Iran (20 Nov. 1986), in IRAN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4, 18 (Amnesty International ed., 1987).
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Id.
28. Shari'a is the body of Islamic law codified over centuries; today it is being abused and selectively applied by the Islamic Republic. The Shari'a offers the strongest legitimizing factor for the rules of clerics.
29. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1995, at 164 (1995).
30. Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley, Introduction, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 1, 3 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
31. Elaine Sciolino, Condemning Iranian Oil Deal, U.S. May Tighten Trade Ban, N.Y. TIMES, 10 Mar. 1995, at A2.
32. John L. Esposito, Islamic Movements, the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations, and the Role of Regional Players, in US-IRAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF TENSION AND MUTUAL INTEREST 29, 31 (Hooshang Amirahmadi & Eric Hooglund eds., 1994). Esposito's essay was first presented during a conference held in Washington, DC in 1994. It was the second conference on US-Iran relations organized by Hooshang Amirahmadi and sponsored by the "US-Iran Conference," which is based at Rutgers University. The goal of the conference was to create "a dialogue for better understanding between Iran and the United States." Hooshang Amirahmadi, US-Iran Relations: Understanding the Issues, Refocussing the Emphasis, in US-IRAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF TENSION AND MUTUAL INTEREST, supra, at 5, 5. The US-Iran Relations book is the proceedings of the conference. It was published by the Middle East Institute, which publishes the Middle East Journal. The editor of the Journal at the time was Eric Hooglund, another normalizing scholar, who also coedited the book.
33. John L. Esposito, Islamic Movements, the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations, and the Role of Regional Players, in US-IRAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF TENSION AND MUTUAL INTEREST 29, 31 (Hooshang Amirahmadi & Eric Hooglund eds., 1994). Esposito's essay was first presented during a conference held in Washington, DC in 1994. It was the second conference on US-Iran relations organized by Hooshang Amirahmadi and sponsored by the "US-Iran Conference," which is based at Rutgers University. The goal of the conference was to create "a dialogue for better understanding between Iran and the United States." Hooshang Amirahmadi, US-Iran Relations: Understanding the Issues, Refocussing the Emphasis, in US-IRAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF TENSION AND MUTUAL INTEREST, supra, at 5, 5. The US-Iran Relations book is the proceedings of the conference. It was published by the Middle East Institute, which publishes the Middle East Journal. The editor of the Journal at the time was Eric Hooglund, another normalizing scholar, who also coedited the book.
34. Peter Avery, Iran, A Cultural Challenge, MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT, July-Aug. 1995, at 38.
35. Id. at 38-39.
36. Eric Hooglund, The Pulse of Iran Today, in MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT, supra note 33, at 40, 41.
37. Mohsen Milani, The Roots and Characteristics of the Iranian Theocracy, 1993 PROCEEDINGS OF A ONE-DAY CONFERENCE, THEOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WOMEN: THE IRANIAN EXPERIENCE 7. These proceedings were published by Montclair State University, where the conference was held.
38. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IRAN: OFFICIAL SECRECY HIDES CONTINUING REPRESSION 1 (1995).
39. Richard W. Bulliet, Reform or Revolution, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., 5 Mar. 1995, at 16 (reviewing MICHAEL FIELD, INSIDE THE ARAB WORLD (1994)).
40. Richard W. Bulliet, Reform or Revolution, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., 5 Mar. 1995, at 16 (reviewing MICHAEL FIELD, INSIDE THE ARAB WORLD (1994)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315, 319 (1993).
45. Both of these practices, public stoning and public hanging, widely occurred immediately after the establishment of the Islamic Revolution but are seldom done today, except for rare instances in remote towns and traditional provincial cities.
46. EMORY C. BOGLE, THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST: FROM IMPERIALISM TO FREEDOM, 1800-1958, at 6, 8 (1996).
47. In the writings of some Western scholars, the secular voice is absent. The otherwise very useful article by Heiner Bielefeldt is the latest example; it might give the impression that the future of human rights discourse in Islamic countries solely depends on the outcome of the debate between conservative, liberal, and pragmatic Muslims, representing them as the only interlocutors in today's fashionable notion of a "cross-cultural dialogue." Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 587 (1995).
48. See Reza Afshari, An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 235 (1994).
49. Saidi Sirjani's third letter addressed to Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 12 Nov. 1990, in FROM SHAIKH SAN'AN TO DEATH IN PRISON, 33 (1995). Saidi Sirjani's letters are translated and published in this book which is a commemorative volume on the occasion of the first anniversary of Saidi Sirjani's death; no editor is named. It includes of section of Sirjani's writing, poetry, and letters. The book also includes appeals and protest letters sent by the international human rights community to the government of Iran.
50. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, A Storyteller and His Times: 'Ali-Akbar Sa'idi-Sirjani of Iran, 68 WORLD LIT. TODAY 516, 522 (1994).
51. Ulema refers to Islamic scholars trained in Islamic law, the traditional custodians of the faith.
52. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1988).
53. Hamid Dabashi, The Shattering of the Wor(l)d: 'Theocracy, Human Rights and Women,' in PROCEEDINGS OF A ONE-DAY CONFERENCE, supra note 36, at 55.
54. Hamid Dabashi, Re-Reading Reality: Kiarostami's Through the Olive Trees and the Cultural Politics of a Postrevolutionary Aesthetics, 7 CRITIQUE: J. CRITICAL STUD. IRAN AND MIDDLE EAST 63, 79 (1995).
55. Id. at 74.
56. See ALI AKBAR MAHDI & ABDOLALI LAHSAEIZADEH, SOCIOLOGY IN IRAN 82 (Middle Eastern Series No. 27, 1992).
57. Recently a large number of prominent Iranian writers and poets issued "We are Writers," expressing their frustration with censorship and the country's inhospitable cultural climate. In response, the powerful Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati issued the clerics' standard threat, unleashing the hizbollahi gangs: You want to write lies, to make accusations, to mar others' reputations and to weaken the foundation of our young people's beliefs. But our people and our officials are not going to let you do that. . . . Let me tell them that if they do not observe the limits and keep doing what they are doing, then the Hizbollah people will definitely come to sense their duty. Robin Wright, Testing the Limits of Cultural Freedom, CIVILIZATION, THE MAGAZINE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12.
58. Amnesty reports that "between 1979 and 1992 at least 200 Baha'is were reportedly executed and hundreds have been imprisoned and tortured because of their religious beliefs." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 37, at 8.
59. A recent report states that "[m]ore than 86,000 Iranians were arrested for 'social corruption' last year, while more than a million were warned about errant behavior." Robin Wright, Iran Embraces Paradoxes, if Not Western Culture, L.A. TIMES, 27 June 1995, World Report, at 1.
60. Reflecting on responses of different political groups to confessions, Iran scholar Abrahamian observed the following: To paraphrase Brecht, few worried when the regime went after the religious Left. More worried when it went after the Left in general. Yet more worried when it came after anyone suspected of subversion. It is no accident that it was in these later years [that] the intelligentsia discovered the importance of Koestler's Darkness at Noon - a work that in the past they had tended to dismiss as a worthless piece of Cold-War propaganda. Harsh experience had raised both social awareness and political consciousness. In the 1980's, public confessions helped legitimize and strengthen the Islamic Republic. By the 1990's, the same confessions and the means to obtain them threatened to delegitimize and weaken the Islamic Republic. Ervand Abrahamian, The Shadow of Law, Public Confessions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in RULES AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 223 (Ellis Goldberg et al. eds., 1993).
61. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 37, at 7.
62. "Extrajudicial executions" refers to those who were found dead under suspicious circumstances. Id. at 9.
63. JAMES AVERY JOYCE, THE NEW POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (1978). Mobilization of Shame is the title of a chapter.
64. HENRY MUNSON, JR., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 24 (1988).
65. Interview with the President Hashimi Rafsanjani, supra note 20, at 14.
66. Speech by Mohammad Javad Larijani at Tehran University, quoted in, IRAN TIMES (Wash.), 30 June 1995 (Quotable Notable), at 5. Larijani is one of the most active members of the Majlis' Foreign Relations Committee.
67. Marvin Zonis discussed a "second stratum" serving the Shah's state, "located structurally between the Shah and the non-elite." Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran: A Second Stratum? in POLITICAL ELITES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 195-96 (Frank Tachau ed., 1975).
68. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 10 (1990).
69. DARIUS M. REJALI, TORTURE AND MODERNITY: SELF, SOCIETY, AND STATE IN MODERN IRAN 5 (1994).
70. Id.
71. Frankfurtur Rundschau, Interview with Bazargan, 12 Jan. 1995 34 NASHRIYA-I HUQUQ-I BASHAR (1994). This is a publication of the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran, based in Germany. The League is often late in publishing the next, back-dated issue.
72. Interview with the President Hashimi Rafsanjani, supra note 20, at 14.
73. ETTELA'AT, INT'L ED (Tehran), 14 Feb. 1995.
74. Id. One such conference, Iran: Partner or Pariah, was scheduled at The Royal Institute of International Affairs, at Chatham House in London, 14 November 1995, with the same Deputy Foreign Minister as a main speaker. The focus was on oil, gas, and investment possibilities. The schedule included no discussion on human rights in Iran.
75. The Islamist rules seek political recognition, and this is transparent at every conference they organize. For example, some 200 outside academics, a few from the United States, attended what the regime propaganda organs termed "the first ever international gathering of Persian language scholars," held at Tehran University in early January 1996. The clerical president, Rafsanjani, opened the conference with a political theme, which was further elaborated by his technobureaucrats in their subsequent lectures to academics. A bad translation in an official newspaper quotes Rafsanjani as saying: Iran and the Persian language now shoulder a grave responsibility of conveying the message of Islam to the world. Although the first language of Islam was Arabic, Arabic speaking nations are not in a position to convey the message of Islam to the world. Islam is able to have its message heard by the world through Iran and the Persian language. The Persian language can be the language of diplomacy in the region and the world because of its high flexibility and its ability to tolerate [sic] the heavy burden of difficult scientific and technical contexts. President inaugurates Int'l congress of scholars of Persian language, literature, ETTELA'AT, INT'L ED. 4 Jan. 1996, English section, at 1. The next day, the minister for Culture and Higher Education, a Ph.D. technobureaucrat, called Persian the second language of the Islamic world. Farsi is the Second Language of the Islamic World, ETTELA'AT, INT'L ED. 5 Jan. 1996, at 2. Clerics often repeat such platitudes across the campus where Tehran's Friday Sermons take place. No doubt they think of their legitimizing effect when they deliver these platitudes to a gathering of "international scholars." The US scholars attending could hardly fail to perceive the manipulative aspect of this theme; yet, by their presence they help advance the regime's ploy for boosting its legitimacy, especially because no one could possibly dare to openly contradict this political characterization of the language. It is interesting to note that some secular Iranians uphold Persian as the language of Iranian identity, separate from Islam.
76. The Islamist rules seek political recognition, and this is transparent at every conference they organize. For example, some 200 outside academics, a few from the United States, attended what the regime propaganda organs termed "the first ever international gathering of Persian language scholars," held at Tehran University in early January 1996. The clerical president, Rafsanjani, opened the conference with a political theme, which was further elaborated by his technobureaucrats in their subsequent lectures to academics. A bad translation in an official newspaper quotes Rafsanjani as saying: Iran and the Persian language now shoulder a grave responsibility of conveying the message of Islam to the world. Although the first language of Islam was Arabic, Arabic speaking nations are not in a position to convey the message of Islam to the world. Islam is able to have its message heard by the world through Iran and the Persian language. The Persian language can be the language of diplomacy in the region and the world because of its high flexibility and its ability to tolerate [sic] the heavy burden of difficult scientific and technical contexts. President inaugurates Int'l congress of scholars of Persian language, literature, ETTELA'AT, INT'L ED. 4 Jan. 1996, English section, at 1. The next day, the minister for Culture and Higher Education, a Ph.D. technobureaucrat, called Persian the second language of the Islamic world. Farsi is the Second Language of the Islamic World, ETTELA'AT, INT'L ED. 5 Jan. 1996, at 2. Clerics often repeat such platitudes across the campus where Tehran's Friday Sermons take place. No doubt they think of their legitimizing effect when they deliver these platitudes to a gathering of "international scholars." The US scholars attending could hardly fail to perceive the manipulative aspect of this theme; yet, by their presence they help advance the regime's ploy for boosting its legitimacy, especially because no one could possibly dare to openly contradict this political characterization of the language. It is interesting to note that some secular Iranians uphold Persian as the language of Iranian identity, separate from Islam.
77. James W. Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 77, 78-79 (1993).
78. Id. at 86.
79. Id. at 80-81.
80. See Edward G. Shirley, Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future? FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1995, at 28, 31.
81. Amirahmadi, supra note 32, at 5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Those who advocate normalization whisper that "he asked for it," implying that he should have been less outspoken in defense of his freedom of expression and against the banning of his books.
84. REIALI, supra note 67. Ann Elizabeth Mayer also discusses the Islamic Republic's constitution in light of the human rights discourse. See ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS (1995).
85. John Waterbury, Social Science Research and Arab Studies in the Coming Decade, in THE NEXT ARAB DECADE: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 296 (Hisham Sharabi ed., 1988).
86. Reza Afshari, A Critique of Dabashi's Reconstruction of Islamic Ideology as a Prerequisite for the Islamic Revolution, CRITIQUE: J. CRITICAL STUD. IRAN AND MIDDLE EAST, 5, 67-83 (1994). Hamid Dabashi's Theology of Discontent is the most intelligent and comprehensive ideological study.
87. See generally 26 IRANIAN STUD., supra note 17.
88. Hossein Askari, It's Time to Make Peace with Iran, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, 50, 50.
89. James Bill, "Opening Remarks," The Clinton Administration and the Future of U.S.-Iran Relations, MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT (Special Iran Conference Issue) 5, 7 (1993).
90. Ramcharan, supra note 12, at 161.
91. Milani, Power Shifts in Revolutionary Iran, supra note 17, at 361.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 371.
95. The most significant comment Milani makes with regard to the political dynamics is a reference to Khomeini's successor as the supreme leader: Khamene'i had to move slowly and cautiously to consolidate his position, and he did. . . . [H]e kept intact Khomeini's large networks, assuring those in strategic posts that they would remain and that he would carry on Khomeini's ideological torch to the end; he made only a few appointments; and he stayed relatively neutral in the ongoing factional rivalry. Id. at 369.
96. Bahman Bakhtiari, Parliamentary Elections in Iran, in 26 IRANIAN STUD., supra note 17, at 375, 375.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 377-78.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 389.
101. Milani, The Roots and Characteristics of the Iranian Theocracy, supra note 36, at 10-11.
102. Those academics who advocate normalization all take such a narrow perspective in their evaluation. One example is Askari, supra note 85, at 52.
103. "All newspapers derive their funding from and serve as mouthpieces for the government, semi-autonomous foundations or influential clergy. . . . Newspapers nevertheless reflect widely divergent views on governance and policy, within the restricted paradigm of an Islamic government." MIDDLE EAST WATCH, GUARDIANS OF THOUGHT: LIMITS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN IRAN 35 (1993).
104. Milani, Power Shifts in Revolutionary Iran, supra note 17, at 359-74; James A. Bill, The Challenge of Institutionalization: Revolutionary Iran, in 26 IRANIAN STUD., supra note 17, at 403, 403-06.
105. Milani, Power Shifts in Revolutionary Iran, supra note 17, at 359-74; James A. Bill, The Challenge of Institutionalization: Revolutionary Iran, in 26 IRANIAN STUD., supra note 17, at 403, 403-06.
106. The economist Jahangir Amuzegar, minister of commerce and finance in the Shah's government, offers a cogent view of the intricate institutional procedure that preserves "a religious oligarchy" in Iran: At the apex of the political pyramid is the Supreme Leader (rahbar) who is the spiritual guide of the nation, the official head of state, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, as vali-e-faqih, the protector of the faith. He is constitutionally elected for life by the Assembly of Experts, who are elected by the people. But all candidates for the Assembly of Experts must first be approved by the 12-member Council of Guardians composed of six clerics (faqihs) and six lay jurists. The Council is the highest constitutional court of the realm; it has veto power over all legislation and supervisory responsibility over all elections. But half of the Council members are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the other half - the lay lawyers - are elected by the Majlis from among individuals nominated by the Chief Judge. The Chief Judge, however, is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader. And, Majlis deputies, who are to elect the six lay jurists, are men and women who, before standing for popular elections, must be pre-screened and approved for their religious and revolutionary qualifications by the Council of Guardians. In this merry-go-round all major players thus owe their positions to each other in one way or another. . . . The president of the republic, too, must first be anointed by the Council of Guardians, and, after popular elections, confirmed by the rahbar, who is elected by the Assembly of the Experts where the current president sits as vice-chairman. Jahangir Amuzegar, Islamic Fundamentalism in Action: The Case of Iran, IV MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 22, 26 (Sept. 1995). Human rights scholar Ann Mayer observes: Article 4 of the Iranian Constitution, quoted here, illustrates what Islamization meant for Iran's rights guarantees: "All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political laws and regulations, as well as any other laws or regulations, should be based on Islamic principles. This principle will in general prevail over all of the principles of the constitution, and other laws and regulations as well. Any judgment in regard to this will be made by the clerical members of the Council of Guardians." . . . As this article shows, it will be Islamic principles as determined by Islamic clerics (who, according to Article 110, are to be appointed by Iran's religious leader in his capacity as the leading jurist) that constitute the supreme law in Iran. In consequence, not even constitutional rights guarantees can have force should clerics, and in the Iranian context this inevitably means ones allied with the government, decide that those guarantees are not based on Islamic principles. MAYER, supra note 81, at 36.
107. One Islamist commentator deplores the decline of revolutionary vigor and egalitarian tendencies he attributes to the early days of the Islamic Revolution. He is saddened by the practice of certain individuals and groups who accuse officials of being tolerant of anti-Islamic cultural practices in order to force them out of their coveted positions in the government. He asserts that revolutionary values and Islamic cultural criteria for judgment will be debased if they are abused for personal gain. Abbas Abdi, Where is the Islamic Republic Heading, RESALAT (Tehran), reprinted in IRAN TIMES (Wash.), 22 Sept. 1995, at 8.
108. One Islamist commentator deplores the decline of revolutionary vigor and egalitarian tendencies he attributes to the early days of the Islamic Revolution. He is saddened by the practice of certain individuals and groups who accuse officials of being tolerant of anti-Islamic cultural practices in order to force them out of their coveted positions in the government. He asserts that revolutionary values and Islamic cultural criteria for judgment will be debased if they are abused for personal gain. Abbas Abdi, Where is the Islamic Republic Heading, RESALAT (Tehran), reprinted in IRAN TIMES (Wash.), 22 Sept. 1995, at 8.
109. Milani, The Roots and Characteristics of the Iranian Theocracy, supra note 36, at 11.
110. Gary Sick said that "[t]here is no viable political alternative to the present system. We may not like this regime, but we're going to have to live with it." Ellen Laipson et al., Symposium: U.S. Policy Toward Iran: From Containment to Relentless Pursuit? IV MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 1, 7 (Sept. 1995).
111. Ramcharan, supra note 12, at 160.
112. Report of the Special Representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl on the Islamic Republic of Iran, Commission on Human Rights, at 8, U.M. Doc. E/CD.4/1995/55 (1995).
113. James C. Scott's general remarks are equally applicable to the Islamist rulers: It is tempting to see displays and rituals of power as something of an inexpensive substitute for the use of coercive force or as an attempt to tap an original source of power and legitimacy that has since been attenuated. Effective display may, by conveying the impression of actual power and the will to use it, economize on the actual use of violence. SCOTT, supra note 66, at 48.
114. Again a general observation by James C. Scott is relevant: First, there is the visual impact of collective power that a vast assembly of subordinates conveys both to its own number and to its adversaries. Second, such an assembly provides each participant with a measure of anonymity or disguise, thereby lowering the risk of being identified. . . . Finally, if something is said or done that is the open expression of a shared hidden transcript [anticlericalism in our case], the collective exhilaration of finally declaring oneself in the face of power will compound the drama of the moment. Id. at 65-66. This is how the Shah's regime was brought down, and the Ayatollahs know this fact only too well.
115. Bill, supra note 101, at 403.
116. Id. at 404.
117. Id. at 405.
118. Id. at 408.
119. Gary Sick, Confronting Contradictions: The Revolution in Its Teens, in 26 IRANIAN STUD., supra note 17, at 407.
120. Id. at 408.
121. It is indeed peculiar for scholars of Iran to concentrate on the human rights record of Iraq. We would do well to keep in mind the principle used by Amnesty International in publicizing abuses: "Amnesty International does not rate countries according to their record on human rights; instead of attempting comparison Amnesty concentrates on trying to end the specific violations of human rights in each case." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1987-1990, front cover (1990).
122. Bill, supra note 101, at 408.
123. MIDDLE EAST WATCH, IRAN: ARREST OF "LOYAL OPPOSITION" POLITICIANS 3 (1990).
124. Bill, supra note 101, at 409.
125. More recently Amirahmadi has again expressed the views that correspond with those of the Islamist technobureaucrats: The political impact of this new approach [Clinton's new economic sanctions against Iran) will be even more harmful to larger American interests as it will strengthen radical Islamic forces in Iran at the expense of positive trends evolving in the country's domestic politics and international relations. . . . Despite its many ills, Iran is one of a few states in the region with an elected parliament and president. The Islamic Republic has given rise to a vibrant public sphere and plurality of voice. Intellectuals discuss Foucault and Marx in widely read journals, and the public openly criticize government policies. More power in the hands of President Hashimi Rafsanjani and his secular technocrats will expedite these positive changes. Hooshang Amirahmadi, U.S. Embargo is Counterproductive for Both Countries, IV IRAN BUS. MONITOR, June 1995, at 11. This journal is published by the Center for Iranian Trade and Development (Cited Inc.), and it pushes the line advocated by Iran's technobureaucrats, trying to attract businesses to Iran.
126. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 37.
127. This letter was published in 11 MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT, May-June 1995, at 4-5.
128. The only response that included a consideration of human rights came from a commentator outside of academia. Hushang Ansary included in his normalization plan a necessary first step for the Islamic Republic to bring about "the normalization of political life in Iran." Iran would have to take appropriale steps, in keeping with its constitution, to dismantle the bureaucracy it created to cope with the problems of the early years of the Islamic revolution. These steps should include the rehabilitation of those unjustly deprived of their civil rights on the basis of their political beliefs, the repeal of laws and regulations that discriminate on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity and faith, and the removal of restrictions . . . on freedom of expression, association and election. Hushang Ansary, Beyond the Great Satan: How the U.S. and Iran Can Mend Their Rift, WASH. POST, 9 July 1995, at C3.
129. Hooshang Amirahmadi, an activist supporter of the Islamist regime, is a board member of the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis. See Minutes of CIRA Business Meeting, 10 CIRA BULL., Spring 1995, at 6, 6-7.
130. Some even compare Iran to Saudi Arabia, a country with very few historical, demographic, and societal similarities. See Askari, supra note 85. The same author observes that "Iranian institutions and respect for human rights may not live up to Western ideals, but they are years ahead of their neighbors." Id. at 51.
131. See, for example, the Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/50 (1994) and the Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/44 (1993), both of which were prepared or submitted by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl.
132. See, for example, the Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/50 (1994) and the Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/44 (1993), both of which were prepared or submitted by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl.
133. See supra note 32.
134. Amirahmadi, supra note 32, at 5-12.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Andrew Whitley, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Media, in US-IRAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF TENSION AND MUTUAL INTEREST, supra note 32, at 37, 38.
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id.
141. DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 14.
142. See Zubaida, supra note 23.