Using disaster planning to optimize expenditures on financial safety nets

Atlantic Economic Journal

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 243-253

  Kane, Edward J ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006146426     PISSN: 01974254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02300546     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Hart, Oliver. "Different Approaches to Bankruptcy," discussion paper, 1903, Harvard University, 2000.
4. Kane, Edward J. "Designing Financial Safety Nets to Fit Country Circumstances," working paper, 2453, World Bank, 2000a.
5. _. "Dynamic Inconsistency of Capital Forbearance: Long-Run versus Short-Run Effects of Too-Big-to-Fail Policymaking," Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 2000b.
6. _. "Relevance and Need for International Regulatory Standards," Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 4, 2001.
7. Kaufman, George; Scott, Kenneth. "Does Bank Regulation Retard or Contribute to Systemic Risk?," working paper, 00-12-02, Loyola University, 2000.
8. Kaufman, George; Seelig, Stephen A. "Treatment of Depositors at Failed Banks: Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and Too Big to Fail," working paper, 00-12-01, Loyola University, 2000.
9. Laeven, Luc. "Banking Risks Around the World: The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach," working paper, 2473, World Bank, 2000.
10. Todd, Walker F. "Lessons from the Collapse of Three State-Chartered Private Deposit Insurance Funds," Economic Commentary Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 1994.