One share-one vote and the market for corporate control

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 20, Issue C, 1988, Pages 175-202

  Grossman, Sanford J ^a   Hart, Oliver D ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007043402     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90044-X     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Defensive stock purchases
2. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock
3. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm
4. On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests
5. Corporate control transactions
6. Voting in corporate law
7. Appraisal remedy in corporate law
8. One share/one vote and the market for corporate control
9. Takeover bids the free-rider problem and the theory of corporation
10. The costs and benefits of ownership A theory of vertical and lateral integration
11. Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules
12. Corporate control contests and capital structure
13. Squeeze-out mergers in Delaware: The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
14. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure
15. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence
16. Economic evaluation of voting power of common stock
17. Ownership structure and control: The mutualization of stock life insurance companies
18. The economics of any-or-all, partial, and two-tier tender offers
19. Large shareholders and corporate control