Cost manipulation games in oligopoly, with costs of manipulating

International Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 505-533

  van Long, Ngo ^a   Soubeyran, Antoine ^b  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005799527     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00119     Document Type: Article

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