Asset specificity, unionization and the firm’s use of debt

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 255-269

  Cavanaugh, Joseph K ^a   Garen, John ^b  

^a WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005291079     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199705)18:3<255::AID-MDE820>3.0.CO;2-R     Document Type: Article

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