Ultimatum decision-making: A test of reciprocal kindness

Theory and Decision

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 151-177

  Dickinson, David L ^a  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiments; Fairness; Reciprocity; Ultimatum Bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007180856     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005274316908     Document Type: Article

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