The native American graves protection and repatriation act: A benefit and a burden, refining NAGPRA's cultural patrimony definition

International Journal of Cultural Property

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 229-244

  Goldman, Dawn Elyse ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0006521088     PISSN: 09407391     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0940739199770682     Document Type: Article

References (172)

1. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (1994).
2. See Illegal Trafficking in Native American Human Remains and Cultural Items, 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b) (1994);
3. Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 Arizona State Law Journal 35, 73 (1992).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (3)(D).
5. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(4) (1997);
6. Trope and Echo-Hawk, C.F.R, at 70.
7. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994);
8. Trope and Echo-Hawk, U.S.C, at 40.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b). For the purpose of this paper, “Indian tribe” or “tribe” is defined as “a tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native Village … which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”
10. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (7) (1994).
11. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (1994) (defining Native American people as “of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States”).
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 101–877, at 10 (1990);
13. Trope and Echo-Hawk, H.R. Rep., at 60;
14. see also 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
15. See generally Amy Van Allen, Artifact Trade in U.S. (visited October 14, 1997) http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/TED/ARTIFACT.HTM (copy on file with author) (discussing illegal trade of Native American artifacts).
16. See H.R. Rep. No. 101–877, at 10;
17. see also 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (1994);
18. Trope and Echo-Hawk, U.S.C, at 60.
19. Telephone Interview with Phil Holstein, art dealer specializing in Native American art and artifacts (March 29, 1998) [hereinafter Holstein Interview].
20. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1170. A clear definition is critical because the act imposes criminal sanctions on violators.
21. 941 F. Supp. 1553 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd
22. 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
23. 119 F.3d at 802.
24. 941 F. Supp. at 1564;
25. Holstein Interview, F. Supp. (expressing that the Corrow court erred in finding NAGPRAs cultural patrimony definition constitutional).
26. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433.
27. See United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding the Antiquities Act constitutional and protecting masks excavated at prehistoric Mimbres ruin);
28. see also Sherry Hutt, Illegal Trafficking in Native American Human Remains and Cultural Items: A New Protection Tool, 24 Arizona State Law Journal 135, 135–40 (1992) (discussing goals of the Antiquities Act).
29. See Corrow, 941 F. Supp. at 1559;
30. Trope and Echo-Hawk, F. Supp., at 4243.
31. 499 F. 2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. Id. at 113 -117.
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1994).
34. See Native American Grave and Burial Protection Act (Repatriation)
35. Native American Repatriation of Cultural Patrimony Act
36. Heard Museum Report: Hearings on S. 1021 and S. 1980 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., 4–28 (1990) (statement of Keith Kintigh)
37. [hereinafter Senate Hearing Report 1990] (explaining that NAGPRA should protect and clarify what constitutes cultural patrimony).
38. One way to distinguish cultural patrimony from other objects may be to define cultural patrimony in part by also referring to it as material culture. James Deetz, In Small Things Forgotten: The Archeology of Early American Life 24 (Anchor Books 1977). Material culture refers to “that sector of our physical environment that we modify through culturally determined behavior.” Id. Material culture embodies people's identity and history.
39. See Robert H. Mclaughlin, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Issues Between Material Culture and Legal Definitions, 3 University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 767, 770 (1996).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm.
41. Id.
42. See Diaz, 499 F.2d at 113 (discussing the Antiquities Act's failure and establishing reason for Congress to amend its definitions);
43. Hutt, F.2d, at 140 (explaining that Congress enacted NAGPRA to refine certain definitions the Antiquities Act failed to define clearly).
44. Trope and Echo-Hawk, F.2d, at 43–44 (explaining that people trading Native American goods often obtained them illegally and placed them in museums to shield goods from tribes' repatriation claims). In addition to the religious property and sacred objects in museums, today “pothunters” enter the Native American lands to export illegally sacred objects.
45. See John E. Bersin, The Protection of Cultural Property and the Promotion of International Trade in Art, 13 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 125, 129–31 (1992) (giving an overview of art trade and export into private collections);
46. see also Francis P. Mc-Manamon and Larry V. Nordby, Implementing the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 24 Arizona State Law Journal 217, 218–22 (1992) (discussing art dealers selling and illegally exporting sacred objects).
47. Trope and Echo-Hawk, Arizona State Law Journal, at 44–45.
48. See Senate Hearing Report 1990
49. Senate Hearing Report, at 4–28 (proposing NAGPRA to protect tribes' culture and heritage);
50. Van Allen, Senate Hearing Report.
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (1994). Various state legislative attempts to protect unmarked graves and secure repatriation of various cultural items preceded Congress's enactment of NAGPRA.
52. See, e.g., Arizona Revised Statute §§ 41–844 (1992) (providing policies requiring repatriation of Native American cultural items and skeletal remains);
53. 1989 Hawaii Session Laws 316 (providing protection for Native American remains and cultural items);
54. Nebraska Revised Statute §§ 12–1209–10 (1990) (stating that state-recognized museums must repatriate Native American remains and cultural objects upon tribe's request).
55. H.R. Rep. No. 877 (1990)
56. reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367
57. S. Rep. No. 473, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3003(b)(1)(B) (1994);
59. McManamon and Nordby, U.S.C, at 235–236.
60. But see 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (8) (1994) (excluding the Smithsonian Institution from federally funded agencies and from NAGPRA's repatriation requirements);
61. The National Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80–15 (1994) (requiring the Smithsonian Institution to inventory and return funerary objects and culturally affiliated human remains).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 3002; § 3004; § 3006 (1994);
63. see also McManamon and Nordby, U.S.C, at 234.
64. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3003–3005
65. Trope and Echo-Hawk, U.S.C, at 61. The tribe may retrieve cultural items if it can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the tribe has a cultural affiliation with the item.
66. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (a)(1). NAGPRA provides that a statutorily created review committee must compile an inventory of culturally unidentifiable remains and cultural items and recommend specific actions for such items.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 3006.
68. 25 U.S.C. § 3002; § 3005;
69. see also Trope and Echo-Hawk, U.S.C, at 59.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
71. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D);
72. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1997).
73. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D);
74. S. Rep. No. 473, at 7.
75. S. Rep. No. 473, at 7–8 (1990).
76. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (b) (1994) (fining first-time violators $100,000 and imposing a jail sentence of up to one year for illegally trafficking cultural patrimony);
78. see Trope and Echo-Hawk, U.S.C, at 73.
79. NAGPRA subjects repeat offenders to a maximum of five years in jail and fines up to $250,000. Id. at 74
80. Hutt, U.S.C, at 140–141.
81. See generally Mclaughlin, U.S.C, at 786
82. Holstein Interview, U.S.C (expressing that NAGPRA is vague because it does not inform traders what Native American items they can trade).
83. United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd
84. 119 F. 3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997)
85. The facts of the case are presented in 119 F. 3d at 799–800.
86. A hataali is a ceremonial leader and medicine man. Winnie acquired the Yei B'Chei from a Navajo clan other than his own during his hataali apprenticeship. According to expert testimony, it is traditional to pass or loan the Ye i B'Chei from clan to clan. 119 F. 3d at 800.
87. 941 F. Supp. at 1555. Alfred Yazzie, Navajo medicine man, testified that ceremonial masks should be called Yei B'Chei or jish, but not masks, because Navajo people consider them living gods.
88. 119 F. 3d at 799–800 (explaining Corrow's argument that NAGPRA's ambiguity promotes law enforcement officers' broad discretion to assert illegal trafficking allegations);
89. see also Mark Smith, Collecting Indian Artifacts Can Be Illegal, Thanks to a Law Protecting Them, a Law Many Call To o Vague, Houston Chronicle, February 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3561552 (discussing NAGPRA's overly broad definitions granting law enforcement officers tremendous leeway in asserting that people have violated NAGPRA).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994);
91. see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.2 (1997).
92. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D); § 3002.
93. 119 F. 3d at 801–3.
94. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 3002;
95. McManamon and Nordby, U.S.C., at 233–234.
96. See also 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(4).
97. 119 F.3d at 801–2.
98. See generally United States v. Austin, 902 F.2d 743, 745 (10th Cir. 1990) (expressing the court's concern with possible vagueness of the law as it applied to the defendant in a criminal case and not to others).
99. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (1994); § 3002;
100. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. at 1561–1562 (court expected Corrow to investigate Yei B'Chei before trading them).
101. 119 F. 3d at 800–3.
102. Id. at 800–801.
103. See Smith, U.S.C.;
104. Holstein Interview, U.S.C. (stating that despite the Corrow decision, the NAGPRA definition of cultural patrimony remains vague).
105. Holstein Interview, U.S.C.
106. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D);
107. Holstein Interview, U.S.C.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (defining cultural patrimony);
109. see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.2 (1997).
110. Holstein Interview, C.F.R. (explaining that tribes take unfair advantage of traders under NAGPRA's vague definition). Recently, the Hopi tribe has taken the position that all the objects they use or create are cultural patrimony.
111. Smith, C.F.R.
112. Senate Hearing Report 1990, C.F.R., at 4–28;
113. Trope and Echo-Hawk, C.F.R., at 52.
114. Smith, C.F.R.;
115. Holstein Interview, C.F.R. (explaining that Native American tribes best know important items within their own heritage).
116. Smith, C.F.R.
117. (quoting Peter Schoenburg, Albuquerque attorney, “What you have is a law that is unconstitutionally vague, without direction or definition sufficient to provide notice to someone about what is criminal and not criminal”)
118. 119 F. 3d at 803.
119. Id. at 801.
120. See Epstein v. National Mach. Exch., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 260, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that a case-specific test avoids determining whether statute is vague to the ordinary person).
121. See, e.g.,Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Carlisle, 515 U.S. 532 (1994) (fact-specific tests lead to haphazard results because people violate statutes before litigation).
122. See generally Epstein, 966 F. Supp. at 261 (discussing drawbacks of case specific tests);
123. Int'l, Inc., v. United States, 956 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (arguing against case-specific tests).
124. Corrow, 941 F. Supp at 1556 (use of expert testimony to determine whether Yei B'Chei constitute cultural patrimony).
125. Holstein Interview, F. Supp.
126. Christine Gail Clark, The Sky is Falling: the ALI's Efficient Response to Courts in Crisis?, 1995 Brigham Young University Law Review 997, 1018 (1995) (discussing the problem of complex litigation overwhelming the court's capacity to handle caseloads efficiently);
127. Deborah R. Hensler and Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-legal Analysis, 59 Brooklyn Law Review 961, 979 (1993) (describing cases where unresolved issues will cause excessive litigation).
128. Smith, Brooklyn Law Review.
129. See also Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1030 (Ala. 1994) (selective prosecution denies equal protection of laws and violates due process);
130. Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals).
131. Smith, F.2d
132. Holstein Interview, F.2d
133. 941 F. Supp. at 1564.
134. Id.
135. Smith, F. Supp. (discussing the fact that some tribes view creation of a cultural patrimony list as nearly impossible because differences in tribal languages make it difficult to translate terms for cultural patrimony items consistently into English)
136. Holstein Interview, F. Supp. (NAGPRA needs amendment before it can effectively protect cultural patrimony). Art collectors and dealers support NAGPRA's intent, but they think it is overly broad and vague.
137. See Smith, F. Supp.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (b) (1994);
139. Corrow, 119 F.3d at 803 (establishing Corrow's punishment for illegally trafficking in cultural patrimony under § 1170(b)).
140. 941 F. Supp. at 1555.
141. See Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1030 (Ala. 1994) (selective prosecution denies equal protection of laws and violates due process);
142. Coleman v. Risley, 839 F. 2d 434, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) (disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals).
143. 119 F. 3d at 801. The conflicting opinions concerning Yei B'Chei, which were offered as expert testimony on Corrow's behalf, demonstrated that the inconsistent views among tribe members confused traders.
144. Senate Hearing Report 1990, F. 3d, at 4–28.
145. See Van Allen, F. 3d (Oct. 14, 1997) (discussing illegal trade of Native American artifacts and harsh effects tribes suffer when items they create to represent their tribe are illegally traded);
146. see also Smith, F. 3d (explaining that Hopi tribes view all items they create as representing the tribe's cultural heritage).
147. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994) (defining cultural patrimony using the words “central to the tribe's culture and heritage”);
148. James A. R. Nafziger, The New International Framework for the Return, Restitution, or Forfeiture of Cultural Property, 15 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 789, 807–8 (1983) (explaining that countries depend on cultural items to explain their heritage and encourage people to continue traditions).
149. See, e.g., UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, November 14, 1970
150. 823 U.N.T.S. 231
151. 10 I.L.M. 289
152. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. See generally Kurt Siehr, International Art Trade and the Law 101–8
153. (Extract from Recueil des cours, vol. 243) (1993) (discussing the UNESCO convention and other international agreements)
154. See Judith A. Rasson, Albania's Antiquities at Risk, Illyria No. 397, May 11–13, 1995, at 5 (describing the private collectors' business of buying cultural property to sell for profit);
155. see also Siehr, Illyria, at 244–45. Protection is afforded to cultural heritage for religious, patriotic, or even political reasons.
156. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1392–1400 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd
157. 917 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1990);
158. Bersin, F. Supp, at 135 (protecting cultural patrimony for religious, political, and patriotic reasons).
159. See Corrow, 119 F.3d at 800;
160. Eric Miller, Nineteenth-Century Items from Pueblo Sold Star Valley Man Charged in Trafficking, Arizona Republic, March 13, 1997, at A1 (discussing Rodney Tidwell's defense to illegal trafficking charges where Tidwell asserted that he did not believe he traded illegally because of lack of clarity in NAGPRA's definition of cultural patrimony);
161. Holstein Interview, Arizona Republic (discussing that NAGPRA is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to clearly define cultural patrimony and most people are left confused).
162. Holstein Interview, Arizona Republic (discussing ways NAGPRA can clearly define cultural patrimony).
163. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2 (1997).
164. Smith, Arizona Republic (stating that tribes benefit from protection when exercising their own discretion in deciding which cultural items may be certified and traded).
165. Holstein Interview, Arizona Republic (discussing amending NAGPRA).
166. 25 U.S.C. § 3006 (1994);
167. see also McManamon and Nordby, U.S.C. at 227. The review committee consists of seven members whose duties entail monitoring the repatriation activities and reviewing the inventory and identification process.
168. See 25 U.S.C. § 3006.
169. Holstein Interview, U.S.C. (discussing redefining NAGPRA to include trader-to-tribe contact).
170. see also Smith, U.S.C.
171. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 437 F.2d 16, 42 (1972) (proper notification to the public reduces violations of laws and unnecessary litigation).
172. Smith, F.2d.