Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: An empirical analysis of UK mergers

Applied Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 11, 1997, Pages 1465-1475

  Weir, Charlie ^a  

^a ROBERT GORDON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007005483     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/000368497326291     Document Type: Article

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