Evolutionary equilibria: Characterization theorems and their implications

Theory and Decision

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 99-159

  Bendor, Jonathan ^a   Swistak, Piotr ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionarily stable strategies; Evolutionary equilibria; Evolutionary game theory; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD); Tit For Tat (TFT)

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007212451     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005083323183     Document Type: Article

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