Induced preferences, dynamic consistency and Dutch books

Economica

Volumn 64, Issue 255, 1997, Pages 471-481

  Kelsey, David ^a   Milne, Frank ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006685648     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00091     Document Type: Article

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