Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 183-205

  Cressman, R ^a  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

evolutionary dynamics; extensive form games; Subgame monotone

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007264418     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0767     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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