Group size, memory, and interaction rate in the evolution of cooperation

Current Anthropology

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 369-377

  Cox, S J ^a   Sluckin, T J ^a   Steele, J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005722697     PISSN: 00113204     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2991405     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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