Neocolonialism and neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 114, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 479-502

  Hanson, Margaret ^a   Hentz, James J ^b  

^a INSEAD   (France)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005797332     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2658207     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. See for example, David Gordon, "Debt Conditionality and Reform" in Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
2. By "ownership," we mean the political identification that a government or political party develops toward a set of policy ideas.
3. This point has been made repeatedly. See for example, Thomas Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market" in Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
4. This framework of analysis takes off from Miles Kahler's proposition that political conflict can erupt along at least three dimensions: content of programs, nationalist resentment at the intervention that is implied by conditionality, and the differential effects of conditionality on groups inside and outside the government. This article focuses largely on the first two dimensions of content and political framing of the reform programs, arguing that conflict along these two dimensions gives insight as to how political support aligns with respect to economic reforms. Miles Kahler, "External Influence, Conditionalily and the Politics of Adjustment" in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 89-136.
5. By referring to the "ownership of ideas" we want to highlight the importance of looking at policy ideas within their domestic support base, not solely as a function of external debates.
6. For a discussion of IFI conditionally, see Matthew Martin, "Neither Phoenix or Icarus" in Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In, 143-45.
7. According to World Bank sources, Zambia is categorized as "severely indebted low income," whereas South Africa is categorized as "less-indebted middle-income." See World Debt Tables, 1994-95 (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1994, 49-50). In 1992, Zambia's debt was estimated at $7.2 billion in 1991 and 6.3 billion in 1995 according to the Ministry of Finance (1995).
8. Economist, 28 October 1995, 48.
9. Authors' interview in Pretoria with P. J. Gloster, assistant general manager, Exchange Control, South African Reserve Bank, 23 November 1993.
10. "No Adam Smith Fans Here." Newsweek, 7 February 1994, 48.
11. Authors' interview, Bank of Zambia, 6 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
12. Authors' interviews with representatives of the donor community and the government of the Republic of Zambia, November-December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
13. See selections from Times of Zambia during January 1996.
14. "Zambia: Bargaining with the IMF," Africa Confidential, 28(23), 6-7.
15. "Zambia: Kaunda Tightens His Grip," Africa Confidential, 23 September 1988, 3.
16. Donors repeatedly cited problems with exchange rate and price liberalization. The Swedish development organisation, SIDA, argued, "the Zambian government plan has flaws," citing price controls and exchange rates as especially problematic. (Times of Zambia, 21 October 1987). The British and the Americans explicitly linked their disapproval with the GRZ to their going off the IMF program. (Times of Zambia, 22 October 1987).
17. Donors repeatedly cited problems with exchange rate and price liberalization. The Swedish development organisation, SIDA, argued, "the Zambian government plan has flaws," citing price controls and exchange rates as especially problematic. (Times of Zambia, 21 October 1987). The British and the Americans explicitly linked their disapproval with the GRZ to their going off the IMF program. (Times of Zambia, 22 October 1987).
18. Authors' interviews with members of the donor community, government officials, and former government officials in Lusaka, Zambia, November-December 1995.
19. "Zambia: Kaunda Tightens His Grip" and "Back to the IMF," Africa Confidential, 23 September 1988, 2-3.
20. Headlines taken from the Times of Zambia, 6 October 1986, 29 November 1986, and 5 January 1987.
21. "Zambia: Borrowing," Africa Confidential, 15 April 1987, 1.
22. Matthew Martin, The Crumbling Facade of Debt (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 53.
23. "Zambia: Actions and Auctions," Africa Confidential, 22 April 1987, 3-5.
24. For elaboration on the political reaction to economic crises, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Popular Protests and Political Reform in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Carol Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," Foreign Policy 85 (Winter 1991-92); and Nicolas van de Walle, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia," MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa, 15 November 1994.
25. For elaboration on the political reaction to economic crises, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Popular Protests and Political Reform in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Carol Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," Foreign Policy 85 (Winter 1991-92); and Nicolas van de Walle, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia," MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa, 15 November 1994.
26. For elaboration on the political reaction to economic crises, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Popular Protests and Political Reform in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Carol Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," Foreign Policy 85 (Winter 1991-92); and Nicolas van de Walle, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia," MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa, 15 November 1994.
27. "Zambia: Kaunda Still Going Strong," Africa Confidential, 18 November 1987, 7.
28. There is evidence of some policy learning having gone on in the civil service during the successive attempts at economic reform during the 1980s. For a brief discussion, see van de Walle, "Democratization."
29. Authors' interview, Bank of Zambia, 6 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
30. Headlines from the Times of Zambia, 6 May 1987, 21 May 1987, and 3 July 1987.
31. Times of Zambia, 13 September 1987.
32. "Zambia: Tightening up for New Term," Africa Confidential, 18 November 1988, 6-7.
33. Times of Zambia, 22 January 1988. Clearly, the story of normalizing relations between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the GRZ was much more complicated than making a proposal. It entailed building support in the donor community to assist in climbing out of the mounting arrears to the Bretton Woods Institutions, not to mention the technical capacity to do so.
34. "Zambia: Bargaining with the IMF," Africa Confidential, 18 November 1987, 6.
35. For example, Chigaga, Kaunda's political adviser and later minister of finance, was instrumental in urging Kaunda's rapprochement with the IMF. Authors' interview, former government official, 22 November 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
36. The RAP was successfully completed in December 1995, and an ESAF agreement signed, which cleared GRZ arrears to the IMF.
37. MMD Manifesto, published by the Campaign Committee, MMD, Lusaka, Zambia, 1995, 1.
38. "Zambia: Government Presents Economic Plans to Donors," Inter Press News Service, 6 December 1991.
39. Authors' interview, Emmanuel Kasonde, minister of finance (1991-1993), November 1995.
40. "Zambia: The Model Democracy Loses its Shine," Africa Confidential, 14 May 1993, 1-3.
41. Economic adviser to President Kaunda and to President Chiluba, 5 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
42. Authors' interview, founding member of the MMD, 6 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
43. Economic adviser to President Kaunda and to President Chiluba, 5 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
44. "Zambia: All Change but No Change," Africa Confidential, 3 July 1992, 5-6.
45. MMD Manifesto, 1995.
46. Authors' interviews, former member of GRZ candidate and MP, 20 November 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
47. Authors' interview, Zambian adviser, 21 November 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.
48. Authors' interview, T. Malan, economist, Central Economic Advisory Service, 18 March 1994. Malan pointed out that in fact the document was accompanied with a disclaimer stating that it was not an NP policy document.
49. Greta Steyn, "MERG Poses Serious Challenge to Govt's Economic Model," Business Day (Johannesburg), 1 December 1993.
50. We refer to the former as the RDP, and the latter as the MERG Report.
51. The ANC had a more conservative and more liberal faction engaged in what one South Africa newspaper called, "A Battle Royal for the Economic Soul of the ANC." Greyta Steyn, "A Battle Royal for the Economic Soul of the ANC," Business Day, 17 November 1993.
52. Steyn, "MERG Poses Serious Challenge to Govt's Economic Model."
53. For a general review of the early debate in South Africa over the appropriate role of the IFIs in postapartheid-South Africa, see Leslie Lipschitz, "Review of the Debate on the Prospective Role of the IMF and World Bank" in Pauline Baker, Alex Boraine, Warren Krafchik, eds., South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1993), 212-217.
54. Desmond Lachman and Kenneth Bercuson, Economic Policies for a New South Africa: Occasional Paper 91 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, January 1992), vii.
55. World Bank, An Economic Perspective on South Africa (Washington, DC: Southern Africa Department, The World Bank, May 1993), foreword.
56. Kelvin Brown, "Govt. Should Spur Demand," Business Day (Johannesburg), 17 November 1994, 3.
57. Ketso Gordhan, "Should South Africa Get Involved with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank" in What Has the IMF in Store for South Africa, Proceedings of a Symposium on 27th and 28th July 1981 at the Soweto College of Education, 8.
58. ANC, "Reconstruction and Development Programme," Draft: for Discussion Purposes Only, For ANC Regions and Departments Only, 17 February 1994, 74.
59. Alan Hirsch, Trading Up: Towards a Trade Policy for Industrial Growth in South Africa, Industrial Strategy Project Draft Final Report (Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, August 1993), 54-55.
60. Central Economic Advisory Service, The Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative Model Approach (NEM) (Pretoria, March 1993), 4. In stark contrast, the RDP states, that "The pressure of the world economy and the operations of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and GATT, affect our neighbors and South Africa in differing ways."
61. World Bank, "An Economic Perspective," 10.
62. NEM, 29.
63. Lachman and Bercuson, "Economic Policies," 14.
64. World Bank, "An Economic Perspective," 6.
65. NEM, 6.
66. Ibid., 123.
67. Sven Lunsche, "Paycut Will Boost Jobs Claims IMF," Sunday Times/Business Times (Johannesburg), 27 March 1994; World Bank, "Economic Perspective," 13.
68. Sven Lunsche, "Paycut Will Boost Jobs Claims IMF," Sunday Times/Business Times (Johannesburg), 27 March 1994; World Bank, "Economic Perspective," 13.
69. MERG Report, 152-153.
70. Ibid., 40.
71. Ibid., 152.
72. Marina Ottaway, South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), 48.
73. Jeffrey Herbst, "South Africa: Economic Crisis and Distributional Imperative" in Stephen John Stedman, ed., South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 33.
74. "Policy Plan Omits Forced Unbundling: Merg Proposes Antitrust Caution," Business Day (Johannesburg), 6 December 1993.
75. RDP, 46.
76. Simon Barber, "World Bank Takes a Delicate Approach to South Africa," Business Day (Johannesburg), 7 December 1993.
77. MERG Report, 25.
78. The MERG Report, 71, for instance, argues that the government in the past has focused much too much on inflation.
79. Lachman and Bercuson, "Economic Policies," 16.
80. Eric Jankowitz, "Cheap Labour is no Panacea Says Shilowa," Business Day (Johannesburg), 2 December 1993.
81. Ibid. The Asian Tiger scenario has in the mainstream been associated with the neoliberalism of the IFIs and thus acts as a code-word for IFI policy.
82. Claire Gebhardt, "Bankers under the Whip," The Star (Johannesburg), 4 February 1994.
83. "COSATU Bites the IMF Hand," Business Times (Johannesburg), 31 October 1993.
84. Patti Waldmeis, "A New Nation Takes Shape," Business Day (Johannesburg), 22 November 1993.
85. "State Intervention to Help Business," Business Day (Johannesburg), 15 February 1994.
86. Sven Lunsche, "An Underground Struggle," The Star (Johannesburg), 12 February 1994.
87. Kevin Davie, "Economic Freedom Paves Way to Success," Sunday Times, Business Times (Johannesburg), 6 March 1994.
88. Simon Barber, "World Bank Takes a Delicate Approach to SA," Business Day, 7 December 1993.
89. "Profile: The Economic Team," Financial Times (London), 18 July 1994.
90. Ibid. Alec Erwin, who represented COSATU on the National Economic Forum (NEF), and became deputy finance minister in the new government, had earlier stated: "We do not accept a simple macro-economic formula, such as the IMF's labour elasticity model, in assessing job growth in SA." Sunday Times/Business Times, 27 March 1994, 3.
91. Associated Press, 24 May 1994.
92. Ibid., 9 June 1994.
93. Reuters, 23 June 1994.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., 27 August 1995.
96. Economist, 6 May 1995, 67.
97. Claire Gebhardt, "ANC Allays Fears," The Star, 31 March 1994.
98. Neil Behrmann, "Inkatha Accord Cheers Investors," The Star, 21 April 1994.
99. Willie Esterhuyse of the University of Stellenbosch argued, for instance, that it was just a necessary administrative move for greater efficiency. "What Happened to the Reconstruction and Development Programme," 28 June 1996, mimeo.
100. The ANC had always argued for development with growth. The connotation, however, was that development was the focus and would be promoted through state-initiated demand-led growth.
101. Issues: A View of South African Political Trends (Johannesburg: Communications Services, June 1996), 5. This policy shift was evident as early as mid-1995, when Mbeki and others had concluded that economic growth was more important than growth and redistribution. See Esterhuyse, "What Happened," 2.
102. Reuters, 11 June 1996.
103. Patti Waldmeir, "Trade Unions Are Changing," Financial Times (London).
104. Jovial Rantao, "COSATU's Influence to Grow- Expert," The Star, 3 February 1994.
105. Thomas Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria" in Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Policy and Policy Choice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
106. In wake of the recent successful Consultative Group Meeting and conclusion of the RAP with the IMF, the incumbent minister of finance has been trying to gather political capital out of the successful agreement, unleashing large amounts of aid and new loans from the IMF. However, emerging opposition parties have also been trying to build political capital by portraying the current government as puppets of the donors. Times of Zambia, January, 1996; The Weekly Post, January 1996.
107. In wake of the recent successful Consultative Group Meeting and conclusion of the RAP with the IMF, the incumbent minister of finance has been trying to gather political capital out of the successful agreement, unleashing large amounts of aid and new loans from the IMF. However, emerging opposition parties have also been trying to build political capital by portraying the current government as puppets of the donors. Times of Zambia, January, 1996; The Weekly Post, January 1996.