Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games

European Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 3-5, 1998, Pages 641-649

  Weibull, Jörgen W ^a,b  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Evolution; Game theory; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006050479     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00012-9     Document Type: Article

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